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Abstract
This analysis provides evidence regarding the performance of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) in Europe during a time of dramatic change. For the sample of 973 IPOs taken 
from the six major Continental European markets and Sweden during 1988-98, there is 
significant underpricing and autocorrelation in IPO underpricing and activity. 
Privatization programs account for most of the “money left on the table”. For the 
sample as a whole, we do not find long-run underperformance. Over shorter 
measurement horizons, IPOs outperform the market. The favourable performance is 
driven by New Economy IPOs, which account for 28 percent of the sample. The 
pervasiveness of these results across various methodological choices is puzzling and 
shows one of the forces behind the dramatic shift in industry composition of IPOs in 
favour of New Economy IPOs during the “Internet Bubble” o f 1999 and 2000. 
Underpricing extends across all countries studied, with IPO activity being partially 
influenced by changes in tax regimes or in the regulatory framework. There is also a 
strong link between IPO performance and the national exchanges’ ability to attract New 
Economy IPOs. This fundamentally explains why stock exchanges have attempted to 
establish “New Market” segments during the 1990s. Tests for performance differences 
between countries confirm the homogeneity of the European IPO market. In order to 
shed more light on the results, we study the relationship between management 
behaviour towards earnings management and the subsequent market response for the 
German IPO market. When applying two forms of earnings management, issuers that 
overperform in the long-run tend to manage earnings less aggressively. Over shorter 
measurement horizons, however, the performance is sensitive to the starting date of the 
measurement period. The market takes a considerable amount of time to respond to the 
fundamental message conveyed by management behaviour towards earnings 
management. Within the first four months, IPO returns are essentially driven by factors 
other than fundamentals. Apart from casting doubt on the efficiency of the IPO 
aftermarket, this can explain the observed negative relationship between short- and 
long-run IPO returns and the rationale behind investing in IPOs.
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Chapter I 
Introduction
DURING THE ELEVEN-YEAR PERIOD between 1988-1998, almost 1,000 
companies raised a total of €126.6 billion on the seven major European markets, 
excluding the UK. This figure, when compared to the number o f already listed 
companies in Europe as well as to the US, is considerably large and shows the growing 
significance of the European marketplace for issuers, investors and underwriters.1 It 
also demonstrates the declining cultural aversion of entrepreneurs and investors to the 
stock market. The large number o f firms “going public” include well-known companies 
in a variety of industries such as Adidas AG, a sportswear company famous for its 
three-stripe logo, France Telecom SA, a leading telecommunications company, or 
SAP AG, the world’s third largest software company measured by market 
capitalization. This development has allowed us to investigate the phenomena 
associated with Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from the perspective of other, non 
Anglo-Saxon countries, where stock markets play an increasingly crucial role in 
company financing.
In the US, a large body o f empirical and theoretical research has focused on 
phenomena associated with IPOs. Such phenomena concern, for example, abnormal 
initial returns, whereby the first market price is on average significantly higher than the 
offering price. This adjustment is typically interpreted as evidence of “underpricing” o f 
IPOs (e.g., Ibbotson (1975), Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) or Ritter and Welch 
(2002)). Another observed anomaly associated with IPOs is the “hot issue”
1 Ritter and Welch (2002) report that during the same period 3,872 firms raised a total of $237.9 billion in 
the US.
phenomenon, whereby the observed issuing activity exhibits significant, recurring, and 
to some extent predictable variations over time (Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984) 
or Lowry and Schwert (2002)). The facet that has attracted most academic interest is the 
aftermarket performance of IPOs. IPOs seem, on average, to perform poorly in the long- 
run (Stoll and Curley (1970), Ritter (1991) or Brav and Gompers (1997)). Their poor 
stock price performance is reportedly also accompanied by poor operating performance, 
post-IPO relative to pre-IPO (Jain and Kini (1994)), and by an overly aggressive 
management of earnings during the IPO year (Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998)).
One key question that is the starting point for a number of further considerations 
is how these phenomena relate to companies going public in Continental Europe and 
Sweden during 1988 and 1998. We address this question in three independent, yet 
complimentary, research projects from three different geographical perspectives taking 
into account various methodological choices. These research projects form the core of 
the following empirical analysis o f European IPO markets.
In Chapter II, “The Cross-Section o f  European IPO Returns”, our motivation is 
to study the phenomena associated with IPOs from a pan-European perspective. Here, 
we pool the data from a set of 973 European IPOs between 1988 and 1998. By taking a 
pan-European perspective, we are able to investigate a large enough sample of IPOs that 
stretch beyond the rising markets of the late 1990s. The sample is interesting because 
European IPOs, unlike IPOs in the US, come from a broad mix of industries with a 
potentially different rational behind the going public decision.
In this chapter, we first review the theoretical literature on the IPO phenomena. 
We then present the data and empirical methodology that is needed to shed light on how
2 Helwege and Liang (2001) find that US IPOs from 1982-93 are largely concentrated in die same narrow 
set of high-tech industries. Interestingly, Ritter (2001) reports that the median age of US IPOs in 2001 
was 12 years, the highest in any year since 1980. Because this starts to resemble our sample mix, this 
analysis may provide a useful guide for US practitioners.
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some of those phenomena relate to European IPOs. In the first part of the empirical 
analysis, we study the underpricing phenomenon. Second, we show how European IPOs 
have performed in the aftermarket. Because we are particularly interested in the 
dynamics of aftermarket performance, we report absolute and relative returns over a 
variety o f methodological choices and also for IPOs issued in “hot” and “cold” markets. 
Finally, we study how the sample of European IPOs perform based on a set of issuing 
characteristics over various measurement horizons and market conditions.
For the sample of European IPOs, we find considerable underpricing which is 
time-varying and related to company characteristics. IPOs offered in “hot” markets are 
substantially more underpriced than IPOs offered in “cold” markets. There is also 
significant autocorrelation in IPO underpricing and activity. This is higher for firms in 
the New Economy. Much of the large “amounts of money left on the table” can be 
explained by the influence of privatization issues with an arguably different rationale for 
underpricing. For the sample as whole, we find that IPOs did not underperform in the 
long-run. This underlines the more recent US evidence which argues that poor long-run 
IPO performance is a time-varying phenomenon. Over short measurement horizons we 
find significant absolute and relative overperformance. IPOs offered in “hot” markets 
have the best relative and absolute performance whereas IPOs offered in “cold” markets 
fare worst. These results are pervasive and extend across sampling periods and 
measurement horizons. Our findings also underline significant differences in IPO 
performance in sub-groups of the sample. There is particularly strong support for 
signaling theories that postulate a negative relationship between the size of the public 
float and aftermarket performance. A notion, which runs through the whole analysis and 
is reflective of global equity markets in the 1990s, concerns the influence o f the New 
Economy. We find that the favourable performance of the sample as a whole is driven
10
by New Economy IPOs, which account for 28 percent of the sample as a whole. The 
pervasiveness of this performance across time and measurement horizons sheds some 
light on the drivers behind the dramatic shift in industry composition of IPOs in favor of 
New Economy IPOs during the “Internet Bubble” of 1999 and part of 2000.
In Chapter III, “Initial Public Offerings: Insights from seven European 
countries”, we extend the evidence by studying European IPOs from the perspective of 
seven individual countries: Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland. The major purpose of this chapter is to study the robustness o f the 
phenomena associated with IPOs by applying a common empirical framework to each 
European country. By extending our analysis to the individual countries, we improve 
our understanding about the potential drivers o f the IPO performance patterns as well as 
the homogeneity of the European IPO market.
We first provide a detailed overview o f the institutional arrangements in the 
individual European IPO markets under study, describe the data and review the existing 
empirical literature from the individual countries. By using a variety o f empirical 
measurement techniques, we then present the evidence on underpricing and long-run 
performance. We also study time-series and cross-sectional performance patterns in 
individual European countries and perform a number o f robustness checks for the 
significance of country-by-country differences.
The findings show that the underpricing phenomenon, while time-varying, is a 
consistent feature across all the countries under study. Our results also underline the 
effect of changes in tax regimes (in the case of France and Sweden) or the regulatory 
framework (in the case of Spain) on pricing and IPO activity. Evidence on long-run 
performance of IPOs in the individual European countries suggests that 
underperformance is a time-varying phenomenon and sensitive to benchmark
11
adjustment and measurement period. When performing significance tests of 
performance differences between the individual countries, we can generally confirm the 
similarity of the patterns for the sample as a whole as well as in the cross-section of the 
returns. This evidence underlines the homogeneity of the European IPO market. Finally, 
we find a pervasive link between the performance of IPOs and the exchanges’ ability to 
attract IPOs from the New Economy. This helps to shed some light on the rationale 
behind the big efforts made by stock exchanges across Europe to establish “New 
Market” segments during the 1990s.
Further, this study underlines the general impression that long-horizon return 
studies can yield bizarre results. This is reinforced in our work which demonstrates that 
results can be interpreted differently depending on the experimental setting, therefore 
underlining recent simulation results in the academic literature.
Chapter IV, “Management Behaviour and Market Response”, joint with Jinhui 
Luo, studies a set of 126 companies going public between 1988 and 1997 in Germany, 
with the aim of broadening our understanding o f several unexplored issues relating to 
IPOs. Here, we examine the relationship between management behaviour towards 
earnings management and aftermarket performance in the German market.
By applying a similar measuring specification as found in the US literature, we 
first test the relationship between management behaviour, proxied by the aggressiveness 
of using discretionary current accruals and income smoothing, and aftermarket IPO 
performance. We then deviate from this benchmark measuring specification to test 
whether the IPO market is informationally efficient in the sense that management 
behaviour can be efficiently inferred by the market. We also go beyond the prior work 
in the literature to examine further the relationship between the two forms of earnings 
management and test how the market responds to their interaction. Finally, we combine
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the typical empirical IPO methodology of Ritter (1991) and the framework o f 
discretionary current accruals and income smoothing to examine the driving sources o f 
the dynamics of aftermarket IPO performance.
The results show that managers of IPO firms tend to use discretionary current 
accruals to buoy up earnings during the IPO year and, to some extent, manage a firms’ 
income. The long-run performance of German IPOs is related to such earnings 
management behaviour. The firms that use discretionary accruals more conservatively 
during the IPO year and the firms that smooth their reported income more, outperform 
their counterparts in the long-run. Moreover, we find that the two commonly identified 
earnings management strategies in IPOs are not deterministic, yet complementary. In 
the long-run, firms that use discretionary current accruals during the IPO year more 
conservatively also tend to smooth their reported income more. The firms undertaking 
both strategies outperform the market and other IPOs that only apply any one of the two 
strategies. We also find that the relationship between IPO aftermarket performance and 
the strategic earnings reporting behaviour documented in the literature is sensitive to 
both measurement horizon and starting date. Ironically, firms managing their earnings 
more opportunistically perform better than those managing their earnings more 
conservatively when performance is measured from a date closer to the IPO and when 
measured over short horizons. This sheds some light on the pervasive influence of the 
New Economy. Finally, we show that the market takes a considerable time to 
incorporate fundamentals into IPO prices. During this period, fundamental information 
about the IPO has weak explanatory power for long-run performance suggesting that the 
returns in the immediate IPO aftermarket are dominated by factors other than 
fundamentals. After a period o f learning, the market starts to respond and the power of
13
fundamentals to explain long-run IPO returns increases substantially. This sheds light 
on the negative relationship between the short- and long-run dynamics in IPO returns.
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Chapter II
The Cross-Section of European IPO Returns 
1 Introduction
The academic literature on Initial Public Offering (IPOs) has grown rapidly over the 
past decade. Much of this literature has focused on documenting and explaining 
empirical patterns associated with the phenomena surrounding IPOs: underpricing, “hot 
issue” markets, and long-run underperformance. The patterns and models that try to 
explain them are mostly from an American perspective whereas the European 
marketplace has received considerably less attention.
In this chapter, we seek to close this gap by extending the international evidence 
on IPOs to include 973 companies which went public on the six largest Continental 
European markets and Sweden between 1988 and 1998. The extension of empirical IPO 
work to a pan-European scale responds to a number o f fundamental developments 
during the past decade which have shaped European stock markets. First, throughout 
the 1990s, the European IPO market has developed as one of the cornerstones of the 
worldwide IPO market. This has been fostered either by privatization programs 
introducing “equity culture” to the Continental European marketplace, by initially 
highly successful stock exchange segments catering to companies in high-growth 
industries, or by the convergence of listing requirements, reporting rules and pricing 
mechanisms across Europe. Within this setting, European IPO activity has overtaken 
US IPO activity. During the late 1990s, more companies went public and more fUnds 
were raised by companies on the European market segments than in the US. Second,
3 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) provide a comprehensive coverage of the theory, empirical evidence, 
international patterns and institutional practices.
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European integration has been at work for some time now, and the changes brought 
about by the introduction of the European single currency and the adoption of a 
common monetary policy have resulted in a dramatic change in portfolio allocation
decisions. As the barriers to cross-border investing have declined, it has become
/
increasingly important for issuers and investors alike to evaluate the European market 
from the perspective of a full set of available opportunities across countries. One of 
those consequences has been the rise of pan-European sector analysis at the expense of 
individual country analysis.
By taking a pan-European perspective, we are able to investigate the performance 
patterns of a large enough sample of IPOs over a period that stretches beyond the rising 
markets of the late 1990s. This allows us to shed more light on the generality of the 
empirical patterns and theoretical foundations associated with IPOs. In this respect, 
some issues are of particular interest.
Our first objective is to study the underpricing phenomenon for European IPOs. 
Here, we are interested in whether initial returns are time-varying and related to 
company characteristics. We are also interested in studying the relation between short- 
run and long-run IPO returns because institutional arrangements in the IPO aftermarket 
that are unrelated to fundamentals seem to affect IPO price dynamics. These 
institutional arrangements include short-selling restrictions (Geczy, Musto and Reed 
(2002)), the “quiet period” (Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2002)), aftermarket stabilization 
through price support (Aggarwal (2002)) and the expiration of the “lock-up” period 
(Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi, (2001)). Recent studies show that IPO 
underperformance is a time-varying phenomenon (Gompers and Lemer (2001)) or 
disappears in sub-sample analysis (Brav and Gompers (1997)). We study how European 
IPO returns relate to this evidence. Finally, the sample period has also been
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characterized by unprecedented changes in global economies caused by the increasing 
role o f technology, the effects of which are still subject to intense debate (Gordon 
(2000)). This has had a dramatic impact on the composition of equity indices in general, 
and the nature of companies seeking an IPO in particular. We are interested in finding 
out whether the performance patterns of European IPOs mirror this change.
In this respect we make a number o f interesting observations that appear robust 
across various methodological choices:
(1) For the sample o f 973 European IPOs offered between 1988 and 1998, we 
find considerable underpricing which is time-varying and related to proxies of 
uncertainty, such as age or sector. There is a large discrepancy between the 
mean and median amount of “money left on the table” which is due to the 
impact of large privatizations.
(2) For the sample as a whole we do not find long-run underperformance. This is 
consistent with Gompers and Lemer’s (2001) conjecture that long-run IPO 
underperformance is a time-varying phenomenon. Over the short-run, there is 
significant absolute and relative overperformance. This result supports the 
growing literature that addresses the effect of institutional practices on the 
IPO return dynamics (Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002)).
(3) IPOs offered in “hot” markets, during which the general market is generally 
rising and which have the highest initial return, are associated with the best 
absolute and relative IPO performance. IPOs offered in “cold” markets, 
where underpricing is lower and stock markets are either stable or falling, 
experience poorer absolute and relative aftermarket performance. For the 
sample as a whole, this does not necessarily indicate that European IPOs
17
issued in “hot” markets were aggressively priced in order to take advantage 
of “windows of opportunity”.
(4) The study emphasizes the significant difference in IPO performance of sub­
groups of IPOs (Brav and Gompers (1997)). There is strong evidence to 
support the fact that aftermarket performance is positively related to 
underpricing and negatively related to the size of the public float. Moreover, 
the relatively favourable aftermarket performance throughout the sample 
period is driven by New Economy IPOs, which account for 28 percent of the 
sample on average. This can help to explain the dramatic shift in industry 
composition of IPOs towards New Economy IPOs during the “Internet 
Bubble” of 1999 and 2000.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical 
anomalies associated with IPOs and surveys some of the main theories that try to 
explain them. The data, sample and methodology are described in Section 3. In Section 
4, we turn to the examination of initial and aftermarket performance. Here, we also 
study aftermarket performance when categorized according to issuing characteristics. 
Regression results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the chapter and 
discusses the significance of our findings in order to help to explain recent events.
2 Patterns in IPOs
2.1 Initial Pricing
One observed pattern in IPOs concerns the existence of abnormal initial returns, 
whereby the first market price is on average significantly higher than the offering price. 
This adjustment is usually interpreted as evidence of IPO underpricing. Over the years, 
a large body of literature has documented the underpricing phenomenon (Logue (1973),
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Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984), Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988)). In a recent study, 
Ritter and Welch (2002) find an average first-day return of 18.8 percent when looking at 
6,240 US IPOs issued between 1980 and 2001. The underpricing phenomenon has also 
been documented internationally (Loughran and Ritter (1995)).
A number of papers reviewing the theoretical literature classify the theories o f 
underpricing based on whether the information between issuer, underwriter and 
different groups of investors is assumed to be symmetric or not. The underwriter plays a 
particularly crucial role. It performs three main functions: underwriting, advising and 
distribution. Owing to the potentially conflicting incentives offered by these functions, 
underwriters may face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of underpricing. On the 
one hand, for instance, underpricing may lower both the risk that the issue fails as well 
as the efforts in marketing. On the other hand, since underwriting fees are typically 
proportional to gross floatation proceeds, and thus negatively related to the degree of 
underpricing, investment banks should have an incentive to minimize underpricing. 
Because of the important role of an investment bank in practice, we divide the theories 
related to underpricing into two sections on the premise that explanations related to the 
underpricing phenomenon assume a more passive or active role of the underwriter.4 It 
must be noted that many of the underpricing theories are not mutually exclusive.
2.1.1 Theories assuming a passive role o f  the underwriter
Winner’s Curse
One model, in which underwriters act primarily as passive agents for the issuing 
firm, has been developed by Rock (1986). His winner’s curse hypothesis explains the
4 The recent literature on IPO underpricing focuses on the institutional aspects of underpricing and the 
role of the underwriter. In particular, the theory and evidence concerning the allocation of shares has 
stimulated a large number of papers. See Ritter and Welch (2002) for a literature survey.
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underpricing phenomenon in terms of information asymmetry among the different 
groups of investors, the issuing firm and the underwriter. The information asymmetry 
arises because an issuer faces an unknown demand for its shares from two types of 
investors. The first group consists of outside or informed investors who have better 
knowledge about the prospective cash flow than does the issuing firm and its 
underwriter for which it incurred a cost. These informed investors will only submit 
purchase orders if the offering price is less than the true value o f the IPO. The second 
type, uninformed investors, lack special knowledge about firm value. They may 
participate in the market even though they did not purchase information. Consequently, 
informed investors will bid for more shares of the more successful firms, which will 
leave the uninformed investors with a disproportionate amount of the less successful 
IPOs. In addition, since the allocation is not made on a pro rata basis and over 
subscription and rationing can occur, the bias against uninformed investors can be even 
larger if the underwriters favor the informed investors. This information asymmetry 
may lead to Akerlof s (1970) ‘lemons problem’, where the uninformed investor ends up 
primarily with the less successful issues. Underpricing the issue results in compensating 
uninformed investors for the bias in the allocation mechanism. The model generates a 
number of empirical predictions. For example, underpricing will be directly 
proportionate to the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the issue.
The empirical literature is supportive o f the model’s predictions in countries 
where underwriters play a relatively passive role in bringing new issues to market. Koh 
and Walter (1989), using information on rationing, find that an uninformed strategy in 
Singapore just about broke even. Keloharju (1993) also finds evidence of a winner’s 
curse in Finland. Ritter (1984) verifies some predictions and finds a monotonous link 
between underpricing and empirical proxies for uncertainty, such as sales and the daily
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aftermarket standard deviation of stock returns for the first month in aftermarket
trading.
Information Cascades
In the information cascades or “herding” hypothesis, developed by Welch 
(1992), it is assumed that, in aggregate, investors hold perfectly accurate information 
about the issuing firm. However, information concerning the value o f the shares is 
highly uncertain for investors. Furthermore, it is assumed that it takes investment 
bankers time to approach interested investors because of their limited distribution 
channels. The hypothesis draws from the notion that potential investors base their 
investment decisions not only on their own information about the issue, but also on 
whether or not other investors, who were approached earlier, are purchasing. Thus, 
subsequent investors will view the actions o f previous investors as an indication of what 
information they hold privately. Thus, they will imitate the purchasing decisions of their 
predecessors. Consequently, an issuer may want to underprice an offering to induce the 
first few potential investors to buy and induce a cascade in which all subsequent 
investors want to buy irrespective o f their own information. When combining the 
cascades hypothesis within a setting o f a pricing process in which the underwriter 
dynamically adjusts the IPO price, positively sloped demand curves can result.5
Empirical support for the cascades hypothesis is mixed. Barry and Jennings 
(1992) reject the cascades model in favor of the dynamic information acquisition 
argument, while in a recent work, Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh (2002) test the theory on a
5 Similar dynamics can be applied when a cut in the offer price may actually scare away potential 
investors. See Financial Times (June 26, 2002) for the dynamics leading to the postponement and 
eventual cancellation of the IPO of Prada SpA, and CBS Marketwatch.com (July 2, 2002), describing the 
circumstances surrounding the IPO of CIT Group Inc., an insurance company and Tyco International Inc. 
spin-off, which offered shares at $23 against an expected range of $25 to $29 and closed at $22 after the 
first day of trading in an adverse company and market environment.
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sample of 284 IPOs in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1989 and 1993 and find 
evidence consistent with herding. More specifically, they found that investors either 
subscribed overwhelmingly to new issues, which resulted in very small allocations, or 
largely abstained from subscribing so that the issue was undersubscribed and 
subscribers received full allocations, with very few cases in-between.
Signaling
Another line of theoretical literature reverses Rock’s assumption regarding 
informational asymmetry and assumes that the issuer is better informed than investors. 
Here, underpricing is a means for high quality firms to distinguish themselves from low 
quality issuers. These studies are motivated by Ibbotson’s (1975) conjecture that the 
issuer may want to “leave a good taste in investors’ mouths.” In the signaling models, 
banks are simply assumed to be passive distributors of shares to the general public.
In Allen and Faulhaber (1989), bad managers, who are more likely to run bad 
firms, are deterred from mimicking good managers who underprice, because subsequent 
cash flows partially reveal the firm’s type. Consequently, their model implies that firms 
that underprice more are likelier to have higher dividends, and that the market reacts 
more favourably to dividend announcements by firms that underprice more. In Welch’s 
(1989) model, risk-neutral entrepreneurs sell a fraction of their firm in an unseasoned 
offering and the remainder in a subsequent seasoned offering. Low-quality firms that 
mimic high quality firms must pay an exogenously specified operation cost, which the 
high-quality firms do not incur. In some cases, this cost may be insufficient to deter 
mimicking, and underpricing becomes the additional wedge that deters low-quality 
firms in the separating equilibrium. In Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), a firm employs two 
signals to convey the mean and variance o f its future cash flow: the degree of
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underpricing and the fraction of shares held by insiders. To overcome the asymmetric 
information problem, the issuer signals the true value of the firm by offering shares at a 
discount and by retaining some o f the shares. In the model’s separating equilibrium, a 
firm’s intrinsic value is positively related to underpricing. This model is a generalization 
of Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling hypothesis which suggests that, by retaining a 
significant ownership stake in the firm, entrepreneurs can signal project quality as false 
representation can be costly. The hypothesis therefore predicts relatively superior 
performance of IPO firms with high entrepreneurial ownership.
The empirical support for the signaling models o f underpricing is mixed. 
Michaely and Shaw (1994) find no support for signaling. They find no evidence of 
either a higher propensity to pay dividends for IPOs that were more underpriced or of a 
higher propensity to return to the market for a seasoned equity offering. The insider 
holding variable has no significant power to explain initial returns and there is no 
evidence to suggest that insider holdings provide a credible signal of firm quality that 
reduces uncertainty and, therefore, initial underpricing. Neither the initial-day return nor 
the fraction held by insiders seems to explain the value of the firm two years after going 
public. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) find that returns after the first day are 
just as effective in inducing future issuing activity as the first-day returns are. While 
providing evidence suggesting a positive relation between managerial ownership 
retention and post-IPO operating performance, Jain and Kini (1994) find no support that 
firms that underprice more produce superior operating performance after the IPO.
Legal Liability
A further line of research does not rely on asymmetric information that is 
resolved on the first day of trading. Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) have suggested
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that the issuing firm may underprice to reduce the legal liability arising from any false 
or inadequate information in the prospectuses.
Drake and Vetsuypens (1992), however, call such a conclusion into question. By 
examining a sample of 93 US firms from 1969 to 1990 that are sued after their IPO, 
they find that the average initial return for the sample firms is approximately the same 
as that for a control group of IPOs of similar size. They also present evidence that 
litigation typically results from some unfavourable company-specific news in the 
aftermarket and not from IPO overpricing on the first trading day. Keloharju (1993) 
argues that, given the paucity of legal liabilities associated with the process o f going 
public in Finland, it is unlikely that potential legal liability has much to do with the 
observed initial returns.6
2.1.1 Theories assuming an active role o f  the underwriter
Underwriter Reputation
While their focus was on signaling firm quality through underpricing, Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) had already noted that signaling could also be 
accomplished through the choice o f underwriter.
Carter and Manaster (1990) uncovered that high-quality underwriters are 
typically associated with less underpricing. Findings in Beatty and Welch (1996) and 
Cooney, Singh, Carter and Dark (2001) document, however, that the relationship 
between underwriter reputation and underpricing has changed over time, casting doubt 
on the theory. Loughran and Ritter (2001) report that unlike the 1980s, IPOs that are
6 Chalmers, Dann and Harford (2002) analyze a sample of 72 US IPOs between 1992 and 1996 and 
investigate the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. They find a significant negative relation 
between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in 
conjunction with the IPO.
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managed by high-prestige underwriters during the internet boom in the late 1990s are 
associated with more underpricing than IPOs managed by less prestigious underwriters.
Underwriter Price support
Ruud (1993) challenges the conventional view that positive average initial IPO 
returns result from deliberate underpricing. By investigating the distribution of initial 
returns o f469 IPOs in 1982 and 1983, she shows that positive mean initial returns result 
from a partially censored left (negative) tail. She argues that underwriter price support 
or stabilization can account for this censoring of the distribution of initial returns 
because in the US regulatory framework, the practice is not considered manipulative as 
long as it is disclosed in the offering prospectus. The theory predicts that a large 
percentage o f stocks should experience positive initial and short-run abnormal 
aftermarket returns. More specifically, because underwriters remove price support over 
time, prices of fully priced or just-underpriced IPOs are more likely to fall than to rise 
over the short-term.7
Miller and Reilly (1987) examine the returns and spread behaviour of IPOs over 
the first five days of trading and find that the relation of the spread and its determinants 
differs between overpriced and underpriced issues only on the first trading day. For a 
sample of 1,523 NASDAQ IPOs issued between 1982 and 1987, Hanley, Kumar and 
Seguin (1993) find evidence suggesting that stabilization significantly affects quoted 
spreads. Moreover, significant negative returns are documented after the termination of 
stabilization.
7 Aggarwal (2000) provides a detailed account of the mechanics of stabilization in the aftermarket.
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Dynamic Information Acquisition
The dynamic information acquisition argument - also referred to as bookbuilding 
theory or information-gathering theory (Beneviste and Spindt (1989), Beneviste and 
Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991)) - studies the process whereby the 
offer price is set and its effect on underpricing. The assumed pricing mechanism is the 
bookbuilding process, whereby, after setting a preliminary offer price range, the 
underwriter and issuer solicit “indications of interest” from prospective investors during 
the “road show”, where the company is marketed to selected, typically institutional 
investors. Through bookbuilding, investment banks extract information about the true 
value from investors.8 The investors natural inclination to bid lower during the 
marketing phase entails a trade-off: while it increases the potential profit from selling 
the IPO in the immediate aftermarket, assuming shares have been allocated at the 
offering price, it also jeopardizes the probability and size o f their allocations. In order to 
induce investors to reveal that they want to purchase shares at a high price, the 
investment banker must offer them a combination of underpricing and share allocations 
in return.
There is strong empirical support for the bookbuilding theory o f underpricing.
Hanley (1993) documents that the relation of the final offer price to the range of
anticipated offer prices disclosed in the preliminary prospectus, is a good predictor of
initial returns. Having documented evidence for the partial adjustment phenomenon for
a sample of 1,430 US IPOs from January through September 1987, she finds that issuers
that have final offer prices exceeding the limits of the offer range have greater
underpricing than all other IPOs, and are also more likely to increase the number of
shares issued. The final offer price only “partially adjusts” to new information. Using a
8 In a more general context, Jenkinson, Ljungqvist, and Wilhelm (2000) use a dataset of 2,051 IPOs in 61 
non-US markets during the period 1992-1999 and find that bookbuilding -  while costing around twice as 
much as the fixed costs offering - leads to substantially less underpricing.
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unique dataset from 39 international equity issues that used bookbuilding between 1995 
and 1997, Comelli and Goldreich (2001) find that the investment banker awards more 
shares to bidders who provide information in their bids or to those who bid regularly.
Investment Banker’s Monopsony Power
Baron (1982) offers an agency-based explanation for underpricing. His theory 
assumes that the value of a new issue is affected by market demand and by the 
investment banker’s selling effort. In the model, the investment banker is better 
informed about market demand than the issuer, but his distribution effort is 
unobservable. To address this moral hazard, the optimal contract sets the issue’s 
offering price below its “true value”, defined as the equilibrium offering price when the 
investment banker expends his best effort.
Some empirical evidence of self-underwritten IPOs refutes this theory. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) find that when underwriters themselves go public, 
their shares are just as underpriced, even though there is no monitoring problem.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that agency problems between underwriters 
and issuing firms, largely latent in the 1980s, have become increasingly important and 
are partly responsible for the high initial returns of Internet stocks during the late 1990s. 
They postulate that higher valuations have resulted in issuers being more complacent 
about “leaving money on the table”. In this context, they apply Prospect Theory, 
developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to the IPO market. Here, individuals 
often violate Bayes’ Rule and rational choice theories when making decisions under 
uncertainty in experimental settings. Loughran and Ritter (2002) predict that in most 
situations issuers will sum the wealth loss from underpricing with the larger wealth gain 
on the retained shares from a price jump, producing a net increase in wealth for pre-
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issue shareholders. They empirically show that most of the money left on the table 
comes from a minority of IPOs. In the cross-section, the IPOs that were underpriced 
most were those where the offer price was revised upwards from what had been 
anticipated at the time of filing the initial price range. This observation is consistent 
with the dynamic information acquisition theory of Beneviste and Spindt (1989) and the 
empirical documentation of the partial adjustment phenomenon by Hanley (1993). It is 
also in line with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) who argue that the opportunity cost of 
underpricing is less if the relative float is small. The complacency about underpricing, 
combined with the desire of underwriters to leave money on the table so as to receive 
indirect compensation from buy-side clients that were favoured in IPO allocations, 
resulted in even greater underpricing during the boom in Internet stocks during the late 
1990s.9
This conjecture is similar to Shiller’s (1990) “Impresario” hypothesis of 
underpricing, whereby underwriters choose a lower offering price because they know 
that the cumulative profit o f underpricing (through less transparent forms of revenue 
streams such as brokerage commissions) will be higher than maximizing revenue for the 
single event (compensation in the form of the gross underwriter spread).10
9 For a related article see, Wall Street Journal Europe (Mai 05, 2002): eToys Sues Goldman Sachs Over 
Management of Its IPO. “...The relatively low price set for the IPO, the suit alleges, robbed eToys of 
hundreds of millions of dollars of cash that could have helped the company to stave off bankruptcy. The 
shares nearly quadrupled in the price on their first day of trading. The suit charged Goldman induced 
some investors to agree to give the firm a portion of the profits they later made on eToys shares in 
exchange for getting IPO stock allocation ...”
10 On January 22, 2002, Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), an investment bank, agreed to settle a $100 
million with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US regulatory agency, based on the 
following allegations: “... From at least April 1999 through June 2000, CSFB employees allocated shares 
of IPOs to over 100 customers who were willing to funnel between 33 and 65 percent of their IPO profits 
to CSFB. The profits were channeled to CSFB in the form of excessive brokerage commissions generated 
by the customers in unrelated securities trades that the customers effected solely to satisfy CSFB’s 
demands for a share of the IPO profits...” (Source: SEC Litigation Release No. 17327). Ritter and Welch 
(2002) calculate that the practice of funneling back IPO profits through excessive trading may have 
accounted for up to 250 million shares per trading day during 1999 to 2000.
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2.2 Cycles in IPO activity
Another anomaly associated with IPOs is the “hot issue” phenomenon, whereby 
the observed issuing activity exhibits significant, recurrent, and to some extent 
predictable variations over time. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) were among the first to 
identify significant autocorrelation in both the monthly number o f IPOs and the monthly 
average underpricing of IPOs. Ritter (1984) studies initial returns for US IPOs between 
1960 and 1982 and finds highly significant autocorrelation in monthly average initial 
returns and in monthly IPO volume. He also observes that periods of high volume tend 
to follow periods of high average initial returns. In the cross-section o f the data, he 
identifies a 15-month period during which the average initial return was 48.4 percent, as 
contrasted with an average initial return o f 16.3 percent for the rest o f the period. This 
“hot” IPO market is also concentrated in a certain class of industries and a certain group 
of underwriters.
In a recent study, Lowry and Schwert (2002) find an autocorrelation coefficient 
o f monthly average first-day returns of 0.60 between 1960 and 1997, which increased 
during the Internet boom in the late 1990s. They confirm a significant positive relation 
between initial returns and future IPO volume and note that, “increased numbers of 
companies go public after observing that IPOs are being underpriced by the greatest 
amount.” They associate the cycles in initial returns with the investment bankers’ 
learning process. Because the registration periods of many IPOs overlap, the 
information that underwriters learn during one firm’s registration period will contribute 
to the first-day returns of many IPOs.
The prospect theory explanation of the partial adjustment phenomenon addresses 
the phenomenon of “hot issue” markets in a similar fashion (Loughran and Ritter 
(2001)). It predicts that all IPOs that are in the “road show” stage o f going public when
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there is an overall market rally, will have higher expected underpricing because offer 
prices are not raised as much as they could be. Because of the length of the 
bookbuilding period, which can take from four weeks to four months, the first day 
returns of these IPOs will be correlated.
Shifter’s (1990) “Impresario” hypothesis can also explain the positive 
autocorrelation in IPO activity and initial returns reported in the literature. “Hot” 
markets appear when underwriters exploit a segment sought to be ripe for a ”fad”. Even 
though many investors may be unwilling to follow a “fad”, they may find it profitable to 
follow positive feedback investment strategies (Rajan and Servaes (1993)). Acting this 
way, they may actually have caused the positive autocorrelation themselves. In the more 
general setting of “fads” described by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), “fads” occur in “hot 
issue” periods when investors are especially overoptimistic about the growth potential 
of the firms that go public, induced by the “Impresario”, the investment bank taking the 
company public. Firms time their IPOs in precisely these periods in order to take 
advantage of “windows of opportunity”. It follows that “hot” markets for IPOs should 
be concentrated in certain industry classes, dominated by specific underwriters and that 
IPO activity should come from those companies for which issuing equity is always the 
least favoured choice o f financing. Moreover, companies with the largest initial returns 
should have the lowest subsequent aftermarket returns.
2.3 Return Dynamics in Aftermarket Trading
Most of the literature on aftermarket performance concentrates on how IPO 
shares perform over three- to five years. Over those time horizons, IPO shares seem, on 
average, to perform poorly when measured against various benchmarks. Ritter (1991) 
finds that every dollar invested in a portfolio o f IPOs purchased at the closing market
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price on the end of the first day of trading results in a terminal wealth of $1.3447 over 
three years, while every dollar in the matching firm results in $1.6168, a ratio of only 
0.841 during the same period. He performs the study for a total sample of 1,526 US 
IPOs of common stock in 1975-84. The international evidence also supports the notion 
of poor long-run performance. Alvarez and Gonzales (2001), Espenlaub, Gregory and 
Tonks (1998), Giudici and Paleari (1999), Leleux and Muzyka (1998) or Schuster
(1996) all highlight low market-adjusted long-run returns for various European IPO 
markets. Jain and Kini (1994) extend this evidence to show that long-run performance is 
also accompanied by poor financial accounting performance post-IPO relative to pre- 
IPO performance. However, because there has been a sustained effort to extend 
empirical evidence on IPO performance beyond the past two decades, it has become 
apparent that the results on long-run performance are sensitive to the time-period 
chosen. In a large out-of-sample test, Gompers and Lemer (2001) study the five-year 
aftermarket performance of a sample of 3,661 US IPOs from 1935 to 1972 and find that 
the long-run performance of IPOs depends considerably on the method used for 
calculating returns and performance. The authors conclude that “...While the results do 
not rule out the possibility o f more broad-based sentiment-driven mispricing, they 
provide little support of a distinct IPO effect.”
Another facet that has attracted much academic interest addresses the relation 
between short- and long-run IPO returns. One of the first to document the dynamics in 
aftermarket trading was Stoll and Curley (1970). They found that investors in new small 
issues floated under Regulation A in 1957, 1959, and 1963, experienced lower long-run 
rates of return than if they had invested in a portfolio of large stocks represented by the 
Standard & Poor’s 425 Industrial Average. However, short-run price appreciation o f the 
643 companies in the sample was considerably greater than the appreciation of large-
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cap stocks. Considerable short-run overperformance is also reported in Ritter (1991) 
and Schuster (1996).
It is difficult to explain these price dynamics in the IPO aftermarket within a 
semi-rational setting. Miller (1977) proposes a theory that is consistent with the 
empirical findings. Assuming the presence of short-selling constraints and 
heterogeneous investors’ expectations, he argues that the prices of new issues are set not 
by the appraisal of the typical investor, but by the small minority who think highly 
enough o f the investment merits of the new issue to include it in their portfolio. This 
“divergence of opinion” about a new issue is greatest when the stock is issued, either 
because the company has not yet started operations, or because there is uncertainty 
about the success of new products or the profitability of a major business expansion. As 
a result, short-sale constraints lead to upward biases in stock prices, as pessimistic 
investors are restricted from short-selling. Over time, as the variance o f opinion 
decreases and the company acquires a history of earnings, the marginal investor’s 
valuation will converge towards the mean valuation and IPOs will start to 
underperform. Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002) present a dynamic model of the 
determination of prices, lending fees and short interest that is consistent with this 
theory. They show that, if lendable securities are difficult to locate, then the price of the 
security is initially elevated and expected to decline over time. This decline increases in 
the degree of heterogeneity o f beliefs of investors about the future value o f the security. 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2002) show that 
short-selling constraints can lead to prices higher than the valuations o f all investors. 
Empirically, Gecy, Musto and Reed (2001) find an extra cost to shorting hotter IPOs.
A number of other institutional arrangements in the short-run aftermarket, 
unrelated to fundamentals, have an effect on prices. For example, some recent studies
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examine the expiration of IPO lockup agreements. Lockup agreements are a feature of 
US and IPOs in international markets and prohibit insider sales before a pre-specified 
date, usually 180 calendar days after the IPO. Since insiders often own a majority of the 
firm, the potential for an increase in the supply of tradable shares following lockup 
expiration could have a significant effect on the value of the stock. Bradley, Jordan, 
Roten, and Yi (2001), Brav and Gompers (2002) and Field and Hanka (2001) document 
significant negative abnormal returns o f approximately two percent around lockup 
expiration. Moreover, Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2002) investigate the performance o f 
IPOs around the expiration of the “quiet period” -  typically the first 25 calendar days in 
aftermarket trading when a company is still “in registration” and subject to a number of 
regulatory restrictions that prohibit certain activities, such as analyst coverage. Using a 
sample of 1,611 firms going public over the period 1996 to 2000, they find that firms, 
for which coverage is initiated, experience a significantly positive abnormal return of
4.1 percent in a five-day period surrounding the end of the “quiet period”. This 
compares to an insignificant 0.1 percent for firms that do not have coverage initiated. 
Most of these abnormal returns experienced by firms with coverage occur in the days 
before the quiet period expires. Furthermore, Aggarwal (2000) pays attention to the 
stabilization activities of underwriters in the aftermarket and their influence on prices by 
studying a sample of 137 US IPOs going public during May and July 1997. She finds 
that direct intervention or “pure” stabilization, in which an identified stabilizing bid is 
posted, is never done, and that aftermarket short-covering, which has the same result as 
pure stabilization, but has no disclosure requirements, is the principal form of 
stabilization. Stabilization by short-covering can occur because the underwriter initially 
sells shares in excess o f the original amount offered, which is then covered by 
exercising the overalottment option and/or by short covering in the aftermarket during
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30 calendar days after the offering. She also finds that stabilization seems to have a 
permanent rather than a temporary effect on prices, a similar observation made by 
Schultz and Zaman (1994).
Several behavioural explanations have also been advanced for the empirical 
findings. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) relate the analysis o f IPO performance to 
earnings management and find that investors do not fully take into consideration that 
financial accounts of companies going public are managed before the IPO, and therefore 
base their valuation on a nai've extrapolation of the past. They use discretionary current 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management and show that companies, which boost 
their earnings most in the IPO year, also have the worst long- run performance. Ritter 
(1991), Lemer (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2001) or Baker and Wurgler (2000) 
discuss another set of behavioural explanations for poor long-run performance. They 
suggest that stock prices periodically diverge from fundamental values, and that 
managers and investment bankers take advantage of overpricing by selling stock to 
overly optimistic investors. This in line with De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) conjecture 
that, at least for low-capitalization stocks, there is a negative relation between past and 
subsequent abnormal returns on individual securities using holding periods of one year 
or more which they interpret as evidence of market overreaction.
3 Data, Sample and Methodology
3.1 Data
In order to be included in the sample, the relevant companies pursuing an IPO 
had to meet the following criteria: (1) the company’s main headquarter is registered in 
Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland with the
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obligation to publish consolidated and/or parent company accounts, (2) the company is
listed on one of the three tiers of the main stock exchange in the respective country: the
Official Market, the Official Parallel Market or the New Market, and meets the relevant
listing requirements,11 (3) each share is given an offer price o f 5.00 units of national
currency or more, (4) gross proceeds, measured in terms of end-1998 purchasing power,
of the equivalent of Euro (€) 2.0 million or more, and (5) the offering being unseasoned
1 ^and involved common and/or preferred stock. While the sample includes 
Privatizations (13), spin-offs and equity-carve outs (26), we have excluded foreign
listings, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), investment trust and certificates,
• 1  ^demutualizations and companies that transferred from one market segment to another .
The data was hand-collected individually from each of the respective country. It
is unique in its entirety as it spans over a relatively long period of time covering at least
one market cycle of IPO activity in the seven largest European countries ranked in terms
of market capitalization, excluding the UK, and is not commercially available.14 The
data collection involved a two-stage process:
First, in order to insure a most complete sample, we identified the IPOs by
collecting information from the individual stock exchanges, national publications in the
respective country or other sources such as regulatory agencies, central banks,
commercial providers and, if necessary, by directly contacting the issuing company.
This step included the search for full name o f the offering company, nationality, IPO
date and place o f the offering, total number of shares issued, public float adjusted for
11 Appendix C, Table 48, lists listing requirements in European countries in detail.
12 The large number of IPOs issuing dual-class shares is a relatively unique feature of the Swedish IPO 
market. For Germany, for example, only seven companies issued dual-class shares during the sample 
period 1988 to 1998.
13 For empirical evidence relating to privatizations or equity carve-outs, see D’Souza and Megginson 
(1999) or Vijh (1999).
14 Capitaldata, a division of Euromoney PLC, is a commercial provider of IPO information. For the period 
1988 to 1998, their IPO database includes around 550 companies, almost half of our database. This 
commercially available data includes only limited cross-sectional IPO characteristics.
35
overalottment options exercised, issue price, sector and year of foundation. We did not 
collect data for issuing activity in the secondary market.15
For Germany, information provided by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the 
various yearly issues of the Saling Aktienfuhrer were primary data sources of company 
data.16 Data on French issuers and issuing characteristics was obtained from the annual 
lists published by Euronext France and Societes cotees, 1996 and 1999 edition, 
Cofisem. Italian IPO data came from Indici e Dati, 1992 and 1999 edition, Mediobanca, 
and from the Italian Stock Exchange. Euronext Netherlands and Effectengids, 2000 
edition, Kluwer, were the primary source for data on Dutch IPOs. Spanish IPO 
company data was obtained from the Madrid Official Stock Exchange Bulletins and 
from CNMV, the Spanish regulating agency. Swedish data is from annual reports of the 
OM Stockholm Exchanges and from Six AB. The Swiss Stock Exchange and Swiss 
Central Bank were sources of the data for the sample of Swiss IPOs.17
Second, we collected daily closing stock prices from the national stock market 
operators, academic institutions and, if necessary, commercial services. Sources of the 
German stock price data included the University of Karlsruhe Stock Price Database, the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange and daily issues o f the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
French, Italian and Spanish Stock Price data was made available by Euronext Paris and 
the Italian and Madrid Stock Exchange, respectively. Data on Swedish stock returns 
was obtained from Six AB. Dutch and Swiss stock price data was collected from 
Datastream. We used Dow Jones for the time-series data for the four size-based 
benchmark indices. Macroeconomic data such as Exchange rates and GDP deflators was 
collected from Datastream.
15 A large number of empirical studies link seasoned issuing activity with IPO performance. For European 
markets see, for example, Espenlaub and Tonks (1998) or Stehle, Erhardt and Przyborowsky (1998).
16 We want to thank Hoppenstedt Finanzinformationen GmbH, for allowing access to their archives.
17 Prof. Alfred Mettler kindly supplied fundamental data on Swiss IPOs issued between 1988 and 1990.
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Stock prices are adjusted for dividends, stock splits or rights offerings and were, 
for this section, calibrated to a European trading day calendar and converted into Euro 
(€). Share prices represent closing prices and care was taken that quotations represented 
actual trades. For our sector analysis, we use the Dow Jones STOXX global sector 
classification standard.18
The resulting IPO sample is comprised of 973 companies that conducted an IPO 
of common and/or preferred stock between 1988 and 1998 on one of the three main 
market segments of the main national stock exchange operator in Germany (219 
companies), France (323), Italy (77), The Netherlands (75), Spain (88), Sweden (148) 
and Switzerland (43).19 Based on our original stock exchange records, this represents at 
least 90 percent of IPO activity in Continental Europe between 1988 and 1998, 
measured in terms of number of IPOs and aggregate gross proceeds.
The sample does not suffer from survivorship bias. Only seven companies were 
delisted before their third-year anniversary. In this section, we look at IPOs issued over 
the period 1988 to 1998 using stock returns through February 23, 2001. This implies a 
declining sample size of 686 companies when measuring returns over three years and 
381 companies when measuring returns over a five-year window. In Appendix B, Table 
34 - 47, we provide results based on constant sample sizes o f 686 and 381 IPOs, 
respectively. The results confirm that changes in measurement periods and sample sizes 
do not change the qualitative nature o f the results presented in this section.
18 The Dow Jones STOXX global industry classification standard is displayed in Appendix A.
19 The market segments are (Number of IPOs in brackets): Germany (Deutsche Borse AG: Amtlicher 
Handel (80), Geregelter Markt (89), Neuer Markt (50)); France (SBF-Paris Bourse SA*: Premier Marche 
(21), Second Marche (231), Nouveau Marche (71)); Italy (Borsa Italiana SpA: Borsa Valori (70) Mercato 
Ristretto (7)); The Netherlands (Amsterdam Exchanges NV*: Officiele Markt, (56) Officiele Parallel 
Markt (8)); Spain (Bolsa de Madrid SA: Primer Mercado (56), Segundo Mercado (32)); Sweden (OM 
Stockholm Exchanges AB: A-list (15), OTC-list (52), O-list (81)); and Switzerland (SWX Swiss 
Exchange AG: SWX Hauptsegment, (35) SWX Nebensegment (8)). ""Merged to Euronext SA.
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Table 1
Market Conditions and Sample Characteristics
The sample is comprised of 973 European IPOs. Age is defined as the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 assumed to be 
founded in 1901. New Economy firms (as a percentage of total number of issues) belong to market sectors 5,13,16 and 17 representing Technology, Media, 
Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Public Float is the percentage of equity offered. 
Initial Return is defined as the percentage difference between the final offer price and the first-day closing price. Market measures stock market momentum using the value- 
weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index, excluding the UK. Size is the total number of shares issued times the final offer price and is expressed in constant end- 
1998 prices using monthly national consumer price indices. Issuing Volume is defined as the total number of shares issued multiplied by the final offer price and expressed in 
constant end-1998 prices. For the measurement of inflation-adjusted size and issuing volume, amounts in national currency were concerted using the appropriate € exchange 
rate at the IPO date. The monthly distribution of European IPOs is as follows: Month of January (25 IPOs), February (30), March (59), April (65), May (95), June (184), July 
(131), August (25), September (57), October (107), November (98) and December (97)._____________________________________________________________________
IPO Market 
Conditions
Duration
Months
Months Offerings 
Number Number
Age
Years
New
Economy
Percent
Public
Float
Percent
Initial Returns 
Mean Median 
Percent Percent
Market
Change
Percent
Size 
Median 
€ million
Issuing Volume 
Total Mean Median 
€ billion € million € million
Cold Market Jan-88 - Aug-88 8 41 26 27 36 7.08 4.00 18.66 78.45 2,425.1 59,15 24.74
Cold Market Apr-90 - Sep-93 42 127 40 10 31 6.13 1.70 8.52 108.97 12,078.6 95.11 35.29
Cold Market May-94 - Mar-96 23 148 34 20 35 8.25 3.80 12.57 85.56 26,700.0 180.41 26.82
All Cold Markets 73 316 35 17 34 7.25 2.65 90.32 41,203.7 130.39 30.14
Hot Market Sep-88 - Mar-90 19 130 35 18 31 17.66 10.00 41.94 105.57 12,708.2 97.76 27.09
Hot Market Oct-93 - Apr-94 7 31 30 35 31 24.49 20.90 13.12 73.28 6,505.8 209.86 22.44
Hot Market Apr-96 - Dec-98 33 496 21 37 34 21.64 9,00 92.46 60.32 63,219.0 127.46 16.52
All Hot Markets 59 657 24 33 33 20.98 9.52 66.24 82,433.0 125.47 18.33
All 973 issues Jan-88 - Dec-98 132 973 28 28 33 16.52 7.14 347.97 73.93 123,636.8 127.07 22.02
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3.2 Sample
In Table 1, we provide some summary statistics for our sample. While 
presenting evidence for the sample as a whole, we also divide IPOs based on whether 
they were issued in “hot” or “cold” markets. Because of big fluctuations in the level o f 
the stock market and IPO activity throughout the sample period, this potentially enables 
us to draw more inferences about the robustness of the patterns associated with IPOs.
The most frequently used definition of “hot” IPO markets is based on “volume”. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), for example, describe the 1980s as “hot” because most of 
that decade had much higher issuance volume than the 1970s. Helwege and Liang 
(2001) define “hot” and “cold” months according to volume of issuance, based on a 
three-month centred moving average o f the number of IPOs for each month in the 
sample. Similar to Ritter (1984) and Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), we define “hot” IPO 
markets based on the level o f underpricing.21 We also include a proxy for the general 
level of the stock market into the analysis. Initially, we define those months with higher 
average monthly underpricing compared to median underpricing for the total sample as 
“hot” IPO months; we consider those months during which the mean is lower than the 
median as “cold” IPO months. We apply the same procedure to our proxy for market 
returns. Months during which the market return exceeds the median for the monthly 
series o f 132 months (January 1988 -  December 1998), are defined as “hot” market 
months. Likewise, months during which the market return is less than the median are 
considered “cold” months. Finally, we match “hot” (“cold”) IPO months with “hot”
20 The sample differs from US studies in some important respects. Our sample period does not overlap 
with Ritter (1991) who looks at IPOs from 1971 to 1988. Neither does it completely overlap with Brav 
and Gompers (1997) who study 3,407 non venture-backed and 934 venture-backed US IPOs between 
1975 and 1992. Moreover, while Ritter (1991) and Brav and Gompers (1997) focus on reporting long-run 
returns over three and five years, we present evidence on the dynamics of short- and long-run 
performance over a variety of dimensions.
Because of the presence of some very large IPOs, defining “hot” and “cold” markets by volume does 
potentially lead to misleading results.
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(“cold”) market months to identify “hot” and “cold” IPO markets. During 118 months, 
(89 percent of the entire period), a “hot” (“cold”) IPO month corresponds to a “hot” 
(“cold”) market month. During 14 months, a “hot” (“cold”) IPO month does not 
correspond to a “hot” (“cold”) market months. We attribute part of this to seasonalities 
in the underwriting industry. The overall pattern confirms our earlier conjecture about 
the close link between the level o f the stock market and underpricing.
Of the 132 months, we identify 73 months as “cold” markets and 59 months as 
“hot” markets and mark three individual “hot” and “cold” market periods. In more than 
half of the 132 issuing months, the general market was either stable or falling. For 
example, the longest “cold” market period occurred between April 1990 and September 
1993. During this period, only 127 IPOs went public, averaging 6.13 percent initial 
return. This period was characterized by subdued economic conditions in Continental 
Europe following the German Unification. During the 42-month period, the Dow Jones 
STOXX broad-market index recorded a rise of 8.52 percent. Conversely, during the 33- 
month “hot” market period between April 1996 and December 1998, 496 IPOs went 
public with an average initial return of 21.64 percent. During this period, the general 
level of the market rose by 92.46 percent. Interestingly, the Asian and Russian Financial 
Crises in the autumn of 1998 did not have an impact on European IPO activity.
Between 1988 and 1998, 973 European companies raised a total o f €123.6 billion 
on the stock market. Ritter (2001) reports that during the same period, 3,872 IPOs raised 
a total of $237.9 billion in the US. The average issuing volume o f European IPOs o f 
€127.1 million, however, is higher than the one reported for the US ($61.4 million). 
Some large offerings such as privatizations (13) and equity carveouts (26) account for 
part of the difference. For example, privatizations raised a total o f €44.4 billion with a 
median issuing volume of €2.6 billion. On average, European companies going public
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have sold 33 percent of their company to the public (henceforth “public float”), which 
remained stable throughout the sample period. This observation is within the close 
range o f 30 percent and 36 percent reported by Ritter (2001) for US IPOs issued 
between 1992 and 1998. Moreover, the average European IPO was 28 years old at the 
time of going public. While the average age of European IPOs has declined throughout 
the sample period, it is still high compared to companies going public in the US. Ritter 
(1991), for example, finds an average age of six years. As shown in Appendix A, 
European IPOs are clearly widespread among the various industries. This is different to 
Helwege and Liang (2001) who study 2,072 US IPOs between 1982 and 1993 and point 
out that US IPOs during this period are drawn largely from the same set of high- 
technology industries.
Table 1 shows that the sample composition is clustered in certain industries: in 
“cold” markets, the percentage of New Economy companies o f total IPO activity is 
almost half o f what is observed for IPOs issued under “hot” markets. Moreover, the 
average size of European IPOs in “cold” markets is €90.3 million compared to €66.2 
million in “hot” markets. This reinforces the fact that IPO activity in “cold” markets, 
during which the stock market is generally more stable or declining, is associated with 
larger and more mature IPOs in Old Economy industries. Table 1 also demonstrates the 
changing composition of IPO issuers. It indicates that during the 1990s, New Economy 
sectors have gradually taken a bigger share of the total IPO market. During this time 
IPO age, size and median issuing volume has also declined considerably. This 
highlights the fact that money, previously flowing into mature industries with lower 
growth prospects, had started to flow into young, technology-oriented companies 
focusing on growth.
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3.3 Methodology
While the estimation of initial returns is less problematic, there are several 
factors that must be taken into account when estimating abnormal returns over longer 
time horizons. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) both highlight 
the problems associated with calculating long-run abnormal returns using either a 
reference portfolio or an asset pricing model.
Barber and Lyon (1997) demonstrate that many of the commonly used matching 
procedures are poorly specified and abnormal return estimates can be systematically 
nonzero. They also show that seemingly minor changes in experimental features can 
have a major impact on the results. These include the benchmark for measuring 
abnormal returns, cumulating procedures or the populations from which securities are 
drawn.22 In this context, they isolate one parametric procedure that may be well- 
specified, specifically to calculate abnormal returns as the buy-and-hold returns on a 
sample firm less the buy-and-hold return on a control firm with similar size and book- 
to-market characteristics.23 The authors also suggest a rebalancing bias that arises 
because the compounded returns o f a reference portfolio, such as an equally weighted 
market index, are usually calculated assuming periodic rebalancing, whereas the returns 
of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing. Furthermore, they also point out 
that a new listing bias arises when an IPO firm, which is known to perform badly 
following an IPO, is added to an index which will cause the index to underperform. 
Kothari and Warner (1997) also show that long-horizon tests are misspecified. They
22 In context of European Markets, Dimson and Marsh (1986), report the importance of controlling for the 
size effect in the United Kingdom. Moreover, Brav and Gompers (1997) find that most institutional 
investors will not be significantly hurt by investing in IPOs because they usually do not buy the small 
issues that underperform most.
23For the European market, this is difficult because of the relative infancy of many of the stock markets in 
the study, with few comparable quoted firms and benchmarks available over a long period of time. The 
use of the Eurostoxx value-weighted size indices as benchmarks may also induce biases that result from 
the feet that these market indices are value-weighted
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find that parametric long-horizon tests will often indicate abnormal performance when 
none is present and suggest that bootstrap procedures might be a promising way to 
minimize test statistic misspecification. Moreover, they suggest a survivorship bias, 
which occurs when the de-listed firms are simply removed and the index is rebalanced. 
This bias tends to cause the index to outperform a portfolio that includes delisted firms.
It must be noted that the inferences drawn by these authors can themselves be 
sensitive to experimental design. Both Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner
(1997), for example, focus on measuring portfolio long-horizon performance in event 
time, rather than calendar time. As Fama (1998) points out, event time results may be 
misleading about the pervasiveness of performance because any verification of an 
observed puzzle may only reflect investor sentiment. Moreover, as noted in Shleifer and 
Summers (1990), many trading strategies are based on pseudo-signals, noise, and 
popular models are correlated, leading to aggregate demand shifts. Consequently, to the 
degree that the design of the empirical experiment has an impact on the confidence of 
the reliability of inferences from long-horizon studies, the interpretation of the results 
on the performance of European IPOs requires caution.
For the evaluation of aftermarket IPO returns, our approach is similar to the 
empirical methodology in Ritter (1991). Consequently, we show results using but-and- 
hold returns (BHRs), when reporting long-term abnormal performance of IPOs. This 
procedure assumes no monthly portfolio rebalancing.24 However, we extend the 
performance analysis across several dimensions for the European market. Because we 
are interested in the dynamics of aftermarket performance, we report aftermarket returns 
over various holding periods. Furthermore, we also determine how the aftermarket
24 We have also calculated performance using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). While not shown 
separately in this section, we report the results in Appendix B, Table 33 amd Appendix B, Figure 10, 
respectively. The results cm monthly portfolio rebalancing confirm that the use of BHRs biases the long- 
run performance upwards, a finding consistent with the literature (Ritter (1991) or Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998)). For evidence on the individual European countries, we refer to Chapter III.
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performance o f European IPOs issued in “hot” and “cold” markets differs. Finally, we 
are also interested in whether issuing characteristics are related to these performance 
dynamics and time-varying market conditions. We calculate equally-weighted raw- and 
benchmark-adjusted returns over 1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months, whereas one month is 
defined as a consecutive 21-day-trading interval after the close of the first day of 
trading. In order to eliminate the effect of national holidays, stock prices for the national 
countries were first calibrated to a European trading day calendar. Returns were then 
calculated whenever at least one of the seven markets covered in this study was trading. 
If the IPO was delisted before the end o f the measurement period, we computed the 
return until the delisting date. Aftermarket returns are compared with four alternative 
size-based benchmarks, all o f which are value-weighted: (1) The Dow Jones STOXX 
broad-market index, excluding UK, which captures the ffee-float adjusted market 
capitalization o f around 95 percent of the market capitalization o f the countries in our 
sample, includes 404 European companies and is similar in terms of industry 
composition to the IPO sample, (2) the Dow Jones STOXX large-cap index, excluding 
UK companies, (3) the Dow Jones STOXX mid-cap index, excluding UK companies, 
and (4) the Dow Jones STOXX small-cap index, excluding UK companies. These 
indices have a history dating back to the start of the sample period in January 1988.
For this section, we also report wealth relatives (WR) by taking the ratio of one 
plus the IPO return divided by one plus the chosen benchmark return. A wealth relative 
less than one indicates that the IPO underperforms the chosen benchmark. Similarly, a 
wealth relative greater than one indicates that the IPO outperforms the chosen 
benchmark.26
25 The chosen benchmarks also form the basis of derivative products and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
26 We do not adjust for betas. A broad literature argues that differences in betas are too small to have 
significant effects on the conclusions (Ibbotson (1975), Clarkson and Thomson (1990) or Chan and 
Lakonishok (1992) for the US market, and Keloharju (1993) or Leleux (1996) for European Markets).
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Table 2
Initial Returns of European IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial return performance of European IPOs (1988-1998) under alternative 
market conditions and categorized according to age, sector, size, public float (%), and average daily 
standard deviation (S.D.) for the first 21 days of trading (unadjusted). The initial return is the difference 
from the final offering price to the first-day closing price. For example, for the youngest age group in 
“hot” markets, the initial return is 0.2496*100 = 24.96 percent. Based on 132 monthly observations, the 
first-order autocorrelation coefficient is i) for number of offerings: 0.597“ (0.086), ii) for average monthly 
initial returns: 0.300* (0.086). In the cross-section of observations, we find a first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient for initial returns of 0.180 for Old Economy Stocks versus 0.481 for New Economy stocks. 
The first-order autocorrelation is higher for the number of offerings: 0.238 for Old Economy Stocks and 
0.639 for New Economy stocks. All coefficients are highly significant at conventional levels. Because of 
the influence of few large privatization offerings, we do not find significant autocorrelation in issuing 
volume; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parenthesis.________________________________________________
Year Market Condition Number of Issues
Category 1988-1998 Hot Cold Hot-Cold All Hot Cold
Age < 14 0.2068* 0.2496* 0.0766“ 0.1731* 420 316 104
(0.0186) (0.0239) (0.0126)
15 < Age <36 0.1654* 0.1990* 0.0893* 0.1096* 297 206 91
(0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0194)
Age> 37 0.0969* 0.1333* 0.0562* 0.0770* 256 135 121
(0.0130) (0.0165) (0.0199)
New Economy 0.2718* 0.3126* 0.1048* 0.2078* 270 217 53
(0.0259) (0.0313) (0.0198)
Old Economy 0.1243* 0.1592* 0.0659* 0.0932* 703 440 263
(0.0092) (0.0127) (0.0117)
Small firms 0.1847* 0.2129* 0.1089* 0.1040* 361 263 98
(0.0176) (0.0221) (0.0249)
Medium firms 0.1729* 0.2259* 0.0619* 0.1639* 421 285 136
(0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0124)
Large firms 0.1114* 0.1604* 0.0463* 0.1141* 191 109 82
(0.0153) (0.0231) (0.0158)
Public Float < 20 0.1413* 0.1743* 0.0794* 0.0950* 273 178 95
(0.0121) (0.0166) (0.0134)
20 < Public Float < 30 0.2143* 0.2619“ 0.0880* 0.1740* 241 175 66
(0.0229) (0.0277) (0.0359)
30 < Public Float < 50 0.1795* 0.2399* 0.0580“ 0.1819* 283 189 94
(0.0225) (0.0322) (0.0132)
Public Float > 50 0.1122* 0.1360“ 0.0672* 0.0688* 176 115 61
(0.0199) (0.0278) (0.0225)
0.0000 < S.D. < 0.0124 0.0542* 0.0810“ 0.0352* 0.0458* 245 102 143
(0.0054) (0.0104) (0.0051)
0.0125 < S.D. < 0.0196 0.0969* 0.1288* 0.0485* 0.0803* 244 147 97
(0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0109)
0.0197 < S.D. < 0.0314 0.1333* 0.1403* 0.1032* 0.0370 243 197 46
(0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0258)
0.0315 < S.D. < oo 0.3794* 0.3935“ 0.2804* 0.1131 241 211 30
(0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0828)
All IPOs (Mean) 0.1652* 0.2098* 0.0725* 0.1374* 973 657 316
(0.0100) (0.0137) (0.0103)
All IPOs (Median) 0.0714 0.0952 0.0265 0.0687 973 657 316
a’b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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4 Performance Analysis of European Initial Public Offerings
4.1 Initial Returns
In Table 2, we present evidence concerning the underpricing phenomenon. The 
average initial return for the 973 European firms that went public between 1988 and 
1998 is 16.52 percent. The median is positive 7.14 percent where only 86 o f the 973 
offerings (8.84 percent) had negative unadjusted initial returns. 129 IPOs (13.26 
percent) did not change from the offering price, supporting the conjecture that positive 
mean initial returns result from a partially censored left tail, which itself stems from 
stabilization activities by underwriters (Ruud (1993) or Aggarwal (2000)). The findings 
are generally consistent with US evidence. For a sample of 6,249 US IPOs between 
1980 and 2001, Ritter and Welch (2002) find average underpricing to be 18.8 percent, 
ranging from 5.4 percent to 22.3 percent during our sample period.
In Figure 1, we graph IPO activity and stock market returns for the sample o f 
European IPOs. The first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the time series o f 132 
monthly observations o f average initial returns between January 1988 and December 
1998 is 0.300. The autocorrelation is higher when looking at the monthly number of 
offerings, with a first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.597 during the period 
between 1988 and 1998. Both coefficients are highly significant at conventional levels. 
Figure 1 also underlines that initial returns and issuing activity in Europe are sensitive 
to the general state of the stock market.
Table 2 shows the substantial variability in average underpricing when 
categorizing the sample according to the issuing characteristics. The model uses age, 
market sector and the standard deviation of aftermarket stock prices as measures o f 
uncertainty, producing results that confirm the monotonic relationship between risk and
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Figure 1
IPO Activity and Stock Market Returns
IPO proceeds are measured in 1998 purchasing power which is defined as the number of shares offered to 
the public times the final offering price. Initial Return is defined as the change from the IPO price to the 
closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The annual stock market return is defined as the annual 
change in the value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index, excluding the UK.
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initial returns, as postulated in the winner’s curse explanation o f underpricing. For the 
period 1988-1998, high-risk companies (younger firms) average substantially higher 
initial returns than low-risk companies (older firms). Initial returns are 10.99 percent 
higher for the youngest age group as compared to the oldest age group in the sample. 
Differences increase to 14.75 percent when comparing underpricing of New versus Old 
Economy IPOs. Using the daily standard deviation o f unadjusted aftermarket returns for 
the first month of trading, an ex-post measure of uncertainty, we confirm our 
observations. Moreover, not only do the higher-risk categories display higher initial 
returns, they also show greater variability in initial returns as indicated by the Standard 
Errors. The relationship between other issuing characteristics and initial returns, 
however, is less clear. Size and public float do not appear to be strongly related to the 
level of underpricing.
Evidence from Table 2 also shows that the quantitative relationship between 
company characteristics and average initial returns are not the same for IPO issued in 
“hot” or “cold” markets. We find average underpricing of 20.98 percent in “hot”
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markets versus 7.25 percent in “cold” markets, a difference of 13.74 percent. Much of 
this difference is attributable to underpricing among New Economy IPOs. This 
observation is similar to Ritter (1984) who relates the “hot issue” market of 1980-1981 
to IPOs in the natural resources sector. For each issuing characteristic, we also find that 
average initial returns are significantly higher in “hot” as opposed to “cold” markets. 
This difference is most pronounced in the category of New Economy IPOs, where the 
difference amounts to 20.78 percent. The findings confirm the effect o f clustering by 
industry in “hot” markets.
It is important to put the magnitude of initial returns into perspective. Loughran 
and Ritter (2002) report that from 1990 to 1998, companies going public in the US left a 
total o f $27.6 billion on the table, calculated by multiplying the first-day price gain by 
the number of shares sold. Investment bankers collected fees of €13 billion during this 
period. They found that most of the money left on the table came from a minority o f 
IPOs whose offering price had been revised upwards in the filing range, a finding 
consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon (Hanley (1993)). Although the 
average amount left on the table is $9.1 million, the median is only $2.3 million. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) attribute the willingness to leave such large amounts on the 
table to Prospect Theory, whereby, in most situations, issuers will sum-up the wealth 
loss from underpricing with the larger wealth gain obtained from the retained shares. 
They also argue that leaving money on the table is an indirect form of underwriter 
compensation.
For the sample of European IPOs, we find similar tendencies. The total amount of 
money left on the table during the period 1990-1998 amounted to €10.9 billion with 
underwriters collecting fees upwards o f €6 billion. We also find that most IPOs left 
relatively little money on the table. The average amount left on the table amounted to
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€13.4 million while the median was only €1.1 million. However, government 
privatizations had a strong effect on the results. When excluding privatization issues, 
which accounted for €5.2 billion o f money left on the table, the average amount of 
money left on the table falls to €7.2 million.27 As Perotti and Guney (1993), Perotti 
(1995), Shafik (1996), and Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) all point out, 
governments and their investment bankers have become extremely adept at 
manipulating the offer price and allocation terms of IPOs in order to achieve multiple, 
often competing, political and economic objectives. During the 1990s, for example, 
European governments decided to kick-start the development of a European equity 
culture by allocating discounted shares from formerly state-owned monopolies, such as 
telecommunications companies, to individual retail investors.
4.2 Aftermarket Returns
In Table 3, we report the buy-and-hold performance for European IPOs issued 
between 1988 and 1998 over different holding periods starting from the close o f the first 
day o f trading. In Panel A, we report the benchmark-adjusted equally-weighted 
aftermarket performance for different holding periods, independent of the market 
condition at the IPO date. The results indicate that the sample o f European IPOs 
outperformed all the benchmarks up to the first year of aftermarket trading. Over 12 
months, for example, the IPOs earned 27.79 percent, on average, while the broad market 
index earned 15.50 percent, a wealth relative o f 1.11. However, the broad-market and 
large-cap market-adjusted wealth relatives fall substantially when measuring 
the aftermarket performance over longer periods. Over three years, for example, IPOs
27 While raising €27.5 billion, four privatizations (Deutsche Telecom AG, France Telecom SA, TNT 
Poest Group NV and Swisscom AG) accounted for €4.0 billion of money left on the table. From 1996 
onwards, each of these companies were brought to the market by using the bookbuilding procedure and 
recorded significant average underpricing (14.02 percent).
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Table 3
Aftermarket Performance of European IPOs
The sample contains 973 European IPOs between 1988 and 1998. Aftermarket returns are measured as 
equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns, whereas one month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading 
interval from the first closing price, using European trading days, assuming a declining sample size. The 
value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX size indices (Broad-Market, Large-Caps, Mid-Caps and Small-Caps), 
excluding UK, were used as a proxy for the market benchmark. The wealth relative is the ratio of one plus 
the average aftermarket period buy-and-hold IPO return, divided by one plus the average aftermarket 
period benchmark buy-and-hold return. For example, for the month 36 adjustment of IPO returns for the 
movement in the broad- market benchmark, (1 + 0.6791)7(1+0.5947) = 1.05; Standard Errors (S.E.) in
Panel A: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: All Market Conditions
IPO and Benchmark Returns
IPO Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth
Aftermarket Return
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(N=973) 
Month 3 
(N=972) 
Month 12 
(N=970) 
Month 36 
(N=686) 
Month 60 
(N=381)
(0.0068) (0.0016) 
0.0591* 0.0276* 
(0.0111) (0.0035) 
0.2779* 0.1550* 
(0.0582) (0.0057) 
0.6791* 0.5947* 
(0.1746) (0.0172) 
0.5974* 0.6179* 
(0.1245) (0.0351)
(0.0066)
1.03*
(0.0104)
l . l l b
(0.0575)
1.05
(0.1729)
0.99
(0.0017)
0.0339*
(0.0035)
0.1791*
(0.0057)
0.7037*
(0.0184)
1.1974*
(0.1204) (0.0426)
(0.0066)
1.02b
(0.0105)
1.08°
(0.0575)
0.99
(0.1729)
0.73*
(0.1177)
(0.0015) (0.0066) 
0.0102* 1.05*
(0.0036) (0.0105) 
0.0910* 1.17*
(0.0058) (0.0575) 
0.3462* 1.25°
(0.0120) (0.1733) 
0.5313* 1.04
(0.0228) (0.1193)
(0.0016)
- 0 . 0101*
(0.0039)
0.0173*
(0.0061)
0.0951*
(0.0091)
0.0933*
(0.0151)
(0.0066)
1.07*
(0.0105)
1.26*
(0.0578)
1.53*
(0.1735)
1.46*
(0.1209)
Panel B: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: Hot Markets
IPO and Benchmark Returns
Aftermarket
IPO Broad- 
Retum Market
Wealth
Relative
Large-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Mid-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Small-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Month 1 
(N=657) 
Month 3 
(N=656) 
Month 12 
(N=655) 
Month 36 
(N=389) 
Month 60 
(N=119)
0.0442*
(0.0094)
0.0829*
(0.0156)
0.3439*
(0.0845)
0.8568*
(0.3014)
0.2795b
(0.1231)
0.0232“
(0.0021)
0.0371*
(0.0047)
0.1825*
(0.0075)
0.6120*
(0.0239)
0.1264*
(0.0310)
1.02°
(0.0093)
1.04*
(0.0147)
1.14c
(0.0837)
1.15
(0.2997)
1.14
(0.1228)
0.0264*
(0.0022)
0.0436*
(0.0047)
0.2068*
(0.0076)
0.7244*
(0.0255)
0.6066*
(0.0343)
1.02°
(0.0093)
1.04*
(0.0147)
1.11
(0.0837)
1.08
(0.2997)
0.80*
(0.1229)
0.0131*
(0.0020)
0.0145*
(0.0048)
0 . 1022*
(0.0075)
0.3146*
(0.0151)
0.2257*
(0.0194)
1.03*
(0.0092)
1.07*
(0.0147)
1.22*
(0.0836)
1.41°
(0.3001)
1.04
(0.1212)
0.0039
(0.0020)
-0.0066
(0.0052)
0.0292*
(0.0078)
0.0775*
(0.0124)
-0.0903*
(0.0100)
1.04*
(0.0092)
1.09“
(0.0148)
1.31*
(0.0839)
1.72*
(0.3002)
1.41*
(0.1222)
Panel C: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f  IPOs: Cold Markets
IPO and Benchmark Returns
IPO
Aftermarket Return
Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth
Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative
Month 1 0.0041 0.0066* 1.00
(N=316) (0.0069) (0.0022) (0.0068)
Month 3 0.0097 0.0077° 1.00
(N=316) (0.0103) (0.0043) (0.0098)
Month 12 0.1406* 0.0978* 1.04
(N=315) (0.0352) (0.0074) (0.0333)
Month 36 0.4465* 0.5719* 0.92°
(N=297) (0.0810) (0.0243) (0.0734)
Month 60 0.7418* 0.8412* 0.95
(N=262) (0.1716) (0.0425) (0.1658)
0.0087* 1.00 0.0048° 1.00 -0.0033 1.01
(0.0022) (0.0068) (0.0023) (0.0068) (0.0024) (0.0069)
0.0137“ 1.00 0.0014 1.01 -0.0175* 1.03*
(0.0042) (0.0098) (0.0045) (0.0098) (0.0051) (0.0100)
0.1215* 1.02 0.0679* 1.07b -0.0076 1.15*
(0.0067) (0.0334) (0.0085) (0.0333) (0.0097) (0.0338)
0.6766* 0.86* 0.3875* 1.04 0.1182* 1.29“
(0.0262) (0.0733) (0.0191) (0.0742) (0.0133) (0.0764)
1.4657* 0.71* 0.6701* 1.04 0.1766* 1.48*
(0.0522) (0.1614) (0.0281) (0.1646) (0.0194) (0.1669)
*’b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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returned 67.91 percent on average while the broad market returned 59.47 percent, a ratio 
of 1.05. Panel A also shows that IPO performance is sensitive to the benchmark 
employed. Across all measurement horizons, IPOs perform better relative to small-caps 
than relative to large-caps. In Panels B and C of Table 3, we present results calculated 
according to the market condition at the time of the IPO. We find that the favourable 
aftermarket IPO performance is mainly driven by outperformance o f IPOs issued in 
“hot” markets. IPOs issued in “cold” markets underperform in the long-run. For 
example, investing in the average sample o f IPOs in “cold” markets would have left the 
investor with only €0.92 relative to each Euro invested in the broad-market index after 
three years, while rendering €1.15 if invested during a “hot” market period.
While not reported separately, the long-run performance picture changes 
dramatically when looking at the median IPO. A strategy of investing in the median IPO 
at the end of the first day of trading and holding over a three-year period, would have 
left the investor with only €0.67 relative to each Euro invested in the broad-market 
index. This underlines the skewness of the return distribution with only 28 percent o f 
the issuers reporting positive broad-market-adjusted returns, and some extreme winners 
dominating the mean return picture. In Appendix B, Table 32, we have also calculated 
value-weighted results for the aftermarket performance o f European IPOs. Brav and 
Gompers (1997) find that value-weighting significantly reduces performance 
differences. For the sample o f European IPOs, however, value-weighting does not 
significantly change the results from equally-weighting. Indeed, the three-year broad- 
market-adjusted wealth relative is 1.06 compared to 1.05 for the equally-weighted 
sample of European IPOs. The wealth relatives fall to 0.73 (equally-weighted) and 0.74 
(value-weighted) when measured over five years, respectively.
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4.3 Cross-Sectional Results
4.3.1 Performance Categorized by Initial Returns
In order to shed more light on the dynamics o f European IPO performance, this 
section distinguishes firms by issuing characteristic and provides time-series evidence 
of performance. For each issuing characteristic, we divide the sample into sub-samples 
and use dummy variables to distinguish each subsample. The resulting regression 
coefficients measure the difference in average market-adjusted returns across 
subsamples, calculated for each measurement horizon and market condition. In the rest 
of this chapter, we will focus on reporting the results adjusted for movements in the 
value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index, excluding the UK.
In Table 4, firms are segmented by the initial return of the IPO. The results are 
categorized according to four initial return categories and across three dimensions: IPOs 
issued in all market conditions, “hot” markets, and “cold” markets. Panel A reveals that 
there is a tendency for companies that have the highest initial returns to have the best 
aftermarket performance across all measurement horizons. Companies that have the 
lowest initial returns also exhibit the worst aftermarket performance. The result extends 
to all measurement horizons and is most significant in the short-run. Over 36 months, 
for example, the difference between the market-adjusted aftermarket performance 
between highest and lowest initial returns category is 65.52 percent. In Panels B and C, 
we are able to disentangle this observation by looking at IPOs issued in “hot” and 
“cold” markets separately. For IPOs issued in “cold” markets, we find that the positive 
relationship between initial returns and broad-market-adjusted aftermarket performance 
is more consistent and more significant, albeit less in magnitude, compared
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Table 4
Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Initial Return
Ri = a + /?iDu + + PiDx + Ej
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R* is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, D2i, and D3j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified initial return 
category and 0 otherwise. The initial return is the percentage difference from the final offering price to the first-day closing price and divided into four categories: IPOs with 
initial returns of not more than 0%, IPOs with more than 0% but less than 7% initial returns, IPOs with at least 7% but less than 20% initial returns and IPOs with more than 
20% initial returns; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses. This table assumes a declining sample size.________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P \ S.E. P i S.E. f i i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0134” -0.0226 (0.0138) -0.0180 (0.0184) 0.0678“ (0.0188) 0.0963“ (0.0190) 973 215 270 250 238
Month 3 0.0315“ -0.0424 (0.0219) 0.0217 (0.0293) 0.1227“ (0.0298) 0.1483“ (0.0301) 972 214 270 250 238
Month 12 0.1229b -0,0436 (0,1225) 0.1826 (0.1643) 0.2671 (0.1669) 0.1923 (0.1688) 970 214 268 250 238
Month 36 0.0845 -0.3006 (0.3676) 0.6181 (0.4882) 0.2319 (0.4961) 0.6552 (0.5216) 686 152 199 185 150
Month 60 -0.0205 -0.1792 (0.2375) -0.0035 (0.3140) -0.1228 (0.3341) 1.1742“ (0.3779) 381 95 127 97 62
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. fix S.E. f i i S.E. f i i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0210b -0.0146 (0.0209) -0.0407 (0.0282) 0.06506 (0.0272) 0.0876“ (0.0265) 657 123 151 178 205
Month 3 0.0458“ -0.0367 (0.0337) 0.0153 (0.0453) 0.1275“ (0.0437) 0.1419“ (0.0426) 656 122 151 178 205
Month 12 0.1614° -0.0705 (0.1939) 0.3656 (0.2611) 0.3311 (0.2517) 0.1859 (0.2449) 655 122 150 178 205
Month 36 0.2448 -0.5121 (0.7391) 1.5288 (0.9714) 0.5059 (0.9166) 0.8449 (0.9179) 389 64 88 119 118
Month 60 0.1531 0.1761 (0.2912) 0.0266 (0.4028) -0.3238 (0.3597) 0.2747 (0.3684) 119 21 23 40 35
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. fix S.E. P i S.E. f i i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0025 -0.0333“ (0.0120) 0.0112 (0.0160) 0.0657“ (0.0182) 0.1111“ (0.0234) 316 92 119 72 33
Month 3 0.0020 -0.0499“ (0.0173) 0.0300 (0.0230) 0.1043“ (0.0261) 0.1604“ (0.0336) 316 92 119 72 33
Month 12 0.0427 -0.0080 (0.0604) -0.0515 (0.0806) 0.1397 (0.0912) 0.3652“ (0.1176) 315 92 118 72 33
Month 36 -0.1254° -0.1468 (0.1339) -0.0900 (0.1792) -0.0346 (0.2045) 0.5819b (0.2592) 297 88 111 66 32
Month 60 -0.0994 -0.2800 (0.3055) 0.0121 (0.3997) -0.1302 (0.4632) 1.9807“ (0.5909) 262 74 104 57 27
“* ,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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to that for “hot” markets. The underperformance of IPOs is most pervasive in the 
category of IPOs with zero or negative initial returns. In this category, IPOs issued in 
“hot” markets underperformed the market by 51.21 percent, while IPOs in “cold” 
markets underperformed by 14.68 percent over three years.
The findings reveal a number o f interesting patterns related to the literature. 
When considering the short-run dynamics, the result indicates a clearly significant 
relation between underpricing and performance under the market conditions studied. 
Underpricing indeed seems to induce sentiment-driven short-run positive feedback 
strategies (Rajan and Servaes (1993)). The significantly negative returns of IPOs with 
least underpricing are also indicative of the effect of the cessation of stabilization 
activities of underwriters in the immediate aftermarket (Hanley, Kumar and Seguin 
(1992), Ruud (1993)). Moreover, the results for long-run performance contrast with 
Ritter’s (1991) findings which reveal a tendency for firms with high initial returns to 
have the worst aftermarket performance. This, according to the author, mildly supports 
DeBondt and Thalers (1985) “overreaction hypothesis” as an explanation for the poor 
long-run performance of US IPOs. The results are also not consistent with Shiller’s 
(1990) “Impresario” hypothesis, which predicts a negative relation between initial 
returns and aftermarket performance, in particular for IPOs issued in “hot” markets. As 
well, our findings do not correspond to the desire of issuers to avoid future lawsuits by 
underpricing (Tinic (1988)). The results, however, do support the various signaling 
theories of underpricing (Allen and Faulhaber (1989) or Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)). 
Here, underpricing separates low-quality firms from high-quality firms, since only high 
quality firms are expected to recoup the initial loss of underpricing once their true value 
is revealed.
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4.3.2 Performance Categorized by Age
In Table 5, we segment firms according to their age at the time of going public. 
Ritter (1991) finds poor long-run performance with younger US IPOs and interprets this 
as being consistent with investor overoptimism and “fads”.
For the sample of European IPOs, we find that young IPOs fare substantially 
better than old IPOs. The pattern consistently extends across all measurement horizons. 
The magnitude of the market-adjusted return difference is economically significant and 
accounts for 86.84 percent of return performance, when comparing the youngest with 
the oldest age group over 36 months. In the short-run, the patterns confirm the large 
performance differences in favor of the youngest IPO firms. For example, the 419 firms 
in the youngest age category outperform the market by 31.20 percent over one year. In 
this case, the difference with their oldest counterparts accounts for 37.90 percent. 
Results in Panels B and C of Table 5 indicate that the relationship between age and 
aftermarket returns is not the same for IPOs issued during “hot” and “cold” markets. In 
“hot” markets, the youngest IPOs have overperformed old firms by 150.79 percent over 
three years, with similarly positive dynamics over shorter measurement horizons. 
However, there is no clear indication that could postulate a link between age and 
aftermarket returns for IPO issued in “cold” markets. Here, the youngest firms 
underperform the market as well as old firms over three years.
The results for the European IPO market suggest that riskier issues require 
higher initial returns and that age is a proxy for risk. This also suggests that the role o f 
age differs for “hot” and “cold” markets and that age is a good proxy for investor 
sentiment, particularly for IPOs in “hot” markets. This is consistent with Helwege and 
Liang (2001) who find that “... investors are much more (perhaps overly)
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Table 5
Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Age
Ri = a + + &D2i+ Si
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R, is the broad-market-adjusted return. Dn and D2i are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified age category and 0 
otherwise. Age is defined as the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 assumed to be founded in 1901. Observations of company 
age are divided into three categories: IPOs with age between 0-14 years (young firms), 15-36 years (medium-young firms) and IPOs older than 37 years (old firms); Standard 
Errors (S.E.) in parentheses. This table assumes a declining sample size._________________________________________________________________________________
Aftermarket Ri
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions 
a  S.E. A S.E. Pi S.E. Total
Number of Issues 
D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 0.0134b 0.0370“ (0.0100) -0.0244 (0.0156) -0.0613“ (0.0163) 973 420 297 256
Month 3 0.0315“ 0.0800“ (0.0158) -0.0646“ (0.0245) -0.1091“ (0.0256) 972 419 297 256
Month 12 0.1229b 0.3120“ (0.0872) -0.2935b (0.1354) -0.3790“ (0.1420) 970 419 297 254
Month 36 0.0845 0.5794b (0.2792) -0,7318° (0.4186) -0.8684b (0.4164) 686 262 210 214
Month 60 -0.0205 0.0404 (0.2110) 0.1410 (0.3100) -0.2554 (0.2852) 381 124 107 150
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. Pi S.E. Pi S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 0.0210b 0.0494“ (0.0132) -0.0388° (0.0211) -0.0789“ (0.0242) 657 316 206 135
Month 3 0.0458“ 0.1060“ (0.0210) -0.1007“ (0.0334) -0.1387“ (0.0383) 656 315 206 135
Month 12 0.1614° 0.3992“ (0.1201) -0.4396b (0.1910) -0.4867b (0.2199) 655 315 206 134
Month 36 0.2448 1.1135b (0.4635) -1.4614b (0.6995) -1.5079b (0.7443) 389 161 126 102
Month 60 0.1531 0.2806 (0.2312) -0.1643 (0.3224) -0.1889 (0.3009) 119 34 36 49
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance of IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. Pi S.E. Pi S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 -0.0025 -0.0008 (0.0118) 0.0178 (0.0173) -0.0178 (0.0161) 316 104 91 121
Month 3 0.0020 0.0014 (0.0169) 0.0372 (0.0247) -0.0264 (0.0230) 316 104 91 121
Month 12 0.0427 0.0478 (0.0576) 0.1038 (0.0844) -0.0919 (0.0788) 315 104 91 120
Month 36 -0.1254° -0.2720b (0.1251) 0.4129b (0.1857) 0.0791 (0.1726) 297 101 84 112
Month 60 -0.0994 -0.0503 (0.2830) 0.2647 (0.4261) -0.3134 (0.3891) 262 90 71 101
 ^ ° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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optimistic in hot markets, as hot market firms may be able to go public at a more 
favourable price and certainly raise more money in their offering.”
4.3.3 Performance Categorized by Size
In Table 6, firms are segmented by market capitalization (size) into three size 
categories. As shown in Table 2, small offerings have slightly higher initial returns. 
Table 6 discloses that smaller offering tend to have the best long-run performance. For 
example, the smallest IPOs with a market capitalization below €100 million at the first 
day o f trading outperform the largest IPO firms by 57.86 percent over three years. This 
is similar for IPOs issued in “hot” and “cold” markets. As shown in Panels A, B, and C, 
the smallest IPOs outperform their larger peers for 27 of the 30 measurement horizons.
Table 6 also reveals a tendency for the smallest offerings in the immediate 
aftermarket to outperform the market and larger offerings. As seen earlier, our sample 
of small European IPOs is clustered in “hot” markets, indicated by the relatively small 
median size of companies going public (€66.2 million). Because small offerings 
typically have a small public float, they are particularly susceptible to institutional 
frictions prevailing in the immediate IPO aftermarket and to investor sentiment. 
Conversely, Ritter (1991) finds a tendency for smaller offerings, which also have the 
highest initial returns, to have the worst aftermarket performance. In his sample, all 
size-categories display poor long-run performance. Our results are consistent with our 
earlier observation that, in contrast to Brav and Gompers (1997), value-weighting does 
not change the results on aftermarket performance. Owing to their weak statistical 
power, however, results regarding the role of size in the European market need to be 
treated with caution.
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Table 6
Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size
Ri = a + y9iDn + /?2D2i+ e;
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). Rj is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, and D*, are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified size category and 0 
otherwise. Size/Market Capitalization in €m is the number of shares issued times the final offer price and is expressed in constant end-1998 prices. Observations for size are 
divided into three categories: Firms with a first day market capitalization less than €100m (small firms), between €100 and €500m (medium firms) and exceeding €500m 
(large firms); Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses. This table assumes a declining sample size.______________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0134b 0.0321“ (0.0109) -0.0274° (0.0148) -0.0346° (0.0185) 973 361 421 191
Month 3 0.0315“ 0.0375b (0.0171) -0.0036 (0.0234) -0.0223 (0.0291) 972 361 420 191
Month 12 0.1229b 0.1973b (0.0944) -0.1644 (0.1288) -0.0175 (0.1604) 970 360 419 191
Month 36 0.0845 0.4670 (0.2910) -0.5975 (0.3942) -0.5786 (0.4667) 686 242 290 154
Month 60 -0.0205 0.2566 (0.2135) -0.6038b (0.2813) -0.0731 (0.3184) 381 120 163 98
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0210b 0.0372b (0.0146) -0.0208 (0.0203) -0.0427 (0.0270) 657 263 285 109
Month 3 0.0458“ 0.0420° (0.0232) 0.0181 (0.0323) -0.0245 (0.0429) 656 263 284 109
Month 12 0.1614° 0.2216° (0.1321) -0.1660 (0.1835) 0.0690 (0.2440) 655 263 283 109
Month 36 0.2448 0.6823 (0.4847) -0.6444 (0.6715) -0.8436 (0.8268) 389 149 162 78
Month 60 0.1531 0.4713b (0.2162) -0.4704° (0.2844) -0.4622 (0.3286) 119 38 52 29
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0025 0.0184 (0.0121) -0.0383b (0.0159) -0.0168 (0.0180) 316 98 136 82
Month 3 0.0020 0.0252 (0.0174) -0.0461b (0.0229) -0.0133 (0.0258) 316 98 136 82
Month 12 0.0427 0.1313b (0.0599) -0.1456° (0.0784) -0.0987 (0.0885) 315 97 136 82
Month 36 -0.1254° 0.1220 (0.1299) -0.4658“ (0.1707) -0.1825 (0.1937) 297 93 128 76
Month 60 -0.0994 0.1571 (0.2950) -0.6674° (0.3889) 0.0996 (0.4363) 262 82 111 69
“■° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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4.3.4 Performance Categorized by Public Float
Table 7 segments the firms by the size of the public float. Here, we divide the 
sample into four groups. Based on the results from Table 2, public float does not appear 
to be strongly related to the level of underpricing.
Three interpretations of Table 7 are possible: First, there appears to be a linear 
relation between public float and market-adjusted aftermarket performance. These 
performance dynamics are pervasive. Companies issuing least, fare the best. Companies 
issuing most, fare the worst. For example, after three months of trading, the difference 
in the broad-market-adjusted return between companies with the smallest and the largest 
public float is 10.66 percent. This difference increases to 64.23 percent after three years 
in the aftermarket. The performance patterns are manifested particularly in firms that 
bring at least 50 percent of their company to the market. Second, the relation between 
public float and IPO return dynamics is relatively insensitive to the market condition at 
the IPO date. For instance, companies with the largest public float underperform 
companies with the lowest public float by 72.61 percent over three years when issued 
during “hot” markets, and by 54.86 percent during “cold” markets. Third, public float is 
significantly related to IPO performance in the immediate aftermarket. This effect 
appears to be stronger under “hot” markets than under “cold” markets. This is indicative 
of the strong influence of investor sentiment in driving a limited supply o f shares, in a 
market characterized by institutional arrangements unrelated to fundamentals.
The negative relation between public float and aftermarket performance for the 
European IPO market is consistent with several explanations in the literature. Primary 
among these are the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency hypothesis and the Leland and 
Pyle (1977) signaling hypothesis. In Jensen and Meckling (1976), a higher ownership 
retention rate, hence lower public float, reduces incentives to undertake non value
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Table 7
Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Public Float
Ri = a + /fjDii + /?2D2i + /?3D3i + 6i
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R* is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, D2i, and D3j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified category of 
public float and 0 otherwise. Public Float is defined as the percentage of equity offered to the public at the IPO date. Observations on the public float are divided into four 
categories: Firms with less than 20% of public float, with at least 20% but less than 30% of public float, with at least 30% but less than 50% of public float, and at least 50% 
of public float; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses. This table assumes a declining sample size.___________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P \ S.E. P i S.E. 0 3 S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0134° 0.0625“ (0.0124) -0.0416° (0.0181) -0.0845“ (0.0173) -0.0788“ (0.0197) 973 273 241 283 176
Month 3 0.0315“ 0.0850“ (0.0195) -0.0292 (0.0285) -0.0931“ (0.0274) -0.1066“ (0.0313) 972 273 241 283 175
Month 12 0.1229b 0.1774 (0.1083) 0.1012 (0.1584) -0.1118 (0.1520) -0.2609 (0.1734) 970 273 240 282 175
Month 36 0.0845 0.2513 (0.3158) -0.2374 (0.4744) 0.0321 (0.4566) -0.6423 (0.5114) 686 206 164 189 127
Month 60 -0.0205 0.2162 (0.2095) -0.2859 (0.3195) -0.3244 (0.3215) -0.4907 (0.3556) 381 126 95 93 67
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. 0 2 S.E. 0 3 S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0210b 0.0828“ (0.0175) -0.0485° (0.0249) -0.1043“ (0.0244) -0.1076“ (0.0279) 657 178 175 189 115
Month 3 0.0458“ 0.1175“ (0.0279) -0.0315 (0.0396) -0.1249“ (0.0389) -0.1570“ (0.0447) 656 178 175 189 114
Month 12 0.1614c 0.1956 (0.1604) 0.1698 (0.2279) -0.1121 (0.2239) -0.2726 (0.2568) 655 178 175 188 114
Month 36 0.2448 0.3654 (0.5624) -0.2107 (0.8127) 0.2581 (0.8086) -0.7261 (0.8965) 389 111 102 104 72
Month 60 0.1531 0.0872 (0.2165) 0.1776 (0.3042) -0.1006 (0.3605) 0.1641 (0.3852) 119 39 40 22 18
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P i S.E. 0 2 S.E. 0 3 S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0025 0.0246° (0.0123) -0.0389° (0.0192) -0.0475“ (0.0174) -0.0249 (0.0196) 316 95 66 94 61
Month 3 0.0020 0.0243 (0.0178) -0.0482° (0.0278) -0.0335 (0.0252) -0.0121 (0.0284) 316 95 66 94 61
Month 12 0.0427 0.1432b (0.0604) -0.0984 (0.0947) -0.1135 (0.0856) -0.2390b (0.0965) 315 95 65 94 61
Month 36 -0.1254° 0.1180 (0.1289) -0.3357 (0.2051) -0.2506 (0.1876) -0.5486“ (0.2129) 297 95 62 85 55
Month 60 -0.0994 0.2740 (0.2878) -0.5870 (0.4624) -0.4115 (0.4293) -0.7416 (0.4795) 262 87 55 71 49
“• ,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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maximizing projects. Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that, by retaining a significant 
stake in the firm, entrepreneurs can signal the quality of their firm since ramification 
can be costly. For US IPOs, Jain and Kini (1994) confirm the relatively superior post- 
IPO operating performance where entrepreneurs retain a large stake in the firm.
4.3.5 Performance Categorized by Sector
The sample period has been characterized by an unprecedented change caused 
by the increasing role of information and communications technologies. In our final 
analysis o f cross-sectional offerings characteristics, we study whether the aftermarket 
performance of European IPOs mirrors this change.
For this purpose, we segment firms according to the attached Dow Jones 
STOXX global sector classification scheme. Initially, we categorize IPOs according to 
18 market sectors. Then, we pool all companies in Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17 into one 
group that represents the New Economy sectors (Technology, Media, 
Telecommunications and Healthcare). For our sample o f 973 European IPOs, 270 
accounted for New Economy IPOs (28 percent). All other IPOs are classified as Old 
Economy firms. The average New Economy firm is 16 years old and has a median size 
o f €51.7 million when going public. Conversely, we record an average age of 32 years 
and a median size of €84.9 million for Old Economy firms. As seen in Table 1, the 
sample composition of European IPOs has changed in favor of New Economy IPOs at 
the expense of Old Economy IPOs over time. The change in industry representation is 
indicative of the flow of capital into growth industries.
Table 2 displays significant differences in terms of underpricing between New 
and Old Economy IPOs. The findings on aftermarket performance o f New Economy 
versus Old Economy IPOs reported in Table 8 follow a similar, clearly distinctive
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Table 8
Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Sector
Ri = a + pD{ + £j
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for 
different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets and Cold Markets). Rj is the broad- 
market-adjusted return. Dj is a (0,1) dummy variable taking the value of 0 if the firm belongs to a market 
sector defined as New Economy and 1 otherwise. New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5,13, 16 
and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively. Old economy 
firms belong to all other sectors; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses. This table assumes a declining 
sample size.__________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 0.0134b 0.0477* (0.0125) -0.0475* (0.0147) 973 270 703
Month 3 0.0315* 0.1160* (0.0196) -0.117* (0.0230) 972 270 702
Month 12 0.1229b 0.3685* (0.1087) -0.340* (0.1280) 970 270 700
Month 36 0.0845 1.3080* (0.3555) -1.593* (0.4056) 686 159 527
Month 60 -0.0205 0.7982* (0.2733) -1.010* (0.3034) 381 72 309
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 0.0210b 0.0566* (0.0160) -0.053* (0.0196) 657 217 440
Month 3 0.0458“ 0.1315* (0.0253) -0.128* (0.0309) 656 217 439
Month 12 0.1614° 0.3749* (0.1451) -0.319° (0.1774) 655 217 438
Month 36 0.2448 1.8065* (0.5673) -2.147* (0.6651) 389 106 283
Month 60 0.1531 0.5148° (0.2663) -0.458 (0.2997) 119 25 94
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 -0.0025 0.0114 (0.0166) -0.017 (0.0182) 316 53 263
Month 3 0.0020 0.0524b (0.0236) -0.06 lb (0.0259) 316 53 263
Month 12 0.0427 0.3420* (0.0792) -0.360* (0.0869) 315 53 262
Month 36 -0.1254° 0.3109° (0.1718) -0.531* (0.1895) 297 53 244
Month 60 -0.0994 0.9490b (0.3857) -1.278* (0.4257) 262 47 215
*• 'denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
performance pattern. New Economy stocks outperform the market as well as their peers 
during all measurement periods. Figure 2 graphs the performance dynamics. The return 
differences are pervasive. For example, the spread in benchmark adjusted returns 
between New and Old Economy IPOs widened from 4.75 percent after the first month, 
to 34.0 percent over one year and to 159.30 percent after three years of aftermarket 
trading. Associated statistics underline the significance of the results that also prevail 
for IPOs issued in “hot” and “cold” markets. Within sectors, telecommu­
nications, technology and healthcare had the best long-run performance, benefiting from
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Month of seasoning
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Figure 2. Average market-adjusted aftermarket Performance Categorized by Sector. The initial 
sample is comprised of 703 Old Economy IPOs and 270 New Economy IPOs. New Economy firms 
belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and 
Healthcare. Old Economy firms belong to all other economic sectors in the Dow Jones STOXX global 
sector classification standard. Returns are measured as buy-and-hold returns from the close at the day of 
going public where one month is defined as consecutive 21-day-trading period using European trading 
days.
deregulation, the global technology boom and the shift towards private medical care in 
Continental Europe. IPOs in sectors representing basic materials or industrial firms 
(many o f which went public in the early 1990s during the boom in German construction 
activity following the German Unification) fared the worst. All but 5 of the 18 industry 
groups recorded long-run underperformance.
The magnitude of the performance differences in New versus Old Economy 
IPOs over such a long time period is puzzling. Generally, the findings are strongly 
supportive o f Brav and Gompers’ (1997) conjecture that investors should not treat IPOs 
as a homogenous group and that subsample analysis can shed more light on the 
generality of the performance patterns. For Old Economy IPOs, the findings can be 
interpreted as evidence that is consistent with the fact that firms take advantage of
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“windows o f opportunity” in bringing their relatively old, mature companies with less 
growth and earnings potential to the market. The evidence on New Economy IPOs, 
however, is not consistent with the predictions o f either the “windows o f opportunity” 
(Ritter (1991)) or “fads” (Shiller (1990)) hypothesis. It is also not consistent with 
theories that address the negative link between short- and long-run performance from an 
institutional perspective (Miller (1977)). The overperformance in New Economy stocks 
may stem from risk mismeasurement, investor sentiment or unexpected positive shocks, 
such as the sharp increase o f the contribution of the New Economy to productivity 
growth during a period of unexpectedly prolonged economic growth during the 1990s 
(Gordon (2000)).28
In Figure 3, we graph the difference in three-year performance of New Economy 
IPOs versus Old Economy IPOs for IPOs issued on a year-by-year basis. We also 
display the composition o f the European IPO sample and extend the information to 
include the sample composition o f European IPOs during 1999 and 2000, the period 
commonly referred to as “Internet Bubble”. Figure 3 underlines how New Economy 
IPOs issued between 1988 and 1998 outperformed their Old Economy peers 
consistently over a three-year horizon. The possible exceptions are Old Economy IPOs
90issued during 1992, which slightly overperformed over a three-year return window. 
We also find a remarkable change in the sample composition during the “Internet 
Bubble”. This seems to be at least partly driven by the outperformance of previous 
years’ New Economy IPOs.
28 See also Fortune (March 18,2002): “The productivity miracle is for real” (page 51).
29 We also perform the analysis for the three individual “hot” and three “cold” markets defined in Table 1 
and find that Old Economy IPOs issued in each of the “hot” and “cold” markets underperform.
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Figure 3. IPO Activity and Performance of New Economy IPOs. The initial sample of European 
IPOs between 1988-1998 is comprised o f 703 Old Economy IPOs and 270 New Economy IPOs. During 
1999 and 2000, a total of 535 companies went public in the seven countries under study, 366 of those 
are classified as New Economy companies. New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 
17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare. Old Economy firms belong to 
all other economic sectors in the Dow Jones STOXX global industry classification scheme. Returns are 
measured as buy-and-hold returns from the close at the day of going public whereas one month is 
defined as a consecutive 21 -day-trading period using European trading days.
5 Regression Results
Our previous analysis shows that the cross-sectional patterns in European IPO 
performance are not mutually exclusive. For example, IPOs in New Economy sectors 
experienced the highest initial returns, tended to be the younger companies and also 
recorded higher returns across all measurement horizons compared their Old Economy 
peers. This observation holds for New Economy firms issued during “hot” and “cold” 
markets. To disentangle these observations, we perform univariate regression analysis 
using the raw return of the IPOs as the dependent variable similar to Ritter (1991). The 
explanatory variables are the unadjusted initial return, the logarithm of one plus age, the 
aftermarket return on the broad-market benchmark, the logarithm o f one plus size, the 
public float and a (0,1) dummy variable representing New Economy firms.
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Table 9
OLS Regression Results for Aftermarket Performance
R* = a + PiIRt + p2Log (1+ageO + p3Market; + p4Log(Sizej) + p5PublicFloati + p6D; + 8t 
R, is the raw return (not reported separately), measured from the first closing price. IR« is the initial return, defined as the difference between the first closing price and the 
offering price. Log (l+agej) is the natural logarithm of one plus the difference between the year of going public and the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Market; is the return on the value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index for the same return interval as the dependent variable. 
Log (Size;) is the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted size/market capitalization, defined as the total number of shares issued times the first closing price. PublicFloat; is the 
Percentage of Equity offered to the public. D; is a (0,1) Dummy variable taking on the value of 0 if the issuing firm belongs to a New Economy sector, and 1 otherwise.
Aftermarket a S.E. fix
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: All Market Conditions 
S.E. fii S.E. A  S.E. A  S.E. A S.E. A S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.209b (0.0886) 0.060“ (0.0215) -0.026 (0.0156) 0.835* (0.1303) -0.018° (0.0109) -0.103* (0.0307) 0.028° (0.0154) 0.082 973
Month 3 0.056 (0.1389) 0.028 (0.0338) -0.050b (0.0246) 1.106* (0.0947) 0.006 (0.0172) -0.140* (0.0485) 0.100* (0.0242) 0.155 972
Month 12 -0.386 (0.7798) -0.024 (0.1888) -0.137 (0.1375) 1.730* (0.3240) 0.083 (0.0958) -0.513° (0.2709) 0.304b (0.1350) 0.041 970
Month 36 0.438 (2.3137) 0.480 (0.7465) -0.196 (0.4008) 1.282* (0.3892) -0.047 (0.2790) -0.862 (0.7806) 1.439* (0.4259) 0.044 686
Month 60 0.045 (1.5609) 1.466* (0.5574) 0.149 (0.2641) 0.950“ (0.1737) -0.039 (0.1899) -0.806 (0.5330) 0.934* (0.3092) 0.116 381
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: Hot Markets
Aftermarket a S.E. fix S.E. P i S.E. P i S.E. P a S.E. P s S.E. f ie S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.276b (0.1287) 0.036 (0.0267) -0.039° (0.0226) 0.868“ (0.1695) -0.023 (0.0157) -0.136* (0.0438) 0.033 (0.0204) 0.078 657
Month 3 0.071 (0.2031) -0.003 (0.0423) -0.073b (0.0356) 1.179* (0.1208) 0.012 (0.0249) -0.223* (0.0697) 0.114* (0.0323) 0.158 656
Month 12 -0.785 (1.1858) -0.075 (0.2463) -0.210 (0.2073) 1.788“ (0.4429) 0.151 (0.1440) -0.670° (0.4037) 0.316° (0.1868) 0.035 655
Month 36 1.017 (4.2188) 0.095 (1.1723) -0.636 (0.7309) 1.079 (0.6607) -0.036 (0.4931) -0.828 (1.3604) 1.955* (0.7043) 0.040 389
Month 60 2.556 (1.7854) 0.557 (0.4746) -0.228 (0.2906) 0.497 (0.3643) -0.275 (0.2035) 0.102 (0.5341) 0.286 (0.3167) 0.073 119
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: Cold Markets
Aftermarket a S.E. fix S.E. fii S.E. f i i S.E. P a S.E. fis S.E. P e S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.036 (0.0847) 0.200* (0.0361) -0.036 (0.0151) 0.739* (0.1657) -0.005 (0.0106) -0.037 (0.0294) 0.010 (0.0179) 0.145 316
Month 3 -0.097 (0.1263) 0.176“ (0.0530) 0.003 (0.0224) 0.766* (0.1297) 0.009 (0.0158) 0.005 (0.0436) 0.066b (0.0270) 0.166 316
Month 12 0.255 (0.4229) 0.271 (0.1789) 0.038 (0.0753) 1.515* (0.2553) -0.037 (0.0531) -0.262° (0.1472) 0.304* (0.0915) 0.179 315
Month 36 0.514 (0.9272) 1.049* (0.3974) -0.298° (0.1613) 1.423* (0.1700) -0.148 (0.1158) -0.794b (0.3214) 0.474b (0.1899) 0.263 297
Month 60
a,b,c j ____. . _
-0.630 (2.1128) 2.437“ (0.9183) 0.272 (0.3631) 0.983* (0.2388) 0.024 (0.2650) -1.296° (0.7414) 1.279* (0.4302) 0.134 262
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The results are displayed in Table 9. For the sample as a whole, the coefficient 
of determination is rather low across the measurement periods.30 It is markedly higher 
for IPOs issued in “cold” than in “hot” markets. The parameter estimates support the 
conclusions that were obtained earlier. The initial return category is correlated with the 
aftermarket performance o f IPOs issued in “cold” markets, with four out of five 
measurement horizons being significantly positive. Age is correlated with immediate 
aftermarket returns for IPOs issued in “hot” markets, with all signs being negative 
across return windows. The coefficient on the market indicates that the beta for our 
sample o f European IPOs is time-varying. Given the techno logy-led rise in share prices, 
particularly throughout the second half o f the sample period, the coefficient on the 
market return of 1.28 over three years is in line with our expectation that IPOs are 
slightly riskier than the market. There is only weak evidence to support that size is 
correlated with returns, confirming our finding that value-weighting does not change 
our findings regarding aftermarket performance. Moreover, during 14 out of the 15 
return horizons studied, the coefficient on the public float is negative, supporting the 
signaling hypothesis. We also find a strong correlation between market sector and raw 
returns, underlining the substantial impact of the New Economy sectors on the results of 
overall aftermarket performance.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The European IPO market has gone through a period o f unprecedented change. 
New Economy sectors have gradually taken a bigger share of total IPO activity, 
indicating that money previously flowing into mature industries with lower growth 
prospects had started to flow into young, technology-oriented companies that focus on
30 We have also experimented with adjusted R* s, and do not find qualitatively different results.
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growth. This process was facilitated by rising stock markets, the initial success o f 
privatizations fuelling a boom in European share ownership, and the creation of market 
segments dedictated to young, growth-oriented companies. However, it is unclear 
whether these developments represent either a structural shift or are just symptoms of a 
time-varying market condition.
This chapter has focused on the return performance o f a large sample of 
European IPOs during the period 1988-1998. The analysis has been pursued for the 
sample as a whole and also under two alternative market conditions: for IPOs issued in 
“hot” markets, when initial returns are high and the general level of the stock market is 
increasing; and for IPOs issued in “cold” markets, when initial returns are low and the 
general stock market level is stable or declining. We have split the research agenda into 
two units: the examination of initial returns and the examination o f aftermarket 
performance. We find significant autocorrelation, which is higher for the number o f 
offerings than for the initial returns. Not surprisingly, we also find significant 
underpricing, which is related to ex-ante characteristics of uncertainty. We attribute the 
large amounts of money left on the table during our sample period to some large 
privatizations.
While we present evidence of short-term overperformance, the results do not 
indicate that IPOs offered underperform in the long-run. This result appears to be robust 
across time periods underlining the most recent literature arguing that the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs is a time-varying phenomenon. Our results are also sensitive 
to the benchmark employed and return methodology with IPO outperformance being 
most magnified when compared against small- and medium- sized company 
benchmarks. The long-run positive aftermarket performance, however, is limited to 
IPOs issued in “hot” markets. In “cold” markets, the broad-market-adjusted equally-
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weighted performance is strongly negative. Moreover, the results on aftermarket 
performance worsen substantially when looking at the median picture, with some 
extreme returns driving the performance.
In order to shed some light on the underlying dynamics of aftermarket 
performance, we categorize returns according to a set of issuing characteristics. We find 
a strong impact of the initial return category. Here, companies with higher initial returns 
fare best, underlining the role of underpricing as a signal o f firm quality. The quality of 
the underpricing signal is best in “cold” markets which are characterised by less 
“noise”. The evidence also points to a strong signaling role of the size of the public 
float, in the sense that it is positively related to aftermarket performance across 
measurement horizons. This is true for IPOs issued in both “hot” and “cold” markets. 
Moreover, the cross-sectional findings in this study provide definitive testimony of the 
overriding influence of the New Economy during the 1990s, which had a dramatic 
impact on the investment world in general and the European IPO market in particular. 
We show that the relatively good average performance of European IPOs issued 
between 1988 and 1998 is due to offerings in the New Economy that account for just 28 
percent of the sample. While we do not adjust for risk, it is unlikely that beta alone can 
account for the performance differences. These results extend across all measurement 
horizons. Through the outburst of IPO activity in the New Economy sectors relative to 
the Old Economy on the “New Market” segments during the height of the “Internet 
Bubble” in 1999 and part o f2000, this multi-year pattern ultimately reversed.
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Chapter III 
IPOs: Insights from seven European countries
1 Introduction
In recent years, a large body of literature has documented the returns on Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) earned by investors in Europe. For example, using a sample of 712 
UK IPOs between 1985 and 1992, Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (1998) find that there 
are negative abnormal returns to a number of alternative benchmark portfolios. They 
conclude that there are negative abnormal returns from an IPO such that a one-pound 
investment is worth less than 85 pence after three years. Leleux and Muzyka (1998) 
analyse the performance o f 307 IPOs in France, the UK, Germany, The Netherlands and 
Belgium, issued between 1987 and 1993. The authors find that European IPO shares 
exhibit the pattern of long-term underperformance highlighted in the US. Summarizing 
evidence from a large number of countries, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) report 
that underpricing, “hot issue” markets and long-run underperformance are global IPO 
phenomena.
The evidence on IPO performance can also be addressed in a more general 
context of “Why do companies go public?”. In this respect, Ellingsen and Rydqvist 
(1997) argue that companies tend to emphasize the following reasons for going public: 
(1) to obtain finance for growth opportunities, (2) to enhance a company’s image and
•i %
mcrease its publicity, (3) to motivate managers and other employees, and (4) to “cash
in” by selling off the financial interest in the company. However, the more fundamental
question is why firms go public to achieve these goals. For example, direct sales of
31 When asked about the reasons for raising funds on the stock market, Nick Ogden, founder of Ogden, an 
UK-based Internet company, said the flotation “will be as much about raising our profile as raising 
money”. (Source: Sunday Business, March 12th 2000).
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stock and bank financing are alternative sources of funds that could potentially finance 
new projects or allow for transfer of ownership. Moreover, funds raised through stock 
market introduction are often very expensive. It is generally perceived that the total cost 
of going public lies between 20 cents and 30 cents per dollar, depending on the size of 
the firm. The only reasonable explanation for the initial offer is that there are some 
further future benefits associated with going public that outweigh the high cost of doing 
so. In this context, Roell (1996) concludes that the reasons why firms pursue an IPO are 
due to “an informative stock price, a more liquid stock, and increased competition 
among providers of finance”.
Our objective in this chapter is to extend the evidence on IPOs by applying a 
common empirical research framework to companies that went public between 1988 
and 1998 in the following seven individual European Countries: Germany, France, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. This period is o f considerable 
importance as it begins with the aftermath o f the 1987 stock market crash, followed by 
large privatization programmes and eventually by a big boom in European equity 
culture and issuing activity towards the late 1990s. These individual markets provide a 
unique opportunity to examine the robustness of findings on the performance o f UK and 
US IPOs within the setting of other market-based financial systems, in which stock 
markets play an increasingly crucial role in company financing. Moreover, by extending 
our analysis of the European IPO market to individual countries, we can improve our 
understanding about the robustness of the patterns reported in Chapter II and the 
homogeneity of the European IPO market.
Some of our findings include the following:
(1) The underpricing phenomenon, while time-varying, is a consistent feature 
across all the countries in the study. There is tentative evidence to suggest
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that changes in tax regimes (in the case of Sweden and France), the 
regulatory framework (in the case of Spain) or the IPO mechanism (in the 
case of France) have had a significant impact on pricing and IPO activity. 
The results for the long-run performance of IPOs in individual European 
countries indicate that long-run underperformance is a time-varying 
phenomenon and sensitive to measurement technique and benchmark 
adjustment.
(2) When performing significance tests of performance differences between the 
individual countries, the results, for overall and cross-sectional patterns, 
confirm similar initial and aftermarket performance of IPOs for each 
European country. This underlines the homogeneity of the European IPO 
market in general and the pervasiveness o f the observed IPO patterns in 
particular.
(3) Throughout the sample period, there appears to be a clearly positive link 
between the degree of a countries’ involvement in New Economy IPO 
activity and long-run IPO performance. While IPOs in Germany, The 
Netherlands or Sweden perform relatively well over the long-run, IPOs in 
countries with no New Economy IPO activity, such as Italy and Spain, fared 
worse. This can help to shed some light on the rationale behind major efforts 
made by stock exchanges across Europe to establish “New Market” 
segments during the 1990s.
(4) As demonstrated by the comparison of findings from Chapter II and this 
Chapter, the design o f the empirical experiment, in particular return 
methodology and benchmark choice, can have an impact on the confidence 
and reliability of inferences from long-horizon studies.
72
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional 
arrangements for IPOs in the seven countries under study and reviews the existing 
empirical literature. In Section 3, we describe the data and methodology. Section 4 
presents evidence regarding aftermarket performance. Section 5 presents cross-sectional 
and time-series evidence on the performance of European IPOs. In Section 6, we check 
to see whether the results are robust across countries. Section 7 concludes with a 
summary and interpretation of the findings.
2 Going public in European countries 1988-1998
2.1 Institutional arrangements
In each of the seven countries under study, the regulations regarding an initial 
public offering (IPO) are set and maintained by the relevant exchange itself, with the 
consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, and must also be in accordance with legal 
guidelines that are set under the European Investment Services Directive.
Before a firm can make an IPO, it must first obtain permission from the Ministry 
of Finance to have its shares listed on an exchange. The request for a listing must be 
made on the basis of a “notice of introduction”, whose contents are subject to detailed 
regulation and is generally filed 120 days before a company starts trading. In the case 
that the shares are listed, the professional association or government body acts as the 
regulatory agency. The issuing firm must also meet certain criteria such as providing 
annual accounts over a certain period of time, specifying the uses to which the proceeds 
of the offering will be put, and disclosing the shareholdings o f the management and 
board of directors. Moreover, a chartered accountant must certify the firm’s annual 
accounts, and an offering prospectus must be submitted to the stock exchange by a
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member of the association, who sponsors the request. In the countries under study, a 
universal or an investment bank typically underwrites the IPO.32 The underwriter is not 
only involved in working out the registration statement, but is also responsible for 
managing the underwriting and floatation process.
A company has, in principle, a choice between three market segments in which 
to list its shares: The Official Market, the Official Parallel Market or the New Market. 
The choice of market segment is mainly based upon the minimum size of the issue. 
Moreover, while the minimum Public Float on the Official Market is at least 25 percent, 
no such requirements exist for shares seeking admission to the Official Parallel Market 
or the New Market. New Market segments, added since the mid-1990s to many 
European stock exchanges, cater exclusively to young, high-growth companies in 
technology-oriented market sectors. Lower requirements for companies listed on the 
New Market segments in terms o f capital and operating history are offset by more 
stringent transparency and reporting rules after the IPO date. It must be stressed that the 
relevant authority has the right to waive certain listing requirements.34 While electronic 
trading of shares takes place in all market segments in France, Italy, Sweden and 
Switzerland, the main stock exchange operators in Germany, The Netherlands and 
Spain have maintained a hybrid system of floor-based and electronic trading.
Firms that intend to go public have -  at least in principle -  a choice of which 
method their shares are offered to the public. A company can use one of the following 
methods to obtaining a listing and issuing equity: “private placing”, “offer for sale by
32 Particularly in Germany, companies seeking a listing have usually been engaged in a long-run 
relationship with its underwriter (“Hausbankbeziehung”).
33 In Appendix C, Table 48, we summarize the main listing requirements that applied to the stock 
exchanges in the countries under study between 1988 and 1998. We do not cover companies going public 
in other market segments, such as the Unregulated Market or NASDAQ Europe (formerly EASDAQ).
34 This is explicitly stated in the statutes of the Milan Stock Exchange. For companies going public in 
Sweden, because of the prevalence of dual-class shares, direct focus is given to the voting and ownership 
structure of companies going public. Here, the minimum number of shareholders necessary for floatation 
is explicitly stated.
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tender”, also referred to as “bookbuilding”, and “offer for sale at a fixed price”. In an 
“offer for sale at a fixed price”, the fixed price element is designed to widen the appeal 
of the issue for investors by eliminating price uncertainty. The prospectus states the 
number of shares being offered for sale and the price per share. Investors can then 
submit bids for the number of shares they wish to take up at the stated price. In “offers 
for sale at a fixed price”, while applications are invited from the general public, the 
issue is sub-underwritten, at the same price, by a group of financial institutions. Once 
the price of the issue is fixed, it can neither be changed in response to emerging 
demand, nor withdrawn. With the possible exception of France, the majority of 
companies going public in the countries under observation went public through “offers 
for sale at a fixed price” until the mid-1990s. The major proclaimed disadvantage of an 
“offer for sale by tender” which uses “bookbuilding” procedure is that it cannot 
eliminate price uncertainty. However, with strong issuing activity and rising equity 
markets since 1995, during which companies, led by E Merck AG, a German 
pharmaceutical company, issued high volumes o f shares, the bookbuilding method has 
been increasingly used as a means for going public as it allows the market itself “much 
more power in the issuance process”. Since the mid-1990s, bookbuilding has become 
the pricing mechanism of choice for 70 percent of the IPOs in our sample. The inherent 
advantages o f this procedure are that it seeks to assess market conditions before pricing, 
and that the final issue price is conditioned on market demand.
The average total direct cost for a company going public in the sample varies
 ^7between 5 percent and 7 percent. This fee structure has been relatively stable over
35 We do not discuss “Private Placements” in detail because they apply to low volume issues only. 
Derrien and Womack (1998) and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) discuss other IPO mechanism 
unique to the French market.
36 Reuters News Service, (December 27, 1995): “German IPO pace to slow but demand still strong.”
37 Kaserer and Kraft (2000) provide a detailed study of floatation costs in Germany. Chen and Ritter 
(1999) document that in the US, at least 90 percent of deals that raised between 20 and 80 million Dollars
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year and country, despite growing competition for mandates between investment banks, 
and seems to exist irrespectively of type, nature and risk profile of the company. Using 
2,051 IPOs in 61 non-US markets between 1992 and 1999, Jenkinson, Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2000) study whether the introduction of bookbuilding has increased the 
efficiency o f IPOs. They find that -  while the direct costs of bookbuilding are typically 
twice that for fixed-price offers -  bookbuilding leads to substantially less underpricing.
In general, the relevant stock exchange operators do not have any rules on how 
oversubscribed issues are to be allocated, beyond the general principle that the 
allocation must be done systematically.38 The degree and method of scaling down is 
entirely at the discretion of the issuing house and may involve any form or pattern that 
best suits the particular circumstances or interests of the company and its underwriter.39 
This may involve a ballot and/or scaling down of applications. In fact, the adopted 
method of allocation reflects the company’s preference regarding the profile o f its new 
shareholders, for example a large number o f small individual investors versus 
institutional investors. Reimer (1998) discusses hot German IPOs where institutional 
investors received a disproportionately large fraction of the shares on sale. This is 
consistent with the empirical findings by Comelli and Goldreich (2001) who find that 
“bidders who participate in many issues receive favourable treatment especially in the 
more successful (i.e. oversubscribed) issues”. Furthermore, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2002) document that the frequency of directed share programs (friends and family 
shares) increased dramatically between 1996 and 1999.
have underwriting spreads exactly equal to 7 percent, and relate this to the lack of competition between 
investment bankers.
38 Oversubscription is a common feature for the IPOs under study. In Germany and The Netherlands, for 
example, oversubscription has been ftielled by the fact that there is no pre-payment for IPOs. Payment for 
the shares is made after the allocation of the bids is announced and trading starts.
39 The fairness of the allocation mechanism has been subject to constant public debate and increasing 
regulatory scrutiny. See Forbes, (June 22, 1992), pp. 156-162, or Wall Street Journal Europe, (June 15, 
1994): “Investors in US Question Access to IPOs, raising issue of Fairness”, or Reimer (1998).
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2.2 Previous Literature
The focus of the empirical literature on IPOs in Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia has shifted over time. While most of the studies in the early 1990s focus on 
the underpricing phenomenon and its theoretical foundations, the research has 
increasingly concentrated on the cross-sectional study of aftermarket performance with 
respect to unique aspects of each country under observation. This has also involved 
going beyond the analysis of time-series stock price data to include the evaluation of 
operating performance data, the types of earnings management around the IPO date, and 
aspects of finance and law.40
2.2.1 Germany
Stehle, Erhardt and Przyborowsky (1998) study the short- and long-run 
performance of a sample of 222 German IPOs between 1960 and 1995. The authors find 
statistically and economically significant underpricing of 15.7 percent. Using an 
equally-weighted market portfolio as a benchmark, they also find a statistically 
insignificant buy-and-hold performance of negative 5.0 percent over a 36-month time 
horizon. Moreover, they argue that, because IPO stocks are typically small- or medium­
sized, market portfolios might not make ideal benchmarks in IPOs studies. According to 
the study, the results on long-term performance are fully in line with the efficient 
market hypothesis and the hypothesis o f deliberate underpricing. Schuster (1996) 
focuses on the performance of 126 German IPOs issued between 1988 and 1995. He 
finds significant short-run overperformance. Moreover, he finds variations in year-to- 
year performance, across industries and other issuing characteristics, with larger 
companies as well as those with lower initial returns faring the worst. Due to the high
40 Using inferences from individual country studies to make general statements about patterns in the 
European IPO market is difficult because o f varying empirical methodologies, different sample sizes, 
measurement periods and the quality o f data.
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median age of 49 years, it is hypothesized that the German IPO market is more of an 
M&A market than a venture capital market, indicated by the fact that IPO proceeds flow 
into maturing and declining industries, rather than those that are growing and dynamic. 
Other studies for the German IPO market include Ljungqvist (1997), Uhlir (1989) and 
Weinberger (1995) who reported evidence concerning underpricing and long-term 
performance.
2.2.2 France
Derrien and Womack (2002) focus on the efficiency of the main procedures of 
going public in France under different market conditions and mechanisms: a 
bookbuilding mechanism similar to the one used in the US, a fixed-price procedure and 
an auction-like procedure. They show that overall market momentum in the three 
months prior to an offering is a significant ex ante predictor of the level of underpricing. 
In the sample o f 264 French IPOs that went public on the French Official Parallel 
Market and New Market between 1992 and 1998, mean underpricing reached 13.2 
percent. After controlling for issuer and industry specific factors, they also find that the 
auction mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lower variance of 
underpricing. Using Cumulated Average Returns (CARs) starting from the eleventh 
trading day, they find insignificant average adjusted underperformance of negative 6.2 
percent for the sample over a two-year horizon. More generally, their work provides 
empirical support for the theoretical work of Biais, Bossaerts & Rochet (2002), who 
find that an IPO mechanism similar to France’s auction-like Offre a Prix Minimum 
(OPM) is optimal.41 Faugeron-Crouzet, Ginglinger and Vijayraghavan (2001) focus on 
the relationship between the initial underpricing and the subsequent recourse to the
41 W.R. Hambrecht, a US investment bank, has recently used a similar procedure called “OpenlPO” for 
US IPOs. This procedure resulted in substantially less underpricing.
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capital market for a sample 288 firms that made an IPO on the French Official Parallel 
Market between 1983 and 1994. While they find positive initial returns of 18.7 percent 
for the sample as a whole, they also find that firms which are more undervalued tend to 
subsequently issue shares, while firms which are not as undervalued tend to 
subsequently issue other kinds of hybrid security. Degeorge and Derrien (2000) 
examine the long-run stock price performance and earnings forecasts at the time of the 
IPO using a sample of 243 French IPOs that went public on the Official Parallel and 
New Market between 1991 and 1998. Using a variety of benchmarks and calculation 
methods, they show that IPOs performed normally over a two-year horizon. They also 
find that the best proxy for investors’ expectations is the average forecast issued by 
financial analysts unaffiliated with the underwriter taking the company public.
2.2.3 Italy
Giudici and Paleari (1999) conduct an empirical study of 135 IPOs on the Milan 
Stock Exchange between 1985 and 1998. Their analysis shows the existence o f two 
periods characterized by different levels o f underpricing. Between 1985 and 1993, the 
findings are consistent with the empirical results in other countries during this time, 
such as the negative correlation between underpricing and the firm size, a positive 
correlation between underpricing and the market trend and the price volatility in the 
aftermarket, and the fraction of the equity maintained by the controlling shareholders. In 
the second period between 1994 and 1998, underpricing is lower and the correlation is 
less significant, which, according to the authors, confirms the “information gathering” 
theory o f Beneviste and Spindt (1989) and validates the importance of placing 
strategies. For the sample as a whole, they find average underpricing of 23.9 percent. 
Using buy-and-hold returns, Italian IPOs also underperform the broad market
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benchmark by 2.5 percent over three years. This work follows an earlier study done by 
Cherubini and Ratti (1992), who investigate the underpricing of a sample o f 75 Italian 
companies that were introduced to the Milan main market between 1985 and 1991. 
They find average underpricing of 29.7 percent and postulate a positive correlation 
between oversubscription, issuing activity in the secondary market and the degree of 
underpricing.
2.2.4 The Netherlands
Bosveld and Venneman (2000) analyse the investment and operating 
performance of a sample of 120 Dutch IPOs between 1983 and 1999 that went public on 
the three market segments of the Amsterdam Exchanges. They find highly significant 
average adjusted initial returns of 9.9 percent. The significance and magnitude o f these 
returns, however, do vary widely over time. When calculated without outliers, it appears 
that the influence of the few extremely high returns is larger than that of the few 
extremely low returns. Furthermore, when using either of three benchmark adjustments, 
the authors do not find underperformance during the first three years o f trading. 
Regardless of the benchmark choice, however, IPOs underperform the market after four 
or five years of trading. They find that, on average, for every Dutch Guilder (NLG) 100 
invested in the benchmark, one would have had to invest NLG118 in the IPOs to obtain 
the same terminal wealth level after four years of trading, or even NLG 124 to obtain the 
same terminal wealth level after five years of trading. They also show that Dutch IPOs 
are timed to coincide with periods of unusually good operating performance levels and 
find that the practise of “window dressing” is common prior to the IPO. Roosenboom, 
Van der Goot, and Mertens (2001) examine the relationship between two forms of 
earnings management and the fortunes of a sample of 80 IPO firms that went public on
80
the Amsterdam Exchanges between 1984 and 1994. Their result provides evidence that 
the form of earnings management during the IPO year can partially explain the cross- 
sectional variation in long-run stock price performance. Using buy-and-hold returns, 
firms in which managers tend to overreport earnings during the IPO year subsequently 
perform poorly, and IPO firms in which managers smooth their income overperform 
their counterparts by a margin of more than 100 percent during a period of three years, 
adjusted for a number of different benchmarks. Van der Goot (1997) focuses on the 
quality of information by studying the offering prospectuses of 74 IPOs on the 
Amsterdam Exchanges between 1983 and 1992. He finds that cash flow statements do 
not contribute to reducing information inequality between a firm’s management and its 
investors. Moreover, he stresses that valuation models based on Price-Earnings Ratios 
or Price-Book Ratios can only explain little o f the observed variance in the issuing 
firm’s value. The author also points to a statistically significant negative relationship 
between firm value and the number of takeover defences introduced by a firm.
2.2.5 Spain
Alvarez and Gonzales (2001) provide a detailed analysis o f the short- and long- 
run performance of 56 Spanish IPOs, including four foreign issues, on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange between 1987 and 1997. The authors also investigate the influence of IPO 
prospectus information on the long-run returns of IPOs. For the sample of companies, 
they report a highly significant unadjusted underpricing of 12.3 percent. With event 
windows of three and five years, they report mixed results for long-run performance. 
The magnitude of abnormal returns depends on the methodology, the weighting method 
and the benchmark used for the adjustment of IPO returns. While long-run 
underperformance is present when calculating buy-and-hold returns, it is not present
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when using other methodologies for returns measurement, such as calendar time returns 
or the Fama-French three factor model. Long-run underperformance is also 
concentrated in small firms. Moreover, none but two of the issuing characteristics of the 
offer are related to the behaviour of the stock price over three to five years. They find a 
positive relationship between initial underpricing, long-run performance and the 
percentage of shares retained confirming the signaling hypothesis. In a similar work, 
Olcoz and Feldsztaijn (2000) report 10.6 percent initial underpricing of a sample o f 99 
IPOs in the Madrid and Barcelona Stock Exchanges between 1986 and 1998. This 
sample also underperformed the Madrid Stock Exchanges General Index (IGBM) by 
29.0 percent over three years. Companies with the highest Return on Equity (ROE) at 
the time o f going public tend to be the best performers in the long-run. Rahnema, 
Fernandez, and Martinez Abascal (1992) examine the short- and long-run performance 
of 85 Spanish IPOs over the period 1985-1990. Here, Spanish IPOs experience, on 
average, 10.8 percent underpricing. “Handsome returns” may be earned by investing in 
new issues, but the authors recommend liquidating within the first 90 days after the first 
market price. In addition, they argue that it is possible to reduce the degree of 
underpricing by selecting the optimal timing, underwriter, and type of placement.
2.2.6 Sweden
Rydqvist (1993, 1997) documents IPO underpricing from the perspective of 
companies going public in Sweden. In his sample, composed of 224 new firms and 84 
equity carve-outs during 1970-1991, average underpricing reached 39 percent. He 
stresses the uniqueness of the Swedish IPO market: The significant difference in 
marginal tax rates between salary increases (85 percent marginal tax) and capital gains 
(20 percent marginal tax) led firms to allocate a significant portion of the offer to firm
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employees and key decision makers of the firm’s creditors, suppliers and customers. 
Therefore, underpricing was driven by an incentive to replace salary increases with tax- 
efficient capital gains. The tax motivation for underpricing disappeared when a new tax 
code was introduced in 1990. This led to a subsequent drop in underpricing. In a similar 
analysis o f IPOs between 1970 and 1991, Hogholm (1994) finds a positive relationship 
between the level of underpricing and the level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the 
IPO. Firms belonging to the service sector seem to underprice their IPOs more than 
other firms. He also finds different levels o f underpricing depending on the motive for 
going public. Using a sample of 162 Swedish IPOs between 1980 and 1990, Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) find initial returns of 38.2 percent and a market-adjusted 
three-year return of 1.2 percent.
A different line of research provides a legal and financial commentary of 
Swedish IPOs. Holmen and Hogfeldt (2000) study how a legal regime, that provides 
weak minority protection and allows for the separation of votes from capital, affects 
behavior at the time o f and after the IPO. They study 229 Swedish IPOs (excluding 
equity-carve-outs and spin-offs) between 1979 and 1997, when close to 90 percent of all 
privately controlled Swedish IPOs used dual-class shares and issued only low-voting B- 
shares. They find that private owners who place much emphasis on being in control 
design the corporate charter and the initial ownership structure to maintain control after 
the IPO. Five years after the IPO, the original private owners o f the companies in their 
sample retained 2/3 of the votes and 44 percent of the capital. Moreover, if the firm has 
dual-class shares, the controlling owner has a stronger incentive to invest and acquire 
other firms in stock financed takeovers since the owner only contributes a smaller 
fraction of the capital but exclusively enjoys all control rights of the larger firms. 
Furthermore, they find that private owners in control firms that later undertake seasoned
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equity offerings retain a significantly higher proportion of votes and capital at the IPO 
date compared to other privately controlled firms. According to the authors, differences 
in ownership concentration, investment behavior and takeover frequency between 
Continental European/Scandinavian and the Anlgo-Saxon countries are, to a large 
extent, determined by endogenously established differences in security design and 
initial ownership structure at the IPO date that reflect differences in legal regimes.
2.2.7 Switzerland
Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) study underpricing of a sample o f 42 IPOs that were 
issued in Switzerland between 1983 and 1989. They find a 35.8 percent average initial 
return between the offering price and the closing price on the first day of trading for 42 
Swiss IPOs. No long-run underperformance in the aftermarket is observed. The average 
excess returns remain well above 30 percent up to three years after the IPO. The authors 
point to a decrease of underpricing over time, indicating growing competition between 
investment banks. They also argue that companies may intentionally underprice their 
stocks in order to invest into their reputation by getting “free publicity”. Moreover, they 
find that the reserved disclosure policy o f Swiss companies and the traditionally close 
ties between issuer and underwriter, may possibly explain the high average underpricing 
in Switzerland as compared to other countries.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
For our study of IPO performance in the individual European countries, we use 
the same company and returns data as in the previous chapter with the initial sample
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Figure 4
IPO activity and Stock Market Returns in European Countries
IPO proceeds are measured in end-1998 purchasing power and defined as the number of shares offered to 
the public times the final offering price and include overalottment options (greenshoe), where applicable. 
The Initial Return is defined as the change from the IPO price to the closing price at the end of the first 
day of trading. The annual stock market return is defined as the annual change in the national stock 
market in the country under study. The following indices (all value-weighted) were used as a proxy for 
the respective national stock market: the FAZ Index (Germany), the SBF 250 Index (France), the MIB 
Historical Index (Italy), the CBS Index (The Netherlands), the Madrid General Index (Spain), the 
Affarsvarlden General Index (Sweden) and the Swiss Total Market Index (Switzerland).
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4: continued
being comprised of 219 German, 323 French, 77 Italian, 75 Dutch, 88 Spanish, 148 
Swedish and 43 Swiss IPOs. For this section, however, we calculate returns in local 
currency using a local trading day calendar. Figure 4 shows that the number and value 
of IPOs was unevenly distributed across the sample period in each country under study. 
It underlines that the sample consists of stocks issued in both high activity and low 
activity markets, in which the underlying momentum in the general level of the stock 
market is positive. In this respect the sample is consistent with most of the empirical 
studies in the literature. Figure 4 also underlines the link between IPO activity and 
general level o f the stock market.42
Table 10 summarizes the IPO sample characteristics for the individual European 
countries. The size of the public float (in percent) is relatively uniform across countries. 
It is also consistent with findings by Espenlaub and Tonks (1998), who report that for a 
sample of 428 IPOs of UK incorporated, non-financial companies issued during 1986- 
1991, the average proportion of equity sold was 29.49 percent. Initially, IPOs came 
from a variety of industries and were carried out by larger and older firms. This 
coincides with the evidence provided by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) who 
show that in Continental Europe, most of the firms that enter the market are more 
mature, larger and more established than their counterparts in the US. However, average 
age and number of industries represented has declined during the sample period. This is 
not surprising considering the large number of service- and technology-related IPOs in 
the German, French and Swedish market segments since the mid-1990s, combined with 
the rapid rise in equity ownership and financial integration in Continental Europe 
toward the late 1990s.
42 Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) provide evidence that companies successfully time their 
offerings for periods when valuations are high, with investors receiving low returns in the long-run.
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Table 10 
Sample Characteristics
Characteristics of IPOs in European countries between 1988 and 1998. Age of the issuing firm is 
measured as the calendar year of going public minus the calendar year of foundation, with firms founded 
before 1901 assumed to be founded in 1901. Public Float is the percentage of equity offered. Firm Size 
(expressed in local currency units), is the total number of shares issued times the final offer price. Gross 
Proceeds are in local currency units and defined as the number of shares placed multiplied by the offer 
price and include overalottment options (greenshoe), where applicable. All values are expressed in end- 
1998 prices using the monthly consumer price indices relating to each country. Market Sectors is a proxy 
for the diversity of the IPO market and represents the number of market sectors present out all 18 market
Country
Age,
years
Public Float, 
Percentage
Firm Size, 
millions/billions
Gross Proceeds, 
millions/billions
Market
Sectors
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Number
Germany 35 23 38 33 803.5 192.6 250.4 71.8 17
France 21 13 21 18 1,966.9 250.9 568.1 47.2 18
Italy 25 19 32 29 1,674.0 235.3 404.9 71.9 17
Netherlands 31 18 39 33 1,504.9 290.0 552.6 92.9 15
Spain 38 31 40 38 60.6 21.4 19.1 8.1 16
Sweden 25 14 39 33 1,207.2 337.0 512.2 93.9 15
Switzerland 30 27 65 59 678.7 158.1 428.4 95.1 12
Table 11 presents the distribution of IPOs in Continental Europe and Sweden by 
year, both in terms of the number of IPOs and gross proceeds. It shows that the number 
and value o f IPOs were not evenly distributed over the sample period. While years 1988 
to 1990 were relatively high volume years in all countries under study, years between 
1991 and 1993 were years of low issuing activity. For example, during 1990 and 1991, 
there was no IPO activity in Switzerland, while Italy did not record any IPO activity in 
1993. Ahead of large privatization programmes, 1995 represented a year with high IPO 
activity, in terms of proceeds raised, size of companies and number of IPOs. Most of the 
issuing activity in Spain was concentrated in 1988 and 1989. This is partially 
attributable to the effect of the Spanish Securities Markets Law aimed at achieving 
greater penetration, transparency and liquidity. Moreover, while the strong increase o f 
the number of listings in France was partly driven by the creation
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Table 11 
Sample Distribution
Distribution of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by country and year of issuance from 1988 to 1998, excluding demutualizations, investment companies and foreign issues. 
Equity carve-outs, spin-offs and privatizations are included. Gross proceeds are in local currency units and defined as the number of shares placed multiplied by the offer 
price, and include overalottment options (greenshoe), where applicable. Aggregate gross proceeds are expressed in end-1998 prices using monthly consumer price indices of 
the respective country._________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Distribution of European IPOs by Country and Year of Issuance
Germany France Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate
Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross
IPO of Proceeds Of Proceeds of Proceeds Of Proceeds of Proceeds of Proceeds of Proceeds
Year IPOs DMm IPOs FRFm IPOs ITLbn IPOs NLGm IPOs ESPbn IPOs SKRm IPOs CHFm
1988 13 979.0 7 721.6 11 2,214.2 4 402.5 18 246.5 12 1,658.3 8 755.5
1989 22 2,534.2 20 13,493.9 7 2,415.3 10 4,843.3 19 309.8 6 2,480.5 1 191.3
1990 25 3,648.9 10 652.2 3 66.1 3 286.3 9 57.8 8 2,652.9 0 -
1991 18 3,753.3 10 3,316.4 4 238.2 2 48.2 9 256.0 2 439.2 0 -
1992 8 709.3 4 1,551.5 2 2,083.5 3 1,485.2 3 73.8 2 143.9 1 158.1
1993 7 890.4 11 23,589.7 0 - 1 16.8 2 144.1 10 4,488.8 1 63.5
1994 10 1,218.9 35 19,674.2 3 8,095.7 5 8,783.5 4 72.7 27 18,782.9 3 269.4
1995 20 8,129.1 16 24,020.3 11 7,810.5 7 2,766.4 1 0.4 12 9,881.2 3 818.5
1996 9 20,854.7 47 5,810.6 12 3,324.3 7 4,209.0 5 75.2 8 21,267.2 6 1,031.4
1997 24 5,696.3 55 47,754.1 10 1,659.2 12 5,161.0 9 268.9 43 10,833.5 8 4,492.6
1998 63 6,413.8 108 42,923.4 14 3,269.7 21 13,442.5 9 177.3 18 3,175.8 12 10,640.9
Total 219 54,828.2 323 183,508.0 77 31,176.7 75 41,444.6 88 1,682.7 148 75,804.1 43 18,421.2
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of the Nouveau Marche in 1996, it was also driven by a change in French tax law.43 In 
the other countries under study, there is no relevant legislation in place that would offer 
any incentive o f a fiscal or financial nature to venture capitalists and venture capital 
companies similar to those in France.
There were also some key institutional determinants of the emergence and 
growth of firms in Sweden. For example, a gradual deregulation of the capital markets 
during the sample period, a cut in corporate taxes and the deregulation of previously 
regulated markets have spurred-on entrepreneurial activity and stock market listings in 
Sweden since the mid-1990s. This came against the backdrop of traditionally high share 
ownership: around 60 percent of the Swedish adult population own shares. Davidsson 
and Henrekson (2000) identify some of the factors that have been particularly 
favourable for the emergence of Swedish firms, such as deregulation and “fortuitous” 
facts such as being a ffontrunner in certain areas of technology, like telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing, for example.
3.2 Methodology
As reported earlier, the results of long-term performance studies are very 
sensitive to methodological choices. Here, we take this robustness issue seriously and 
present our results using a variety o f methods. As in the previous chapter, we use an 
event-study methodology similar to Ritter (1991) for the evaluation o f short- and long- 
run IPO performance. In this Chapter, two measures of abnormal returns are computed
43 Under French legislation, there are two primary venture capital vehicles: the Societe de capital risque 
(“SCR”) and the Fonds commun de placement a risques (“FCPR”). In order to obtain certain tax benefits, 
these vehicles are required to invest at least 50 percent of their assets in qualifying non-quoted securities 
of EU companies. Moreover, when unquoted securities or shares which are eligible to be included in the 
50 percent limit upon acquisition by the SCR or FCPR and subsequently become listed on a regulated 
stock market, they continue to be included within such 50 percent limit during the five-year period 
following the IPO date. Under certain conditions, if a SCR or a FCPR acquires shares that are listed on 
the Nouveau Marche, these shares will be considered as non-quoted shares for the purpose of the 50 
percent quote. (Source: European Venture Capital Association).
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for each country: First, cumulative average returns (CART) are calculated, defined as the 
average of cumulated benchmark-adjusted returns of individual stocks (R it) using 
several different benchmarks:
cart = ^ E  E  r »
i n  i = + i  t =  + i
As an alternative to using cumulative-average returns, which implicitly assumes 
monthly portfolio rebalancing, we also compute adjusted and unadjusted three-year 
buy-and-hold returns (BHRs):
BHRt = ^ E  0  + R » ) - i
i=+l
where Rit is the abnormal return in month t for firm i, with N firms in the sample. 
While there is greater knowledge about the properties of the distribution and the 
statistical tests for CARs, BHRs measure actual investors experience. For the evaluation 
of statistical significance of C ARj and BHRt, we use a simple cross-sectional t-test 44 
To interpret the three-year buy-and-hold performance, we also compute wealth 
relatives (WR) as a performance measure. The wealth relative is the ratio of one plus the 
mean IPO three-year holding period return (not in percent) divided by one plus the 
mean benchmark three-year holding period return (not in percent), excluding the initial 
return. A wealth relative greater than 1.00 indicates outperformance and a wealth 
relative less than 1.00 indicates IPO underperformance. The initial return is the
44 For a further discussion of statistical inference, see Brown and Warner (1980), Kothari and Warner 
(1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997), for example.
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unadjusted change from the offering price to the first closing price and is defined as 
month 0.45 The aftermarket period includes the following 36 months, where one month 
is defined as a successive 21-day period using a local trading day calendar with returns 
denominated in local currency. For IPOs that are delisted before their third-year 
anniversary, the three-year buy-and-hold return ends with the last quoted price. To 
evaluate buy-and-hold returns of up to 36 months of trading, the sample had to be 
reduced to 677 issues. This is due to the large number of IPOs in 1998, that had not yet 
traded for three years as of February 2, 2001 (the cut-off date for this study).46 For the 
sample as a whole, only seven companies were delisted before their third-year 
anniversary. This is sharp contrast to Ritter (1991) who reports that out of a total sample 
of 1,526 US IPOs, 272 firms were delisted before their third-year anniversary on the 
stock market.
Equally critical is the choice of benchmark. With the exception o f Spain and 
Italy, returns for each individual country were adjusted using three different 
benchmarks: (1) a value weighted broad-market index, (2) a value weighted large-cap 
index, and a (3) value weighted small-cap or mid-cap index.47 We have calculated 
performance measures without explicitly adjusting for betas. For the US market, Ritter 
(1991), Ibbotson (1975), Chan and Lakonishok (1990) and Clarkson and Thompson 
(1990) report that average betas for IPO firms are greater than 1.00 and decline over 
time. They argue that the difference in betas between the IPOs and the benchmark is too 
small to have a significant effect on the conclusions. Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks 
(1998) apply a modified form of Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method to estimate the betas
45 Adjusting initial returns for market movements does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
46 This number (677) is slightly lower than the total number of companies used to evaluate three-year 
aftermarket performance in Chapter II (686 IPOs). For this section, we used the local trading day calendar 
for each country instead of the European trading day calendar. Because of more public holidays in some 
countries, the local trading day calendar contains a smaller number of trading days per year.
47 For Italy and Spain, no small- or mid-cap index was available covering the full length of the 
measurement period between 1988 and 2001.
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in their sample of 588 UK IPO firms between 1985 and 1995. Similar to US evidence, 
they find that the significance of the result of underperformance is likely to be 
understated rather than over-stated and that it is unlikely that the magnitude of the 
results can be explained away by specification errors. In his sample of 80 Finnish IPOs 
between 1984 and 1989, Keloharju (1993) concludes that given the magnitude of the 
cross-sectional betas, it is unlikely that risk mismeasurement alone could account for the 
result of underperformance of Finish IPOs. For their sample o f Dutch IPOs, 
Roosenboom, Van der Goot, and Mertens (2001) find a beta range between 0.55 and 
1.16 over the first 36 months of trading. Similarly, using a sample of 307 firms that 
went public in five European countries between 1983 and 1991, Leleux and Muzyka 
(1998) did not record betas in excess of 1.00.
4 Performance Analysis of IPOs in European countries
4.1 Aftermarket Performance
Table 12 reports initial returns and cumulative average returns (CARs) measured 
up to 36 months after the offering date using a broad-market benchmark for each 
individual country. The results indicate the complexity of the IPO performance picture. 
With the exception of Italy, Spain and Switzerland, IPOs experience positive 
aftermarket performance before the end of the first year of trading. Over the long-term, 
however, the picture changes dramatically. When assuming monthly portfolio 
rebalancing, IPOs in all countries record negative average adjusted returns at their third- 
year anniversary, with French, Italian and Spanish IPOs showing significant 
underperformance. With the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, the firm’s negative 
performance is reflected in a steady decline in the CARs after their one-year
93
Table 12
Cumulative Average Returns (CARs)
Aftermarket Returns are measured as Cumulative Average Returns (CARs), with associated Standard 
Errors (S.E.) (in parentheses) for the 36 months after going public, excluding the initial return. One month 
is defined as a consecutive 21-trading interval using local trading days. For each country, raw returns 
were adjusted for the following broad-market value-weighted benchmarks: German IPO returns were 
adjusted for the FAZ Index, French IPO returns for the SBF 250 Index, Italian IPO returns were adjusted 
for the MIB Historical Index, and the CBS Index, excluding Royal-Dutch, was the benchmark for the 
Dutch market. Spanish IPO returns were adjusted form movements in the Madrid General Market 
(IGBM) Index, the Affarsvarlden General Price (AFG) Index was used for the Swedish market, and the 
Swiss Total Market (STM) Index was the benchmark for the sample of Swiss IPOs. An adjustment for the 
relevant MSCI national indices does not change the results. Month 0 is the Initial Return interval._______
Panel A: Germany
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 219 219 219 219 219 219 190 155
CAR,,, 0.2566® 0.0208 0.1585® 0.1608® 0.1419b 0.1003 -0.1067 -0.1166
S.E. (0.0334) (0.0159) (0.0417) (0.0531) (0.0700) (0.0725) (0.0739) (0.0852)
Panel B: France
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 323 323 323 323 321 315 284 213
CAR,,, 0.1237® 0.0343® 0.0045 -0.0280 -0.0748 -0.0666 -0.2227® -0.1901®
S.E. (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0232) (0.0339) (0.0475) (0.0529) (0.0553) (0.0715)
Panel C: Italy
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 77 77 77 77 76 74 70 59
CAR,,, 0.1303® -0.0454® -0.0376 -0.0903 -0.1198 -0.1783b -0.2596® -0.4185®
S.E. (0.0327) (0.0124) (0.0470) (0.0613) (0.0780) (0.0859) (0.0777) (0.0918)
Panel E: The Netherlands
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 75 75 75 75 74 72 67 53
CAR,,, 0.1346® 0.0163 0.0221 0.0018 -0.0981 -0.1103 -0.1297 -0.1558
S.E. (0.0259) (0.0298) (0.0450) (0.0667) (0.0713) (0.0931) (0.1091) (0.1248)
Panel F: Spain
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 88 88 88 87 87 87 80 68
CAR,,, 0.1475® -0.0015 -0.0161 -0.0782b -0.1756® -0.2661“ -0.3500“ -0.3021®
S.E. (0.0260) (0.0154) (0.0303) (0.0388) (0.0495) (0.0688) (0.0761) (0.1667)
P an el G: Sw eden
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 148 148 147 146 141 132 119 99
CAR,,, 0.1846® 0.0071 0.0295 0.0140 0.0418 0.0523 0.0493 -0.1270
S.E. (0.0233) (0.0158) (0.0286) (0.0392) (0.0570) (0.0644) (0.0760) (0.0789)
Panel H: Switzerland
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36
Number of firms 43 43 43 43 43 43 42 31
CAR,,, 0.0971® -0.0217 -0.0226 -0.0646 -0.0485 -0.0446 -0.0502 -0.1817
S.E. (0.0228) (0.0166) (0.0312) (0.0518) (0.0735) (0.0998) (0.1127) (0.1378)
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Figure 5. The Long-Run Performance of IPOs in European Countries. Cumulative average returns 
(CARs) for an equally-weighted portfolio of Initial Public Offerings in Germany, France, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland between 1988 and 1998, with monthly rebalancing, month 1 
to 36. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval using local trading days. With the 
exception of Italy and Spain, four CAR series are plotted for each country for the 36 months after the IPO 
date: 1) raw returns (no adjustment); 2) a broad-market value-weighted index adjustment; 3) a value- 
weighted large-cap index adjustment; and 4) a value-weighted small-cap or mid-cap index adjustment. 
The FAZ Index (broad-market), the DAX 30 Index (large-caps) and the GSC100 Index (small-caps) were 
used as benchmarks for the adjustment of raw German IPO returns. French IPO returns were adjusted for 
the SBF 250 Index (broad-market), the CAC40 Index (large-caps) and the AGEFI Second Market Index 
(small-caps). Because of a lack of a small-cap benchmark over the full measurement period, Italian IPO 
returns were adjusted for the following two benchmarks: the MIB Historical Index (broad-market) and the 
MIB 30 Index (large-caps). Dutch IPO returns were adjusted using the CBS Index, excluding Royal 
Dutch (broad-market), the EOE Index (large-caps) and the MKAP Index (small/mid-caps) as benchmarks. 
Due to a lack of benchmarks for small-cap stocks over the sample period, Spanish IPO returns were 
adjusted using the IGBM Index (broad-market) and the IBEX35 Index (large-caps). The Affarsvarlden 
General Index (broad-market), the OMX 30 Index (large-caps) and the James Capel Smaller Companies 
Index (small-caps) were used for the adjustment of raw Swedish IPO returns. Finally, Swiss IPO returns 
were adjusted for the Swiss Total Market Index (broad-market), the SBC 100 Index (large-caps) and the 
Swiss Small Cap Index (small-caps). An adjustment for the set of Morgan Stanley country indices 
(MSCI) leads to similar results. Month 0 is the initial return interval. Returns were calculated on the basis 
of final closing prices.
anniversary on the stock market. In Figure 5, we have plotted three CAR series, where 
the initial return is also included. The individual benchmarks are main indices used in 
each country to describe either the state of the broad-market, the market for large-caps 
or the market for small- and mid-cap stocks. The distribution of initial returns varies 
across time and country, and is generally positively skewed. While the initial return 
picture is broadly similar, Figure 2 confirms that the dynamics in aftermarket 
performance is not uniform across countries. For German and Dutch IPOs, positive 
initial returns are followed by months o f strongly positive outperformance, until the 
relative performance picture changes quite dramatically after around six month of 
trading. The best overall performance picture emerges for Swedish IPOs that start to 
underperform relatively late. As inspection o f Table 12 shows, high Swedish IPO 
activity in technology- and service-related firms in 1997 preceded the large wave in IPO 
activity in other European countries in 1998. Many of the Swedish IPOs reached their 
third-year anniversary by mid-2000, a time when the NASDAQ Index traded slightly 
off its highs reached in March 2000. The return picture for the Southern European
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countries o f Italy and Spain is dismal. While both countries experience large initial 
returns, IPO performance starts to deteriorate early at least until the third-year 
anniversary. We also find that the performance of IPOs is sensitive to the benchmark 
employed. IPOs generally perform much better when adjusted for movements in small- 
or mid-cap indices and perform worse against large-cap indices. One reason why some 
small- and mid-cap indices match the IPO performance more closely is that index 
constituents are firms that have recently gone public. This issue is inherent in the 
countries under study due to a relatively small universe of listed companies.
The reported results are generally in line with the existing empirical literature in 
the countries under study. Looking at the first 36 months of trading, underperformance 
across the individual countries does not, however, reach the degree of significance 
reported in Ritter (1991) who uses a much larger sample and matching firms as a 
benchmark for reporting abnormal returns.
In Table 13, we show the distribution o f unadjusted three-year buy-and-hold 
(BHRs) returns for the individual countries under study. Median IPO three-year returns 
are positive in only three countries: The Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Swedish IPOs performed best with a median three-year buy-and-hold return o f 26.76 
percent. This is due to a large number of companies that recorded a positive 
performance in absolute terms as well as the existence o f few extreme winners. The 
worst three-year median performance belongs to Spain and Germany. Examination o f 
Table 13 underlines that three-year holding period return distributions are skewed 
across the countries with few extreme winners dominating the mean return picture. The 
highest three-year total return of 8,900.0 percent, excluding the initial return of 4.4 
percent, belongs to EM.TV AG, a German media company that was introduced
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Table 13
Distribution of unadjusted Three-Year Buy-And-Hold Returns
Distribution of unadjusted three-year holding period returns, exclusive of the initial returns, for IPOs in European countries between 1988 and 1998. Returns are measured as 
three-year unadjusted buy-and-hold returns. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval after the first closing price using local trading days. Prices are 
adjusted for dividends, stock splits and rights offerings._______________________________________________________________________________________________
Three-year unadjusted holding period return
Germany France Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs
1 (lowest) -0.9123 1 (lowest) -0.9491 1 (lowest) -0.8748 1 (lowest) -0.9865 1 (lowest) -0.9948 1 (lowest) -0.9455 1 (lowest) -0.9865
10 -0.6418 14 -0.7914 4 -0.6790 4 -0.6548 5 -0.8766 6 -0.7250 2 -0.5312
19 -0.5890 27 -0.6962 7 -0.5891 7 -0.5537 9 -0.7784 12 -0.4293 4 -0.4872
29 -0.4378 40 -0.5372 11 -0.4609 10 -0.5346 13 -0.7213 19 -0.3333 6 -0.3306
39 (25th) -0.3853 53 (25th) -0.4193 15 (25th) -0.2762 13 (25th) -0.3976 17 (25th) -0.6952 24 (25th) -0.2571 8 (25th) -0.2511
49 -0.3308 67 -0.3316 18 -0.2544 17 -0.2384 21 -0.6160 30 -0.2151 10 -0.1579
58 -0.2695 80 -0.1864 22 -0.1861 20 -0.1045 25 -0.5283 36 -0.1317 12 -0.1013
68 -0.1848 92 -0.1047 25 -0.1157 23 0.0000 30 -0.4264 42 0.0284 14 0.0245
78 (median) -0.1323 107 (median) -0.0283 30 (median) -0.5700 26 (median) 0.0240 34 (median) -0.3621 49 (median) 0.2676 16 (median) 0.0812
87 -0.0528 120 0.0855 34 0.0966 29 0.2285 38 -0.2867 55 0.4445 18 0.4200
97 0.0657 133 0.1698 38 0.1478 32 0.4948 43 -0.2229 61 0.5625 20 0.9241
106 0.3652 146 0.4124 42 0.2877 36 0.7243 47 -0.0690 66 0.6170 21 0.9533
116 (75th) 0.6049 160 (75th) 0.8869 45 (75th) 0.3510 39 (75th) 1.0086 51 (75th) 0.0799 72 (75th) 0.8733 23 (75th) 1.0227
126 0.7535 173 1.2511 48 0.6507 42 1.3438 55 0.2175 79 1.3151 25 1.2810
136 1.1216 187 1.7708 52 0.8801 46 2.0831 60 0.6593 86 1.6540 27 1.4113
146 2.0478 200 2.3948 56 1.6319 49 2.9176 64 1.1939 92 3.6296 29 2.2388
155 (highest) 89.0000 213 (highest) 22.4783 59 (highest) 3.4651 53 (highest) 9.1250 68 (highest) 7.8378 99 (highest) 10.1489 31 (highest) 4.2268
All (Mean) 1.3892 All (Mean) 0.5369 All (Mean) 0.1794 All (Mean) 0.7369 All (Mean) -0.0465 All (Mean) 0.7290 All (Mean) 0.5595
Ex. Top 1% 0.1754 Ex. Top 1% 0.3319 Ex. Top 1% 0.1190 Ex. Top 1% 0.5756 Ex. Top 1% -0.1642 Ex. Top 1% 0.6329 Ex. Top 1% 0.4373
Ex. Top 10% -0.0314 Ex. Top 10% 0.0584 Ex. Top 10% -0.0581 Ex. Top 10% 0.2067 Ex. Top 10%-0.3501 Ex. Top 10% 0.2195 Ex. Top 10% 0.2937
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in 1997 on the Neuer Markt as one of its first companies. This is followed by a three- 
year unadjusted return of 6,823.1 percent recorded by Mobilcom AG, the first company 
on the Neuer Markt, which jumped 52.0 percent on its first day of trading. The best 
French performer was Eurofins Scientific SA with a 2,247.8 percent three-year buy- 
and-hold return. Sylis SA, a 1997 IPO on the Second Marche, recorded a three-year raw 
return of 676.3 percent and an initial return of 14.3 percent. The best three-year 
performance of an Italian IPO belongs to Mediolanum SpA, an Italian Financial 
Services Company, with an unadjusted return of 346.5 percent, excluding the initial 
return of 30.8 percent. This is followed by Bulgari Spa, the international fashion and 
jewellery house that recorded an initial return of 5.7 percent and an unadjusted 
performance of 317.0 percent over three years. ASM Lithography NV, a 1995 IPO on 
the Amsterdam Exchanges, was the best Dutch performer. It returned 912.5 percent 
over three years, excluding the initial return of 22.6 percent. The second best Dutch 
performer was Baan NV, a software company, with a three-year unadjusted buy-and- 
hold return of 826.8 percent, excluding the initial return of 55.0 percent. Among the 
best of the Spanish performers was Tele Pizza SA, a Pizza home delivery service, with a 
three-year buy-and-hold return of 394.6 percent, excluding its initial return o f 34.8 
percent. Moreover, Compania Vinicola del Norte de Espana SA, a Spanish Wine 
producer, had a first day return of 28.5 percent and a three-year raw performance o f
119.4 percent. In Sweden, LGP Telecom AB, a technology company going public in 
June 1997 on the OTC list of the OM Stockholm Exchanges, ranked highest with an 
unadjusted return of 1,014.9 percent, excluding its initial return of 8.5 percent. Sigma 
AB, a technology company, ranked second highest, recording an unadjusted three-year 
buy-and-hold return of 962.8 percent, excluding the initial return o f 62.3 percent. In the 
sample of Swiss IPOs, there were several IPOs that had triple-digit investment gains in 
the three years after their IPO. Clariant AG, a chemicals company, rose by 422.68
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percent since its 1995 IPO, excluding the initial return of 0.7 percent. Moreover, 
Phoenix Mecano AG, an IPO on the Swiss market in September 1988, recorded an 
unadjusted return of 265.7 percent, excluding the initial return of 5.7 percent.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Performance Patterns
This section documents cross-sectional patterns in the aftermarket performance 
of IPOs. We perform this analysis for each individual country under study by 
segmenting the sample by a number of cross-sectional characteristics such as IPO year, 
sector, age, size, public float and initial return category. For each country, we conduct 
the analysis for initial and aftermarket returns. This permits examination as to whether 
initial and aftermarket performance are related to the issuing characteristics of the offer 
and allows for a more detailed look at IPO performance in general and pan-European 
IPO performance in particular.
As shown in Figure 5, the quantitative measurement of long-run IPO 
performance is sensitive to the benchmark employed. For evaluating the long-run 
performance of the IPOs in the sample, it is not at all clear what constitutes the 
appropriate benchmark portfolio. As mentioned earlier, the use of small- or mid-cap 
indices as benchmarks may bias the results in favour of finding no abnormal market- 
adjusted returns. Throughout the rest of the paper, we will therefore adjust IPO returns 
for movements in the broad-market value-weighted indices. While not capturing the 
complete picture of the market for small- and medium-sized stocks, broad-market 
indices also include large offerings similar to mature IPOs, privatization issues and 
equity carve-outs. We will also focus on reporting three-year wealth relatives (WR) as 
the primary measure of IPO aftermarket performance.
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Table 14
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of German IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of German IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, public float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in DM millions is the number of shares
issued times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). The initial return is th<
difference between the final offering price and the first-day closing price. Long-run returns are measurec
as mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 3(
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for th<
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.756 is computed as 1.0311/1.3645.
Panel A: Initial Returns
Category N Mean Median StandardDeviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 60 0.1209s 0.0547 0.23 (0.0296) 3.33
IPO year 1991-1994 43 0.0366s 0.0122 0.05 (0.0083) 3.17
IPO year 1995-1998 116 0.4083s 0.1250 0.62 (0.0574) 6.25
New Economy 57 0.5743s 0.1935 0.72 (0.0957) 1.75
Old Economy 162 0.1448s 0.0443 0.32 (0.0248) 5.56
Age < 15 87 0.4252s 0.1290 0.65 (0.0694) 4.60
15 < Age <37 51 0.2531s 0.0606 0.46 (0.0647) 5.88
Age> 37 81 0.0776s 0.0421 0.13 (0.0142) 3.70
Small firms (<100m) 112 0.3174s 0.0730 0.58 (0.0545) 2.27
Medium firms (100-500m) 81 0.2287s 0.0607 0.43 (0.0475) 5.65
Large firms (>500m) 26 0.0816s 0.0695 0.09 (0.0168) 3.92
Public Float < 20 25 0.2463s 0.0920 0.36 (0.0720) 0.00
20 < Public Float < 30 64 0.2804s 0.1250 0.44 (0.0544) 1.56
30 < Public Float < 50 83 0.2976s 0.0526 0.61 (0.0672) 6.02
Public Float > 50 47 0.1571s 0.0444 0.38 (0.0551) 8.51
All IPOs 219 0.2566s 0.0667 0.49 (0.0334) 4.57
Panel B: Long-Run Performance
Category N IPO return FAZ Index return
Wealth
Relative S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 60 0.0157 0.0582 0.960 (0.0802) 65.00
IPO year 1991-1994 42 -0.0799 0.3139 0.700s (0.0747) 76.19
IPO year 1995-1998 53 4.1083 0.8675 2.735 (2.1182) 66.04
New Economy 26 6.7516 0.4648 5.292 (4.1912) 50.00
Old Economy 129 0.3084 0.3920 0.940 (0.1817) 72.09
Age < 15 46 4.5868 0.5210 3.673c (2.4201) 58.70
15 < Age <37 32 0.0605 0.3319 0.796b (0.1299) 59.38
Age> 37 77 0.0311 0.3645 0.756s (0.0699) 77.92
Small firms (<100m) 32 3.1279 0.3612 3.032 (2.7667) 65.63
Medium firms (100-500m) 82 1.1093 0.4013 1.505 (0.8530) 71.95
Large firms (>500m) 41 0.5920 0.4437 1.103 (0.3296) 63.41
Public Float < 20 19 4.1598 0.5125 3.411 (3.5411) 63.16
20 < Public Float < 30 43 0.4220 0.3193 1.078 (0.3112) 67.44
30 < Public Float < 50 60 1.8751 0.3504 2.129 (1.5096) 63.33
Public Float > 50 33 0.1709 0.5503 0.755b (0.1815) 81.82
Initial Return < 0 22 -0.0840 0.3982 0.655s (0.1422) 90.91
0 < Initial Return < 7 69 1.4573 0.3955 1.761 (1.2793) 63.77
7 < Initial Return < 20 43 0.4995 0.4396 1.042 (0.3153) 67.44
Initial Return > 20 21 4.5306 0.3667 4.047 (3.2787) 61.90
All IPOs (Mean) 155 1.3892 0.4042 1.701 (0.7296) 68.39
All IPOs (Median) 155 0.728
^ d e n o te  statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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4.2.1 Germany
In Table 14, we present evidence concerning the initial (Panel A) and long-run 
performance (Panel B) for the sample of German IPOs as a whole, and characterised 
according to a number of cross-sectional characteristics. Underpricing is a cyclical but 
consistent feature throughout the sample period and confirms the positive link between 
initial returns and the general level o f the stock market. Only 4.57 percent of the IPOs in 
the sample experienced negative unadjusted initial returns. We also find that, when 
using buy-and-hold returns, average long-run returns for German IPOs were positive. 
This positive performance, however, is due to IPOs issued between 1995 and 1998. 
IPOs issued in “cold” markets during the early 1990s significantly underperform the 
market. For example, a strategy of investing in all IPOs issued during 1991 and 1994 
would have left the investor with only Deutsche Mark (DM) 0.700 relative to each DM 
invested in the FAZ Index. The underperformance is concentrated in older companies 
that also exhibit the lower initial returns. Companies in the New Economy, companies 
with a small public float and companies with higher initial returns perform substantially 
better. The findings in Table 14 also confirm that the median picture is substantially 
worse than the mean picture. In our sample, 68.39 percent of the companies 
underperformed the market with a median wealth relative of 0.728.
4.2.2 France
In Table 15, we summarize the findings on initial and aftermarket performance 
for the sample o f French IPOs. There is significant underpricing, which, however, is 
less cyclical and lower than in some other countries. This may serve to highlight the 
efficiency of auction-like IPO mechanisms prevalent in France. Only 6.50 percent of 
companies had negative first -day initial returns. Contrary to Germany, IPOs issued in
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Table 15
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of French IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of French IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in FRF billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the
Category N
Panel A: 
Mean
Initial Returns 
Median StandardDeviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 37 0.0759s 0.0769 0.08 (0.0136) 0.00
IPO year 1991-1994 60 0.0869s 0.0323 0.13 (0.0169) 3.33
IPO year 1995-1998 226 0.1413s 0.0880 0.21 (0.0138) 8.41
New Economy 102 0.1533s 0.1000 0.22 (0.0216) 5.88
Old Economy 221 0.1100s 0.0556 0.17 (0.0114) 6.79
Age < 15 168 0.1299s 0.0698 0.21 (0.0165) 9.52
15 < Age <37 105 0.1352s 0.0833 0.17 (0.0166) 1.90
Age> 37 50 0.0785s 0.0398 0.10 (0.0143) 6.00
Small firms (<0.33bn) 186 0.1236s 0.0790 0.20 (0.0145) 8.60
Medium firms (0.33-1.65bn) 101 0.1352s 0.0789 0.18 (0.0181) 0.99
Large firms (>1.65bn) 36 0.0922s 0.0286 0.14 (0.0236) 11.11
Public Float < 20 183 0.1216s 0.0827 0.16 (0.0115) 2.19
20 < Public Float < 30 73 0.1452s 0.0769 0.23 (0.0272) 12.33
30 < Public Float < 50 58 0.1159s 0.0260 0.22 (0.0292) 12.07
Public Float > 50 9 0.0422s 0.0000 0.08 (0.0264) 11.11
All IPOs 323 0.1237s 0.0714 0.19 (0.0104) 6.50
Category
Panel B: Long- 
N IPO return
Run Performance
SBF 250 Wealth
Index return Relative S.E.
Percentage
IPO year 1988-1990 37 -0.0879 0.0369 0.880 (0.0800) 59.46
IPO year 1991-1994 60 0.4750 0.3190 1.118 (0.1381) 60.00
IPO year 1995-1998 116 0.7682 1.1899 0.807 (0.2603) 74.14
New Economy 64 1.0565 0.8161 1.132 (0.4293) 64.06
Old Economy 149 0.3137 0.7134 0.767s (0.1049) 69.13
Age < 15 102 0.6181 0.7993 0.899 (0.2704) 70.59
15 < Age <37 71 0.6740 0.7995 0.930 (0.1961) 60.56
Age> 37 40 0.0863 0.5059 0.721s (0.1560) 72.50
Small firms (<0.33bn) 112 0.6933 0.8729 0.904 (0.2603) 68.75
Medium firms (0.33-1.65bn) 70 0.2771 0.6367 0.780b (0.1456) 68.57
Large firms (> 1.651xi) 31 0.5583 0.5226 1.023 (0.1983) 61.29
Public Float < 20 133 0.4450 0.6391 0.882 (0.1252) 63.91
20 < Public Float < 30 43 1.1452 0.8571 1.155 (0.6002) 69.77
30 < Public Float < 50 32 0.1451 1.0262 0.565s (0.2214) 81.25
Public Float > 50 5 0.2576 0.7676 0.711 (0.3446) 60.00
Initial Return < 0 67 0.3856 0.6792 0.825 (0.1790) 73.13
0 < Initial Return < 7 39 1.1740 0.7888 1.215 (0.5926) 58.97
7 < Initial Return < 20 64 0.5543 0.7078 0.910 (0.2437) 62.50
Initial Return > 20 43 0.1688 0.8597 0.628s (0.2014) 74.42
All IPOs (Mean) 213 0.5369 0.7443 0.881 (0.1481) 67.61
All IPOs (Median) 213 0.631
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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France between 1991 and 1994 overperformed the market. There is also significant 
long-term underperformance in Old Economy stocks that make up 70 percent of the 
sample. While the long-run average performance is negative, it is not statistically 
significant when assuming conventional measures of significance. The data also 
confirms a tendency for older companies and companies with a large public float to 
underperform the market and their younger counterparts in the long-run. 67.61 percent 
of IPOs in the sample underperformed the market, a value similar to one reported for 
Germany. A strategy of investing in the median French IPO at the end o f the first day of 
trading, and holding it over 36 months, would have left the investor with only French 
Franc (FRF) 0.631 relative to each FRF invested in the SBF 250 Index.
4.2.3 Italy
Evidence on the performance of Italian IPOs is summarized in Table 16. Here, 
the following inferences can be drawn: First, Italian IPOs are underpriced on average by
13.03 percent. Underpricing, however, is less significant and more time-varying than for 
any other country in this study. Indeed, 20.78 percent of Italian IPOs had negative initial 
returns. Second, only seven percent of the companies under study were New Economy 
companies, a finding that offers a key insight about the composition of the Italian IPO 
market during the sample period. Moreover, our results also clearly confirm findings by 
Giudici and Paleari (1999) who distinguish two separate periods in which aftermarket 
performance varies substantially: a period up to 1989, when IPOs significantly 
overperformed the broad-market benchmark, and the remaining period that was 
characterized by strong underperformance. In our sample, the percentage of companies 
reporting underperformance rose from 52.63 percent between 1988 and 1990 to 84.85 
percent between 1995 and 1998. Furthermore, the cross-sectional patterns exhibit a
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Table 16
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of Italian IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Italian IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in ITL billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the
Category N
Panel A: Initial Returns
. . . .  Standard Mean Median ~ ..Deviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 21 0.2709b 0.1220 0.49 (0.1067) 28.57
IPO year 1991-1994 9 -0.0051 0.0000 0.11 (0.0364) 44.44
IPO year 1995-1998 47 0.09348 0.0602 0.13 (0.0186) 12.77
New Economy 5 0.2197b 0.1010 0.21 (0.0959) 0.00
Old Economy 72 0.1241s 0.0535 0.29 (0.0344) 22.22
Age < 15 31 0.1630b 0.0500 0.36 (0.0655) 25.81
15 < Age <37 30 0.1141s 0.0842 0.16 (0.0301) 13.33
Age> 37 16 0.0976 0.0236 0.31 (0.0781) 25.00
Small firms (<100bn) 9 0.2368b 0.0889 0.35 (0.1178) 22.22
Medium firms (100-500bn) 46 0.1400s 0.0551 0.32 (0.0473) 21.74
Large firms (>500bn) 22 0.0665b 0.0582 0.14 (0.0308) 18.18
Public Float < 20 6 -0.0099 -0.0062 0.06 (0.0254) 50.00
20 < Public Float < 30 34 0.1848s 0.0996 0.39 (0.0677) 17.65
30 < Public Float < 50 30 0.1225s 0.0792 0.16 (0.0297) 16.67
Public Float > 50 7 0.0194 0.0081 0.08 (0.0313) 28.57
All IPOs 77 0.1303s 0.0593 0.29 (0.0327) 20.78
Category
Panel B: Long-Run Performance
MIB Index Wealth
return RelativeN IPO return S.E.
Percentage
IPO year 1988-1990 19 -0.0510 -0.1253 1.085 (0.1486) 52.63
IPO year 1991-1994 7 -0.4778 0.1734 0.445s (0.1784) 100.00
IPO year 1995-1998 33 0.4515 1.2365 0.649s (0.1554) 84.85
New Economy 4 0.1748 0.6421 0.715b (0.1840) 100.00
Old Economy 55 0.2429 1.0807 0.597s (0.2126) 74.55
Age < 15 22 0.1325 0.7108 0.662s (0.1711) 81.82
15 < Age <37 25 0.2013 0.6819 0.714b (0.2081) 76.00
Age> 37 12 0.2200 0.5794 0.772b (0.1687) 75.00
Small firms (<100bn) 6 0.2846 0.8721 0.686 (0.6386) 83.33
Medium firms (100-500bn) 36 0.0342 0.6644 0.621s (0.1102) 75.00
Large firms (>500bn) 17 0.4500 0.6168 0.897 (0.2224) 76.47
Public Float < 20 6 0.5385 0.7328 0.888 (0.1304) 66.67
20 < Public Float < 30 27 0.0619 0.3671 O U T (0.1806) 70.37
30 < Public Float < 50 20 0.3064 0.9974 0.654s (0.1963) 80.00
Public Float > 50 6 -0.0740 0.8972 0.488s (0.2416) 100.00
Initial Return < 0 14 -0.0176 0.4736 0.667s (0.1178) 85.71
0 < Initial Return < 7 15 0.2303 0.8849 0.653b (0.2547) 80.00
7 < Initial Return < 20 15 0.2635 0.9203 0.658s (0.1747) 73.33
Initial Return > 20 15 0.2284 0.3953 0.880 (0.2980) 66.67
All IPOs (Mean) 59 0.1794 0.6718 0.705s (0.1127) 76.27
All IPOs (Median) 59 0.669
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test
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similar tendency to the patterns reported for Germany: there is a clear tendency for IPOs 
with higher initial returns and higher ownership retention rate to do better in the long- 
run. Finally, the low number of New Economy IPOs, which has been identified as the 
main driver behind the relatively favourable IPO performance in other countries, can 
explain the strong average and median underperformance of Italian IPOs.48
4.2.4 The Netherlands
In Table 17, we present evidence concerning the performance of Dutch IPOs. 
There is significant underpricing that depends on either the market condition at the time 
of going public or the sector. Only 8.00 percent of the IPOs recorded negative 
unadjusted initial returns. The long-run performance picture is similar to the one 
reported for Germany: On average, IPOs have overperformed the market. This 
overperformance is driven by New Economy stocks, which make up 31 percent of the 
sample. While an investment in the sample of New Economy IPOs leaves the average 
investor with Dutch Guilder (NLG) 1.373 relative to each NLG invested in the CBS 
Index over three years, an investment in Old Economy IPOs leaves the average investor 
with only 0.868 NLG relative to each NLG invested in the CBS Index. There is also a 
positive link between offering retention, initial return and long-run performance. We 
also note that, unlike for Italy, the average and median IPO long-run performance is 
clearly different, thus underlying the higher probability of finding extremely positive 
returns in New Economy IPOs, which made up a large percentage of IPOs. O f all the 
companies, 66.04 percent recorded negative long-run market adjusted performance, a 
result similar to the one presented for Germany and France.
48 During the early 1990s, a number of Italian companies such as Luxoticca Group, an eye-ware company, 
pursued their IPO on a foreign exchange, such as on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Some of 
these shares substantially outperformed the market in the long-run.
106
Table 17
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of Dutch IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Dutch IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
market sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in NLG millions is the number of shares 
issued times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured 
as mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative o f0.829 is computed as 1.4695/1.7722.____________________
Panel A : Initial Returns
Category N Mean Median StandardDeviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 17 0.0644s 0.0250 0.09 (0.0224) 21.43
IPO year 1991-1994 11 0.0116s 0.0068 0.01 (0.0038) 0.00
IPO year 1995-1998 47 0.1888s 0.0780 0.26 (0.0384) 6.38
New Economy 30 0.1964s 0.0479 0.29 (0.0521) 3.33
Old Economy 45 0.0934s 0.0317 0.16 (0.0241) 11.11
Age < 15 27 0.1683s 0.0828 0.25 (0.0471) 7.41
15 < Age <37 27 0.1641s 0.0741 0.26 (0.0503) 3.70
Age> 37 21 0.0534s 0.0239 0.09 (0.0204) 14.29
Small firms (<113m) 17 0.2117s 0.0828 0.30 (0.0730) 11.76
Medium firms (113-550m) 31 0.1156s 0.0263 0.24 (0.0428) 12.90
Large firms (>550m) 27 0.1079s 0.0590 0.13 (0.0245) 0.00
Public Float < 20 20 0.1441s 0.0323 0.24 (0.0538) 5.00
20 < Public Float < 30 13 0.202 lb 0.0250 0.34 (0.0949) 15.38
30 < Public Float < 50 20 0.1349s 0.0683 0.21 (0.0465) 5.00
Public Float > 50 22 0.0859s 0.0345 0.12 (0.0248) 9.09
All IPOs 75 0.1346s 0.0333 0.22 (0.0259) 8.00
Panel B: Long-Run Performance
Category N IPO return CBS Index return
Wealth
Relative S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 17 0.0296 0.1844 0.869 (0.4074) 57.89
IPO year 1991-1994 11 0.4455 0.7175 0.842 (0.2495) 77.78
IPO year 1995-1998 25 1.3460 0.9670 1.193 (0.5493) 68.00
New Economy 17 1.4789 0.8056 1.373 (0.6412) 58.82
Old Economy 36 0.3865 0.5974 0.868 (0.2268) 69.44
Age < 15 18 1.1299 0.6651 1.279 (0.5884) 50.00
15 < Age <37 18 0.5964 0.5613 1.022 (0.3191) 77.78
Age> 37 17 0.4695 0.7722 0.829 (0.1978) 70.59
Small firms (<113m) 12 1.1578 0.3696 1.575 (0.5186) 33.33
Medium firms (113-550m) 18 0.2512 0.6354 0.765c (0.1991) 72.22
Large firms (>550m) 23 0.8974 0.8405 1.031 (0.5690) 78.26
Public Float < 20 16 1.8536 0.6981 1.680 (0.7089) 56.25
20 < Public Float < 30 8 0.4678 0.3716 1.070 (0.1503) 37.50
30 < Public Float < 50 13 0.0001 0.6100 0.62 lb (0.2401) 84.62
Public Float > 50 16 0.3533 0.8206 0.743b (0.1877) 75.00
Initial Return < 0 11 0.3486 0.3945 0.967 (0.2869) 54.55
0 < Initial Return < 7 21 0.6089 0.7589 0.915 (0.3061) 76.19
7 < Initial Return < 20 9 0.1234 0.4853 0.756 (0.3067) 77.78
Initial Return > 20 12 1.7769 0.8799 1.477 (0.8881) 50.00
All IPOs (Mean) 53 0.7369 0.6642 1.044 (0.2796) 66.04
All IPOs (Median) 53 0.737
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 18
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of Spanish IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Spanish IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in ESP billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the
Category N
Panel A: Initial Returns 
Mean Median StandardDeviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 46 0.1650s 0.0835 0.24 (0.0350) 2.17
IPO year 1991-1994 18 0.0064 0.0128 0.10 (0.0237) 27.78
IPO year 1995-1998 24 0.2197s 0.0853 0.29 (0.0600) 4.17
New Economy 3 0.3182b 0.3165 0.26 (0.1515) 0.00
Old Economy 85 0.1414s 0.0764 0.24 (0.0263) 8.24
Age < 15 14 0.1146s 0.0590 0.12 (0.0318) 0.00
15 < Age <37 38 0.1821s 0.1055 0.28 (0.0454) 10.53
Age> 37 36 0.1237s 0.0646 0.24 (0.0400) 8.33
Small firms (<7bn) 14 0.1691b 0.0680 0.31 (0.0833) 0.00
Medium firms (7-33bn) 45 0.1577s 0.0764 0.26 (0.0387) 8.89
Large firms (>33 bn) 29 0.1211s 0.0797 0.18 (0.0335) 10.34
Public Float < 20 11 0.0887b 0.0444 0.14 (0.0411) 0.00
20 < Public Float < 30 18 0.1001s 0.0799 0.15 (0.0358) 11.11
30 < Public Float < 50 40 0.1478s 0.1150 0.18 (0.0284) 10.00
Public Float > 50 19 0.2258b 0.0716 0.42 (0.0961) 5.26
All IPOs 88 0.1475s 0.0781 0.24 (0.0260) 7.95
Category N
Panel B: Long-Run Performance
IGBM Index Wealth 
return RelativeIPO return S.E.
Percentage
IPO year 1988-1990 37 -0.4826 -0.1255 0.592s (0.0589) 81.08
IPO year 1991-1994 14 0.0977 0.4334 0.766s (0.1190) 85.71
IPO year 1995-1998 17 0.7840 0.9658 0.907 (0.4545) 82.35
New Economy 2 -0.0367 0.2806 0.752 (0.5202) 50.00
Old Economy 66 -0.3705 -0.3362 0.948s (0.0133) 83.33
Age < 15 11 -0.0651 0.1044 0.847 (0.3027) 72.73
15 < Age <37 30 -0.0375 0.2272 0.784 (0.2282) 86.67
Age> 37 27 -0.0490 0.3659 0.696s (0.1137) 81.48
Small firms (<7bn) 12 0.2739 0.1981 1.063 (0.5414) 75.00
Medium firms (7-33bn) 32 -0.1721 0.2408 0.667s (0.1449) 84.38
Large firms (>33bn) 24 -0.0393 0.3233 0.726s (0.0841) 83.33
Public Float < 20 10 0.3279 0.4430 0.920 (0.1265) 70.00
20 < Public Float < 30 14 -0.2643 0.1337 0.649b (0.1723) 78.57
30 < Public Float < 50 29 -0.2775 0.0954 0.660s (0.1147) 89.66
Public Float > 50 15 0.3537 0.5851 0.854 (0.4722) 80.00
Initial Return < 0 12 -0.4100 0.0831 0.545s (0.0736) 91.67
0 < Initial Return < 7 18 -0.0001 0.3215 0.757s (0.1157) 72.22
7 < Initial Return < 20 18 -0.3256 0.2322 0.547s (0.1007) 94.44
Initial Return > 20 20 0.3810 0.3441 1.027 (0.3690) 75.00
All IPOs (Mean) 68 -0.0465 0.2624 0.755s (0.1193) 82.35
All IPOs (Median) 68 0.553
87 ,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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4.2.5 Spain
We report the results for IPOs issued on the Madrid Stock Exchange in Table 
18. The findings are similar to the one presented for IPOs issued on the Milan Stock 
Exchange. There is significant underpricing which is higher in rising stock markets than 
in stable and falling stock markets. For the sample as a whole, 7.95 percent recorded 
negative returns based on the closing price after the first day of trading. Companies 
from Old Economy sectors dominate the Spanish IPO market during the sample period. 
Less than four percent of companies are from New Economy sectors. When evaluating 
aftermarket performance, we can clearly distinguish between two periods: First, a 
period up to 1990, in which IPOs substantially underperform the market. This period is 
characterised by regulatory changes following the Spanish Securities Market Reform 
Act of 1989. Over three years, a strategy o f investing in the sample of Spanish IPOs 
between 1988 and 1990 would have left the average investor with only Spanish Pesetas 
(ESP) 0.755 relative to each ESP invested in the Madrid General Index (IGBM). 
Second, the period from 1991 and 1998 was characterized by subdued IPO activity and 
generally a more favourable long-run performance picture of the companies going 
public. The results also confirm the signaling role of underpricing for the Spanish IPO 
market. Looking at the sample as a whole, the mean and median long-run performance 
of Spanish IPO is dismal, with 82.35 percent of companies underperforming the market 
benchmark. This could be partly due to the absence of IPOs in New Economy sectors.
4.2.6 Sweden
In Table 19, we display the results for the initial and long-run performance of 
Swedish IPOs. The overall long-run performance of Swedish IPOs was mixed with 
71.72 percent of the IPOs underperforming the market after three years. Without IPOs
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Table 19
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of Swedish IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Swedish IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in SEK billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 1.070 is computed as 1.8417/1.7211.____________________
Panel A: Initial Returns
Category N Mean Median StandardDeviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 26 0.2618a 0.1755 0.23 (0.0457) 0.00
IPO year 1991-1994 41 0.1178" 0.0568 0.21 (0.0334) 21.95
IPO year 1995-1998 81 0.1937" 0.0846 0.32 (0.0358) 13.58
New Economy 55 0.2629" 0.1474 0.29 (0.0390) 5.45
Old Economy 93 0.1383" 0.0714 0.27 (0.0281) 18.28
Age < 15 76 0.1997" 0.0961 0.27 (0.0306) 13.16
15 < Age <37 33 0.1752" 0.1000 0.22 (0.0377) 3.03
Age> 37 39 0.1634" 0.0500 0.36 (0.0577) 23.08
Small firms (<0.4bn) 84 0.2204" 0.1027 0.32 (0.0346) 11.90
Medium firms (0.4-2.0bn) 48 0.1232“ 0.0508 0.21 (0.0304) 18.37
Large firms (>2.0bn) 16 0.1810" 0.0902 0.27 (0.0680) 6.67
Public Float < 20 26 0.2407“ 0.1841 0.22 (0.0434) 7.69
20 < Public Float < 30 37 0.3278" 0.1446 0.41 (0.0676) 2.70
30 < Public Float < 50 42 0.1361" 0.0823 0.23 (0.0354) 16.67
Public Float > 50 43 0.0750" 0.0500 0.15 (0.0225) 23.26
All IPOs 148 0.1846" 0.0866 0.28 (0.0233) 13.51
Panel B: Long-Run Performance
Category N IPO return AFG Index return
Wealth
Relative S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 22 -0.2906 -0.0289 0.731" (0.0798) 77.27
IPO year 1991-1994 32 0.4835 0.9123 0.776" (0.1218) 81.25
IPO year 1995-1998 45 1.4020 1.1286 1.128 (0.3695) 62.22
New Economy 30 1.5212 0.9592 1.287 (0.4887) 60.00
Old Economy 69 0.3846 0.7329 0.799" (0.1231) 76.81
Age < 15 46 0.7928 0.8842 0.952 (0.2688) 69.57
15 < Age <37 22 0.4368 0.7419 0.825 (0.2564) 77.27
Age> 37 31 0.8417 0.7211 1.070 (0.3446) 70.97
Small firms (<0.4bn) 52 0.9782 0.7905 1.105 (0.3077) 69.23
Medium firms (0.4-2.0bn) 35 0.4692 0.8851 0.779b (0.1677) 77.78
Large firms (>2.0bn) 12 0.4071 0.6051 0.877 (0.1414) 63.64
Public Float < 20 19 1.2267 0.7956 1.240 (0.4899) 73.68
20 < Public Float < 30 24 0.4439 0.6520 0.874 (0.2020) 62.50
30 < Public Float < 50 26 1.0572 0.9014 1.082 (0.5026) 65.38
Public Float > 50 30 0.3575 0.8382 0.739" (0.1498) 83.33
Initial Return < 0 19 0.7819 1.1597 0.825 (0.3498) 84.21
0 < Initial Return < 7 24 0.3794 0.7821 0.774b (0.1927) 75.00
7 < Initial Return < 20 26 0.9686 0.7319 1.137 (0.4552) 69.23
Initial Return > 20 30 0.7676 0.6504 1.071 (0.3256) 63.33
All IPOs (Mean) 99 0.7290 0.8015 0.960 (0.1768) 71.72
All IPOs (Median) 99 0.726
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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in New Economy sectors, the average long-run IPO performance would have been 
dismal. The 148 Swedish IPOs record an average underpricing of 18.46 percent, with 
13.51 percent trading in negative territory based on their first close. Underpricing was 
highest between 1988 and 1990. None of the 26 IPOs between 1988 and 1990 recorded 
a negative initial return. This can be explained by the fact that underpricing up until 
1990 was driven by an incentive to replace salary increases by tax efficient capital 
gains. Another important feature of the Swedish IPO market is that 37 percent of 
Swedish IPOs during the sample period belong to the New Economy sectors, the 
highest compared to the other six countries in this study. Most of the New Economy 
stocks went public between 1995 and 1997, which is strongly apparent when dividing 
IPO performance by IPO year. For example, a strategy of investing in the basket of 
Swedish IPOs between 1991 and 1994 at the first closing price and then holding them 
over a three-year period, would have left the investor with only Swedish Krona (SEK) 
0.776 relative to each SEK invested in the AFG Index. In contrast, Swedish IPOs issued 
between 1995 and 1998 rose, on average, by 140.20 percent over three years while the 
AFG Index recorded a rise of 112.86 percent, a ratio of 1.128. The results displayed in 
Table 19 also verify our previous observations that the magnitude o f long-run 
performance is sensitive to the size of the public float and the degree of underpricing.
4.2.7 Switzerland
In Table 20, we present evidence concerning the performance of Swiss IPOs 
going public on the respective market segments of the SWX stock exchange between 
1988 and 1998. We cannot reject that Swiss IPOs were underpriced, on average, across 
the sample period. However, the recorded degree of underpricing is markedly lower 
than for other European countries across the sample period. An interesting feature of the
111
Table 20
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of Swiss IPOs
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Swiss IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare respectively in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in CHF millions is the number of shares 
issued times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured 
as mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.835 is computed as 1.4691/1.7601.____________________
Category N
Panel A : 
Mean
Initial Returns 
Median StandardDeviation S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 10 0.0343 0.0149 0.07 (0.0216) 30.00
IPO year 1991-1994 4 0.09088 0.0882 0.07 (0.0349) 0.00
IPO year 1995-1998 29 0.1196“ 0.0489 0.17 (0.0319) 10.34
New Economy 18 0.1444“ 0.1169 0.16 (0.0387) 16.67
Old Economy 25 0.0629b 0.0227 0.13 (0.0260) 12.00
Age < 15 17 0.0965b 0.0400 0.18 (0.0431) 23.53
15 < Age <37 13 0.1120“ 0.0765 0.10 (0.0264) 7.69
Age> 37 13 0.0829° 0.0194 0.16 (0.0451) 3.85
Small firms (<80m) 6 0.0642b 0.0438 0.08 (0.0319) 0.00
Medium firms (80-450m) 28 0.1235“ 0.0529 0.17 (0.0329) 17.86
Large firms (>450m) 9 0.0368° 0.0194 0.06 (0.0203) 11.11
Public Float < 20 2 0.0496° 0.0496 0.04 (0.0270) 0.00
20 < Public Float < 30 2 0.1301 0.1301 0.15 (0.1033) 0.00
30 < Public Float < 50 10 0.1377b 0.0854 0.18 (0.0567) 0.00
Public Float > 50 29 0.0841“ 0.0375 0.15 (0.0271) 20.69
All IPOs 43 0.0971“ 0.0400 0.15 (0.0228) 13.95
Panel B: Long-Run Performance
Category N IPO return STM Index return
Wealth
Relative S.E.
Percentage
negative
IPO year 1988-1990 10 0.2754 0.1997 1.063 (0.3785) 70.00
IPO year 1991-1994 4 0.8104 0.9888 0.910 (0.4351) 75.00
IPO year 1995-1998 17 0.6676 0.8422 0.905 (0.2459) 64.71
New Economy 12 0.7337 0.7534 0.989 (0.2814) 66.67
Old Economy 19 0.4495 0.5910 0.911 (0.2398) 68.42
Age < 15 13 0.5727 0.6278 0.966 (0.3061) 69.23
15 < Age <37 9 0.6309 0.5852 1.029 (0.2539) 55.56
Age> 37 9 0.4691 0.7601 0.835 (0.3932) 77.78
Small firms (<80m) 6 -0.1098 0.4164 0.628° (0.2726) 83.33
Medium firms (80-450m) 19 0.6779 0.6889 0.993 (0.2200) 63.16
Large firms (>450m) 6 0.8539 0.7803 1.041 (0.5257) 66.67
Public Float < 20 1 -0.1579 0.2933 0.651 - 100.00
20 < Public Float < 30 1 0.9913 1.1113 0.943 - 100.00
30 < Public Float < 50 8 1.1413 0.8974 1.129 (0.4435) 50.00
Public Float > 50 21 0.3515 0.5564 0.868 (0.2134) 71.43
Initial Return < 0 5 0.5664 0.4028 1.117 (0.4195) 80.00
0 < Initial Return < 7 15 0.5731 0.6100 0.977 (0.3075) 66.67
7 < Initial Return < 20 6 0.7013 0.9044 0.893 (0.3627) 66.67
Initial Return > 20 5 0.3415 0.7355 0.773 (0.4062) 60.00
All IPOs (Mean) 31 0.5595 0.6538 0.943 (0.1849) 67.74
All IPOs (Median) 31 0.774
% ° denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Swiss IPO market is the large number o f New Economy IPOs that drive both initial and 
long-run aftermarket returns. For the sample as a whole, we do not find significant long- 
run underperformance. Of all the IPOs in the sample, 67.74 percent recorded negative 
market adjusted returns in the long-run, a number slightly lower than reported for other 
European countries. Owning to the small sample sizes, it is difficult to draw inferences 
about the explanatory power of cross-sectional characteristics and long-run aftermarket 
performance of Swiss IPOs.
5 Checks of Performance Differences
Putting the methodological issues in performance differences between Chapter II 
and Chapter III aside, in order to investigate the patterns in IPO performance across 
countries, we measure the significance o f country-by-country performance differences. 
This analysis is performed for 21 pairs o f countries for the sample as a whole and for 
IPOs categorized by the issuing characteristics identified above using the conventional 
two samples test for Mean Difference. Moreover, because the results may be biased 
because of the skewness of the return distributions, we perform further robustness 
checks using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test.
In Table 21, we report the result for the significance of differences in initial 
returns. The findings confirm our earlier observation. While significantly higher 
underpricing o f Swedish IPOs offered between 1988 and 1990 indicates the effect of 
underpricing as tax-efficient compensation o f management, the large number of young 
companies going public during 1998 explains the significantly higher level of 
underpricing for German IPOs, when compared to their European counterparts. German 
and Swedish underpricing was particularly significantly different when compared to 
France. This underlines the effect of certain IPO mechanisms that are relatively unique
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Table 21
Test for Significance of Initial Return Differences
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted initial return performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two samples test for Mean Difference and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. The initial return (IR) is the percentage difference between the final offering 
price and the first-day closing price. Significance values correspond to p-values.____________________
Tests for significance o f Initial Returns (IR) Differences
Country IR Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.2566 0.0000 0.0348 0.0396 0.0489 0.1098 0.3690
France (FR) 0.1237 0.8034 0.6613 0.3243 0.0059 0.3704
Italy (IT) 0.1303 0.9185 0.6790 0.1764 0.4811
Netherlands (NL) 0.1346 0.7282 0.1847 0.3288
Spain (ES) 0.1475 0.3071 0.2158
Sweden (SD) 0.1846 0.0533
Switzerland (SW) 0.0971
Country IR Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.2566 0.0296 0.0729 0.1044 0.6884 0.4381 0.0751
France (FR) 0.1237 0.6488 0.9817 0.3350 0.0273 0.5481
Italy (IT) 0.1303 0.7137 0.2950 0.0569 0.9172
Netherlands (NL) 0.1346 0.3256 0.0466 0.6464
Spain (ES) 0.1475 0.2960 0.1675
Sweden (SD) 0.1846 0.0295
Switzerland (SW) 0.0971
to the French IPO market during the sample period. For other country pairs, the results 
do not indicate a significant difference in underpricing.
Findings for the significance in long-run performance differences between IPOs 
in the seven European countries under study are shown in Table 22. O f the 21 country 
pairs, 17 do not indicate significant differences in long-run IPO performance. An 
exception is the sample of German IPOs, which, on average, have substantially 
outperformed French IPOs. Much like for Initial Returns, this is due to the favourable 
performance o f German IPOs issued during the late 1990s. Italy ranks lowest in the 
long-run performance ranking. It substantially underperformed most of the other 
countries in the study, which, as argued earlier, could be due to the lack of IPO activity 
in the New Economy sectors in this market.
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Table 22
Test for Significance of Long-Run Return Differences
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two-sample test for Mean Difference and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. Long-run returns are measured as broad-market adjusted mean three-year buy- 
and-hold returns (BHRT) whereas three years is defined as 36 consecutive 21-day trading intervals using 
local trading days. Significance values correspond to p-values.__________________________________
Tests for significance o f Long-Run Performance (BHRT) Differences
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.9850 0.0664 0.1999 0.4667 0.2446 0.2550 0.5118
France (FR) -0.2074 0.2293 0.3991 0.7086 0.5869 0.7753
Italy (IT) -0.5584 0.0222 0.1441 0.0499 0.0305
Netherlands (NL) 0.0649 0.1502 0.6480 0.6554
Spain (ES) -0.3089 0.3116 0.3223
Sweden (SD) -0.0725 0.9471
Switzerland (SW) -0.0943
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.9850 0.0261 0.0158 0.6398 0.2611 0.2565 0.9098
France (FR) -0.2074 0.5102 0.1872 0.4764 0.2786 0.1615
Italy (IT) -0.5584 0.0908 0.2084 0.1383 0.0782
Netherlands (NL) 0.0649 0.8345 0.7337 0.7386
Spain (ES) -0.3089 0.9844 0.5043
Sweden (SD) -0.0725 0.4314
Switzerland (SW) -0.0943
The analysis of cross-sectional results for the significance in performance 
differences across the seven European countries also helps to shed some more light on 
some of the cross-sectional findings reported earlier. In Appendix D, Tables 49 - 60, 
significance tests are conducted by categorizing IPOs in each of the seven countries 
according to the issuing characteristic at the IPO date. We can infer that the 
significantly negative performance of Spanish IPOs was an isolated event limited to 
IPOs issued between 1988 and 1990, a time when changes in Spain’s securities markets 
law facilitated the process of going public. Moreover, tests for New Economy IPOs 
indicate insignificant performance differences across countries. The same result applies 
when comparing the significance o f performance differences of IPOs categorized by 
issuing characteristics such as Old Economy sector, oldest age category or largest size.
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In our pooled sample of 973 European IPOs in Chapter II, we found a tendency 
for companies that retained the least at the IPO date to underperform the most in the 
long-run. The results displayed in Appendix D, Tables 57 - 58, confirm significant 
underperformance of companies with the highest public float at the IPO date. The result 
is not driven by one single country, but extends across all countries in this study. A 
slightly different picture emerges when categorizing long-run returns according to the 
initial returns category. While there is a clear tendency for companies with the lowest 
initial returns to perform similarly, French IPOs in the highest initial return category 
perform significantly worse. In this respect, the majority of all other IPOs in the 
countries do not show significant performance differences when compared with each 
other. This result is robust to both forms o f statistical measurement used. For France, 
therefore, there is weak support for the signaling explanation of underpricing.
In order to underline the sensitivity of our analysis to methodological choices 
extensively addressed in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997), we 
compare the findings on the aftermarket performance of IPOs in the individual 
European countries pursued in this section to the results using the pooled sample of 
European IPOs in the previous chapter. The results are shown in Appendix E, Table 61, 
and indicate methodological issues across two dimensions: First, in both studies (Table 
61, Panel A and B), the results on monthly portfolio rebalancing (CARs) confirm that 
the use of buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) biases the long-run performance upwards, a 
findings consistent with Ritter (1991), Schuster (1996) or Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998). Second, while there is overall consistency in the findings on raw and adjusted 
returns between Chapter II and Chapter III -  the slight difference being due to the use of 
a European versus Local Trading Day Calendar resulting in different sample sizes at the 
and the conversion of stock prices into Euro (€) when appropriate at the individual
116
country level - the choice of a pan-European benchmark index versus a local benchmark 
index with a potentially large divergence in sector weightings has a clear influence on 
the results.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analysed the short- and long-run performance of Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) in seven individual European countries between 1988 and 
1998, a time characterized by a rapid change. In all countries, companies going public 
were significantly underpriced. Average initial returns are also related to age and the 
percentage of New Economy stocks of total IPO activity. In each country under study, 
there appears to be a close link between IPO activity, the level of underpricing and the 
general level o f the stock market. Moreover, the results point to the effects of tax 
incentives (in the case of Sweden or France), the IPO mechanism (in the case of France) 
and changes in the regulatory environment (in the case of Spain) on the level of 
underpricing and IPO activity.
The long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs issued in the seven European 
countries is mixed. We find that a strategy o f investing in IPOs at the end of the first 
day of trading, and holding them over a three-year period, would have left the investor 
in German IPOs with DM1.701 relative to each DM invested in the FAZ Index, and the 
investor in Dutch IPOs with NLG1.044 relative to each NLG invested in the CBS 
Index. Investors in other countries would have underperformed the market: the investor 
in Swedish IPOs would have been left with only SEK0.960 to each SEK invested in the 
AFG Index, the investor in Swiss IPOs would have been left with CHF0.943 relative to 
each CHF invested in the STM Index, and the investor in French IPOs with FRF0.881 
relative to each FRF invested in the SBF 250 Index. Spanish and Italian IPOs fared the
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worst: an investment in the sample of Spanish IPOs resulted in ESP0.755 for each ESP 
invested in the IGBM Index after three years. The investor in Italian IPOs would have 
been left with only ITL0.705 for each ITL invested in the MIB Historical Index over 
three years.
We have also shown that aftermarket performance is sensitive to benchmark 
adjustment and return methodology. In the countries under study, returns on IPOs were 
more favourable when adjusted for movements in small- or mid-cap indices, when 
available. We also found that the use of cumulative average returns (CARs) results in a 
more negative long-run performance picture when compared to buy-and-hold returns 
(BHRs). An analysis of CARs of German, Dutch and Swedish IPOs indicates strong 
overperformance during the first months on the stock market. Capturing the positive 
returns in the countries faring best depends on the investor’s ability o f finding the 
extreme winner. This describes the essence of the IPO market.
For each individual country, we have also documented various cross-sectional 
and time-series patterns in long-run performance by segmenting IPOs according to a 
number of issuing characteristics. When categorizing performance according to the 
public float at the IPO date, for example, we find that companies retaining the least 
amount of equity at the IPO date perform particularly poorly. We also show that the 
relatively favourable average return picture is driven by the outperformance of IPOs in 
sectors representing the New Economy. This applies to Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, the five countries with significant New Economy 
IPO activity during the sample period. Stock exchanges in countries that did not manage 
to cater to companies in New Economy sectors during the sample period via New 
Market segments, such as Italy or Spain, did the worst. Moreover, the poor performance 
of Old Economy IPOs relative to the market and their New Economy peers is not an
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isolated event as it extends to all countries under study. Significance tests of 
performance differences indicate broad similarity in underpricing and long-run return 
behaviour of IPOs in the seven countries under study, which underlines the 
homogeneity of the European IPO market and the pervasiveness of the reported IPO 
patterns.
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Chapter IV
Management Behaviour and Market Response
1 Introduction
A recent line o f empirical research on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) links the 
conventional measurement of stock returns with accounting information, aimed at 
providing more insights into the phenomena associated with IPOs and the decision for 
going public. Using a sample of 1,649 US IPOs issued between 1980 and 1992, Theo, 
Welch and Wong (1998) document the effect of the choice of accounting method 
towards earnings management during the IPO year on aftermarket stock price 
performance. They find that IPO issuers that use discretionary current accruals 
aggressively during the IPO year have a three-year aftermarket stock return of 
approximately 20 percent less than IPO issuers who manage their earnings more 
conservatively during this time.
One o f the important implications o f this study is that the market does respond to 
earnings management behaviour which signals fundamental information about the IPO 
firms. This result, however, draws heavily on the fact that three-year aftermarket 
performance is measured starting from a substantial period of time after the IPO date.49 
This measurement procedure leaves open the question o f when the market starts to 
respond to fundamental information. The measuring strategy should not matter if the 
market is efficient as thought. However, if the market is not perfectly efficient, then the 
market learning process is an important issue to both economists and practitioners. It
49 Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) measure the stock performance from three to six months after the end of 
the first fiscal year, that is itself several months after the IPO date (an average six months in the German 
market, for example).
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might well be true that the market responds earlier than the time the previous literature 
has implied.
It is well known that IPOs perform poorly in the long-run, but outperform the 
market in the short-run (e.g., Stoll and Curley (1970), Ritter (1991), Schuster (1996)). 
This perplexing evidence might indicate that the IPO market is not largely determined 
by fundamental information of IPO firms in the short-run. In another paper, using a 
sample of 489 US IPOs between 1974 and 1984, Chaney and Lewis (1998) study the 
relationship between IPO aftermarket performance and yet another form of earnings 
management: income smoothing. They find that firms that report earnings with less 
variability relative to cash earned from operations perform better than other firms. 
Chaney and Lewis (1998) measure the stock performance from the IPO date, but their 
horizon is five years. Since income smoothing is an ex-post measurement, a long 
measurement horizon is very likely to bury the time characteristic of a market learning 
process. The result therefore gives little clue to the question o f when the market 
responds.
The short-run overperformance of IPO stocks has drawn increasing attention in 
the recent literature. Several papers have tried to build-up theoretical models to explain 
this phenomenon. Scheinkman and Xiong (2002) derive an equilibrium model of 
bubbles where overconfidence and differences o f beliefs can push the stock price above 
its fundamentals. In another recent paper, Duffie, Garleanu and Pederson (2002) present 
a model in which short-selling constraints can drive the IPO stock price to an 
excessively high level before it declines. These models claim that the IPO market is at 
least partially determined by factors such as divergence of opinion (Miller (1977)), 
overconfidence or other institutional arrangements unique to the IPO market, such as
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stabilization, the “quiet period” or lock-up rules. Obviously, none o f them is 
fundamental information about IPO firms.
In this paper, we study a set of 126 companies going public between 1988 and 
1997 in the German market, with the aim to broaden our understanding of several 
unexplored issues related to IPOs. Using the same framework of Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998) and Chaney and Lewis (1998), we examine the relationship between the 
management behaviour towards earnings management and aftermarket performance in 
the German IPO market. By applying a similar measurement specification, we test 
whether the relationship between management behaviour, proxied by the aggressiveness 
o f using discretionary current accruals and income smoothing, and the aftermarket IPO 
performance identified in the US market, also holds in one other major IPO market. We 
then deviate from this benchmark measuring specification to test whether the IPO 
market is informationally efficient in the sense that management behaviour can be 
efficiently inferred by the market. We also go beyond prior work to further examine the 
relationship between the two forms o f strategic behaviour towards earnings 
management, and test how the market responds to their interaction. Finally, we combine 
the typical empirical IPO methodology o f Ritter (1991) and the framework of 
discretionary current accruals and income smoothing to examine the driving sources of 
the dynamics of aftermarket IPO performance.
Our major findings in this chapter include the following:
(1) Managers o f IPO firms tend to use discretionary current accruals to buoy up 
earnings during the IPO year and, to some extent, manage the firms’ income. 
The long-run performance o f German IPOs is related to such eamings- 
management behaviour. Firms that use discretionary current accruals more 
conservatively during the IPO year and firms that smooth their reported
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income more, outperform their counterparts in the long-run. These results are 
generally consistent with US evidence.
(2) The two commonly identified earnings management strategies in IPOs are 
found to be not deterministic, yet complementary. In the long-run, firms that 
use discretionary current accruals during IPO years more conservatively also 
tend to smooth their reported income more. Firms undertaking both strategies 
outperform the market and IPOs that only apply any one o f the two 
strategies.
(3) The relationship between IPO aftermarket performance and strategic 
eamings-reporting behaviour documented in the previous literature is 
sensitive to both the measurement horizon and the starting date. Ironically, 
we find that firms managing their earnings more opportunistically perform 
better than those managing their earnings more conservatively, when 
performance is measured from a date closer to the IPO and also when it is 
measured over shorter horizons.
(4) The market takes a significant period of time to incorporate fundamentals 
into IPO prices. During this period, fundamental information about the IPO 
has weak explanatory power for long-run performance and the IPO market is 
dominated by other non-fundamental “noise”. After a period of learning, the 
market starts to respond and the power of fundamentals to explain long-run 
IPO returns increases substantially.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 describes the data and 
sample characteristics. In Section 2, we measure Management Behaviour with 
Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA). Section 3 deals with the measurement of 
Management Behaviour with Income Smoothing (IS). A comparative analysis of the
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two methods o f earnings management is provided in Section 4. In Section 5, we study 
the dynamics of the explanatory power of fundamentals related to aftermarket 
performance. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary and a discussion of the 
findings.
2 Market Background and Data
2.1 Market Background
During the past decade, German Financial Markets have gone through some 
radical developments. One o f the fundamental features of these developments has been 
the increasing tendency of companies towards going public. At the end of 2001, more 
than 1,000 German companies were listed on the Deutsche Borse AG or on one of the 
regional stock exchanges, double the number from the beginning o f 1988, the start of 
our sample period. While this number seems to be small compared to worldwide 
figures, it indicates the structural shift towards an equity culture in Continental Europe 
in general and Germany in particular.
This structural shift has been enforced by developments such as the initial
success o f the much publicized flotation of Deutsche Telecom AG, the country’s former
telecommunications monopoly, in November 1996. By the end of 2000, 12.33 million
people -  or 19.3 percent of the adult population in Germany -  owned shares, 50 percent
more than the previous year and double the level at the end of 1997, a change
unprecedented in Germany’s post-war financial history.50 During this period, the
German IPO market has also developed as one of the fundamental pillars of Continental
European IPO activity. For our sample period between 1988 and 1997, for example,
50 Source: Financial Times. Glagau (1876) documents evidence of a flurry of IPO activity on the Berlin 
Stock Exchange between 1871 and 1875 which indeed has some strikingly similar features to the IPO 
wave in the late 1990’s on the Neuer Markt, the market segment for growth companies set up in 1997.
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German IPO activity accounted, on average, for more than 25 percent of total IPO 
activity in Continental Europe based on number, funds raised and market capitalization.
2.2 Data
Our original sample consists of 156 companies from a total of 162 companies 
going public between 1988 and 1997 on the German domestic market, meeting the 
following criteria: (1) an offer price of Deutsche Mark (DM) 5.00 per share or more; (2) 
a market capitalization, measured in terms of end-1997 purchasing power, of DM 5.0 
million or more; (3) the offering being unseasoned and involving common and/or 
preferred stock; and (4) the company being listed either on the Official Market 
(Amtlicher Handel), the Official Parallel Market (Geregelter Markt) or the New Market 
(Neuer Markt). We exclude foreign listings, investment companies, companies that 
changed the market segment and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).51
In addition to these criteria, we must also have a minimum of one year pre-IPO 
and four years post-IPO accounting and stock price data available. After excluding IPOs 
from the Financial Sector (12), Privatization Issues (1) and IPOs with no reliable pre- 
IPO accounting information (17), the original sample falls to 126 companies for which 
we have a complete set of accounting and stock price data available. The total sample of 
companies represents around 88 percent of all IPOs in the respective market segments 
going public in Germany between 1988 and 1997. An interesting feature of our data is 
that it does not suffer from survivorship bias. Accounting for survivorship is a frequent 
issue in US studies. This has to do with the large number of mergers, acquisitions, 
takeovers and bankruptcies in the US market. Moreover, the delisting rules are clearly
51 We account for issues on the Frankfurt stock exchange and all regional stock exchanges. During the 
sample period, the share of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, in terms of total German turnover in equity 
trading, has risen from 52 percent to 85 percent, underlying the increasing significance of the exchange. 
(Source: Deutsche Borse AG). We exclude offerings on the Over-the-Counter market (Freiverkehr).
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set out in the US regulatory framework. Until recently, this has not been the case in 
Germany. All the IPOs from the original sample were still listed after their fifth-year 
anniversary on the stock market. We therefore conclude that our sample is highly 
representative of the German IPO market during the sample period.
Due to a lack of accounting data spanning over a reasonably long period of time, 
this study does not include IPOs issued between 1998 and 2000. For the evaluation of 
earnings management, we use the frill version (Vollbilanz) of balance sheets and income 
statements (inflation-adjusted) available from Hoppenstedt Verlag, a provider of 
financial data.52 Other information such as year of foundation or market sector was 
taken from the yearly issues of Hoppenstedt’s Saling Aktienfuhrer. To evaluate 
accounting numbers, we use consolidated financial statements, when available. 
Consolidated financial statements (Weltbilanz) are not the basis for either taxation or 
profit distribution. However, Financial Analysts draw heavily upon information 
contained in consolidated statements because they capture a more complete picture of, 
for example, the operating activities of companies with foreign subsidiaries. The full set 
of consolidated statements is available for 58 percent of the companies in our study. 
For the rest, we extract the accounting information from parent company accounts 
(Muttergesellschaft).53 The stock price data and GDP deflators were taken from 
Datastream and our own IPO database. We use the Dow Jones STOXX global sector 
classification standard for market sector classification.54
In Figure 6, we illustrate our timing convention. The fiscal year in which the IPO 
occurs is Year 0 and includes both pre- and post-IPO information. Fiscal year -1 ends 
before the IPO. The large majority of German companies in our sample end their fiscal
52 A Specimen Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account shown in Appendix F, Table 62.
53 Due to the lack of foreign subsidiaries, for example, parent company accounts are equivalent to 
consolidated accounts for most of the 42 percent of companies that report only parent company accounts.
54 The Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard is displayed in Appendix A, Table 31.
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Figure 6. Time line
year with the calendar year. Our initial screening of IPOs is based on the company 
characteristics around the IPO date. It is important to note that, on average, German 
IPOs went public towards the middle o f the calendar year. For example, as illustrated in 
Table 1, 65 percent of the companies in the sample conducted their IPO between May 
and October.
Because one of our main goals is to shed some light on the relationship between 
management behaviour and market response, we measure returns over 36 months. In 
order to compare our findings with the literature, we chose our benchmark starting date 
as nine months after the IPO. To study the dynamics in the relationship, we then move 
our starting date away and closer to the IPO date. In this case, we measure long-run 
performance after three and twelve months following the IPO. Interestingly, our 
benchmark starting date corresponds closely to the First Annual Shareholder Meeting 
(Erste Allgemeine Aktionarsversammlung).55
55 Based on the observations taken from a sample of 785 Annual Shareholder Meetings in 2002, almost 
75 percent of the meetings took place during May, June and July (Source: Schutzgemeinschaft der 
Kleinaktionare e.V.)
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Table 23
Sample Distribution and Firm Characteristics
The sample consists o f 126 IPOs going public between 1988 and 1997. The initial return is defined as the 
percentage change from the offering price to the first-day closing price. Age is defined as the year of 
going public minus the year o f foundation, with companies founded before 1901 assumed to be founded 
in 1901. Size is defined as the number o f shares times the closing price at the first day o f  trading, 
including overalottment options, where applicable, and expressed in end-1997 prices. The retention ratio 
(in percent) is defined as one minus the size o f the public float (in percent). Underpricing is defined as the 
percentage change from the final offering price to the closing price after the first day o f  trading. 
Privatizations (1) and Financial Companies are excluded (12). We use the Dow Jones STOXX global 
sector classification standard for market sector classification._________________________________________
Panel A: Sample Distribution classified by Market Sector
Market Sector Sector Code Frequency Percentage
Basic Resources 1 3 2.4
Chemicals 2 3 2.4
Automobiles 3 8 6.3
Cyclical Goods & Services 4 27 21.4
Retail 6 9 7.1
Food & Beverages 7 5 4.0
Non-Cyclical Goods & Services 8 8 6.3
Healthcare 13 6 4.8
Construction 14 16 12.7
Industrial Goods & Services 15 24 19.0
Technology 16 14 11.1
Utilities 18 3 2.4
Total 126 100.0
Panel B: Sample Distribution classified by IPO Year and Calendar Month
Year Frequency Percentage Month Frequency Percentage
1988 10 7.9 Jan. 3 2.4
1989 17 13.5 Feb. 5 4.0
1990 22 17.5 Mar. 4 3.2
1991 14 11.1 Apr. 6 4.8
1992 8 6.3 May 10 7.9
1993 6 4.8 Jun. 17 13.5
1994 8 6.3 Jul. 24 19.0
1995 16 12.7 Aug. 3 2.4
1996 6 4.8 Sep. 9 7.1
1997 19 15.1 Oct. 19 15.1
Nov. 15 11.9
Dec. 11 8.7
All firms 126 100.0 All firms 126 100.0
Panel C: Firm Characteristics
Mean Median
Age (years) 44.2 39.5
Underpricing (percent) 11.6 4.8
Retention Ratio (percent) 66.2 66.7
Debt/Equity Ratio (pre- IPO) 1.429 1.093
Debt/Equity Ratio (post- IPO) 0.779 0.643
Size (DM millions) 437.5 195.9
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In this study, we report performance using equally-weighted buy-and-hold 
returns (BHRs) because it measures actual investors’ experience.56 Aftermarket returns 
are measured as equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns, whereas one month is defined 
as a consecutive 21-day trading interval from the close of the first day of trading, using 
local trading days over the respective measurement interval. We adjust returns for 
movements in the value-weighted FAZ Index (Index der Frankfurter Allgemeinen 
Zeitung). This index is composed of the 100 most actively traded companies, adjusted 
for rights offerings and stock splits, and embraces about 75 percent of stock volume 
traded in German shares.
Table 23 provides some descriptive statistics for the 126 IPOs in our sample. 
Panel A indicates that there is some industry clustering in the sample of IPOs, with four 
sectors representing almost 65 percent of the sample. It is not surprising to see so many 
construction-related companies in the sample, representing a large proportion o f IPO 
activity following German unification and the subsequent surge in construction activity. 
Limiting this analysis to IPOs before 1998 eliminates the dominance in technology- 
related companies. Panel B documents considerable differences in issuing activity when 
characterizing the sample according to the calendar year of going public. In line with 
low IPO activity in other Continental European countries, there is also a considerably 
low level in issuing activity during the early 1990s in Germany. Apart from the reasons 
addressed earlier, the reversal o f fortunes in the German IPO market after 1994 can also 
be linked to the success of some large offerings from companies such as Adidas AG, a 
sportswear company, and in particular the phenomenal long-run performance o f SAP 
AG, an enterprise software company that recorded, and MLP AG, a financial services 
company, two IPOs in 1988.
56 For a complete discussion of BHRs versus Cumulative Average Returns (CARs), see e.g., Fama 
(1998), Barber and Lyon (1997), Brown and Warner (1980), Kothari and Warner (1997) and Loughran 
and Ritter (2000).
129
In Panel C, reports number of characteristics for our IPO sample. The average 
IPOs is 44 years old before going public. IPOs retain 66 percent of their equity after 
going public and are underpriced by 11.69 percent, on average. The IPOs have an 
average market capitalization of DM437.5 million, consistent with the average IPO in 
Continental Europe during this period. As we have excluded privatizations, the size of 
Deutsche Telecom AG, a telecommunications company, does not influence the mean 
picture. As seen in Panel C, the IPO has a strong effect on the capital structure: The 
average debt-equity ratio declines from 1.429 pre-IPO to 0.779 post-IPO.
3 Market Response to Management Behaviour around the IPO year
3.1 Measuring Management Behaviour using Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
It is well known that there is high information asymmetry between issuers and 
public investors during the IPO process (Rao (1993)). Investors draw heavily on the 
financial statements published by issuers. For issuers, higher reported earnings lead to 
higher offering prices and hence higher IPO proceeds. This high information asymmetry 
provides issuers with both the incentive and the opportunity to window-dress their 
company accounts, in order to present better-looking financial statements for the IPO 
year. Furthermore, after the IPO, the firm also has an incentive to boost earnings at least 
for some time. The well-known reasons include inside interest (managers or 
entrepreneurs might want to sell part of personal holdings after the lock-up period) and 
outside pressure from underwriters or regulatory aspects.57 Firms that wish to 
manipulate their earnings can achieve this goal by various means. One o f the typical
57 Theo, Welch and Wong (1998) provide a full discussion on the incentives o f  firms to boost their 
earnings before and after the IPO date.
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ways to do so is to use accruals.58 Accruals are changes in non-cash working capital 
before income taxes payable, less total depreciation expenses and can be decomposed 
into current accruals and long-term accruals.59 Current accruals include short-term 
assets and liabilities from the day-to-day operations o f the firm. Managers can 
deliberately increase current accruals in various ways, including advancing recognition 
of revenues with credit sales, delaying the recognition of expenses, decreasing bad-debt 
expenses or decreasing inventory write-offs. Long-term accrual adjustment, which 
involves long-term assets, is, if at all, harder to achieve.60 We base our measures of 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour around the IPO date on their discretionary use o f 
current accruals because managers have greater flexibility and control over current 
accruals as those are less prone to changes in firm business conditions.
From the investors’ perspective, it is difficult to distinguish the accrual 
adjustment that is aimed at boosting higher short-term share prices from that aimed at 
reconciling the mismatch of economic realities between accrual accounting events and 
timing of cash flows. Given the fact that some of the accrual adjustments are 
appropriate and necessary for certain business conditions, it is even harder to infer how 
much of the proportion of the accrual adjustment is discretionary. The justified use of 
accruals, however, is not something that is totally independent from the firm’s business 
activity. As pointed out in Kaplan (1985), changes in some working capital accounts 
and, thereby, accruals depend on the business activity of the firm. All things being 
equal, the accrual of a firm should be a relatively stable function of the firm’s economic 
activities. Indeed, this is the spirit of the widely used accrual decomposing expectations 
model of Jones (1991). As in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), we use a variation of
58 Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP, the firms using accrual accounting systems 
are allowed to make adjustments when reporting earnings.
59 This definition is adopted from Jones (1991) who tests in the context of earnings management during 
import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).
60 See, for example, Guenther (1994) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998).
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Jones’ model because the emphasis is to decompose current accruals into a non- 
discretionary and discretionary part. This variation assumes that the current accruals, 
other things being equal, are a function o f the amount of the firm’s business activities, 
which are proxied by sales.61
The model specification is:
CAn l ASales it
 —  = a (  ) + p (--------- —) + industry dummies + £ it (1)
TA TA TA JJ
j . t-1 j , t-1 j j -1
where j  is the IPO firm index ( /- I , ...,126). CA measures Current Accruals. TA is Total 
Assets. ASales is the change in sales from Yeart-i to Yeart. Industry dummies are aimed 
at capturing the different features of the Accrual-Sales relationship across different 
industries.62
In this paper, Current Accruals (CA) are calculated as:
CA = Aaccounts receivables + Ainventory + Aother current assets 
- [Aaccounts payable + Atax payable + Aother current liabilities] (2)
Given the current accruals of a firm i at year t, CAjjt, the firm’s discretionary 
current accruals of that year is the difference between its actual current accruals and 
expected current accruals:
CA
DCAit = ---- ^
TA,,.,
1 ^ A S a le s -A T R  
a  h p —
TA TAi ,t- \
( 3 )
where DCA is Discretionary Current Accruals, ATR is the change in Trade Receivables. 
Trade receivables represent amounts on open account owed by customers for goods and
61 The derivation of the DCA and IS coefficients is illustrated in Appendix F, Table 63.
62 We also experimented with year dummies, not reported, to capture any cyclical and seasonal effects. 
The result is similar to the one that is reported.
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services sold in the ordinary course of the business. We subtract the increase in trade 
receivables from changes in sales to allow for the possibility o f credit sales 
manipulation by the issuer (for example, by allowing generous credit policies to obtain
high sales prices ahead of the offering), a  and p  are estimations of regression 
coefficients from equation (1) using a pooled estimation sample.
Following Roosenboom, van der Goot and Mertens (2000), who study the 
relationship between methods of earnings management and aftermarket performance for 
a sample of 64 firms going public on the Amsterdam Exchanges between 1984 and 
1994, we estimate model (1) using pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. Once
estimated, a  and P  can be used to estimate the discretionary current accruals.64
3.2 Time-Series Properties O f Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA)
In Table 24, we present evidence concerning the time-series and cross-sectional 
characteristics o f Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) for German IPOs. Panel A 
displays the distribution of DCA by year relative to the IPO year for the sample as a 
whole.
The results indicate a clear tendency towards earnings management by using 
DCA around the IPO year. For example, the average percentage of DCA in Year -1 
amounts to minus nine percent of total o f the previous years’ assets. The DCA rises to 
positive seven percent during the year o f going public and remains positive during the 
first fiscal year. The strongly positive and significant mean and median confirms that
63 This is similar to Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) who also subtract the increase in Trade Receivables 
from changes in Sales to allow for the possibility of Credit Sales. Their results are robust to omitting this 
adjustment. Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) discuss the robustness of this valuation method relative to other 
measures.
64 By using the pooled data, we have 1,170 firm-year observations in our estimation sample. We did not 
exclude observations for the year that firms conducted the IPO, from the sample. We experimented 
without IPO year observations and find that the results do not change qualitatively.
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Table 24
Time Series and Cross-Sectional Characteristics of Discretionary Current
Accruals (DCA)
The sample consists of 126 German IPOs going public during 1988 and 1997, excluding Privatizations 
(1) and Financial Companies (12). Panel A reports the distribution of Discretionary Current Accruals 
(DCA) by Year relative to IPO date for the sample as a whole from Year -1 to Year 4 of going public. In 
Panel B, observations are divided into Quartiles ranked from the most conservative (Quartile 4) to the 
most conservative (Quartile 1) earnings manager. Year 0 is the IPO year.___________________________
Panel A: Distribution o f Discretionary Current Accruals by Year Relative to IPO date, Total Sample
Year -1 YearO Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Mean -0.09 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.00
Whole
Sample
p-value 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.12 0.63 0.92
Median -0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
z-value 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.32 0.25 0.49
All firms 82 126 126 126 124 103
Panel B: Distribution o f Discretionary Current Accruals by Year Relative to IPO date, split in Quartiles
Year-1 YearO Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Mean -0.17 -0.27 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.04
Quartile
1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.08 0.40 0.16
Median -0.17 -0.20 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.061 z-value 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.98 0.11
All firms 16 31 31 31 31 29
Mean -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.00
Quartile p-value 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.95Median -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.012 z-value 0.08 0.42 0.07 0.34 0.02 0.76
All firms 23 31 31 31 31 27
Mean 0.03 0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
Quartile p-value 0.71 0.00 0.42 0.84 0.76 0.70Median 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.013 z-value 0.70 0.00 0.32 0.79 0.82 0.70
All firms 23 31 31 31 30 24
Mean -0.17 0.43 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.04
QuartileA
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.29 0.43 0.81 0.22
Median -0.17 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.004 z-value 0.08 0.00 0.43 0.36 0.62 0.46
All firms 20 33 33 33 32 23
management “borrows” a part of accruals from other years, to potentially convey 
abnormally positive fundamental information about the company at the time of going 
public. The dynamics o f the DCA component over time indicates that, on average, 
aggressive earnings management using DCA during the IPO year is only a short-run 
phenomenon because companies have to make up for the advance borrowing of 
earnings at the long-run cost of their current accruals. This is manifested in a negative
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DCA from Year 2 of going public to the end of the measurement period. The results in 
Panel A are remarkably similar to the findings reported in Theo, Welch and Wong 
(1998) and Roosenboom, van der Goot and Mertens (2000), who find the same patterns 
for the US and Dutch IPO markets.
In Panel B, we rank the companies into quartiles depending on the 
aggressiveness of using DCA during the IPO year. Here, we can distinguish between 
companies that manage their earnings most conservatively around the IPO year, 
summarized in Quartile 1 (Ql), and companies that manage their earnings most 
aggressively, summarized in Quartile 4 (Q4). Panel B verifies our earlier results that 
show a wide variation in the opportunistic behaviour towards earnings management via 
DCA during the IPO year. For example, while the average DCA for the most 
conservative companies (Ql) deviates negative 27 percent from its mean during the IPO 
year, the deviation for the most aggressive group (Q4) is positive 43 percent. Panel B 
also explores the dynamics of DCA in more detail. While the most conservative 
companies manage their earnings more aggressively following the IPO, the most 
aggressive earnings managers have to life up to reality and apply a much more 
conservative use of DCA in later years.
3.3 Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) and IPO Stock Returns
In this section, we extend the analysis to include the relation between Discretionary 
Current Accruals (DCA) and the short- and long-run stock price performance o f 
German IPOs. Because our focus is on the dynamics o f aftermarket returns, we measure 
aftermarket performance starting after three, nine and twelve months following the first 
day of trading. This procedure marks a crucial difference in comparison to the existing
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Table 25
IPO performance categorized by Issue Year DCA Quartiles
The sample consists of 126 German IPOs between 1988 and 1997. Returns are calculated as equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns. One month is defined as a consecutive 
21-day trading interval using the local trading calendar. Returns are reported separately as raw returns and returns adjusted by the broad-based value-weighted FAZ Index. 
The raw and market-adjusted buy-and-hold return is calculated after three, nine and twelve months following the IPO. Difference (Diff.) refers to the percentage change 
between the most aggressive earnings manager (Q4) and the most conservative earnings manager (Ql) in terms of DCA. Associated test statistics for Diff. refer to mean 
difference tests.
Year 1 (one year)
Panel A: Measurement period starts three months after the IPO date
Year 2 (two years) Year 3 (three years)
Return All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff.
Raw returns 
p-value
Adjusted returns 
p-value
0.4269
0.2001
0.3561
0.2835
0.1245
0.1019
0.0519
0.4618
-0.0318 0.3671 
0.6330 0.0177 
-0.0765 0.2727 
0.1959 0.0656
1.1978
0.3482
1.1265
0.3765
1.0733
0.4124
1.0746
0.4110
1.0428 0.3541 -0.0632 0.4786 3.2587 2.9047 
0.2403 0.1003 0.5032 0.0209 0.3408 0.4077 
0.8121 0.1409 -0.2812 0.1932 3.0510 2.9101 
0.3586 0.4736 0.0047 0.3072 0.3708 0.4055
0.1836
0.0815
-0.1771
0.0959
0.4358 -0.1457 0.2963 0.1503 -0.2855 
0.0656 0.1658 0.0497 0.6078 0.4456 
0.1082 -0.4654 -0.1976 -0.1550 -0.2632 
0.6407 0.0002 0.1831 0.5995 0.4851
Year 1 (one year)
Panel B: Measurement period starts nine months after the IPO date
Year 2 (two years) Year 3 (three years)
Return All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff.
Raw returns 
p-value
Adjusted returns 
p-value
0.0527
0.2372
-0.0574
0.2032
0.1175
0.0591
-0.0316
0.5930
-0.0305 0.1379 
0.6241 0.0491 
-0.1264 0.0127 
0.0502 0.8332
-0.0098
0.9427
-0.0828
0.5645
-0.1272
0.4030
-0.0511
0.7463
0.1047 0.2991 -0.1470 0.2509 0.0213 -0.2777 
0.1532 0.0893 0.0913 0.0651 0.9002 0.2515 
-0.1465 0.0523 -0.4016-0.0846-0.1518-0.2041 
0.0454 0.7604 0.0001 0.5076 0.3810 0.4009
-0.1010 0.1287 -0.1748 -0.0378 -0.3070 -0.4357 
0.0280 0.2745 0.0310 0.6625 0.0000 0.0014 
-0.4579 -0.2040 -0.5658 -0.5237 -0.5332 -0.3292 
0.0000 0.1808 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0550
Year 1 (one year)
Panel C: Measurement period starts twelve months after the IPO date
Year 2 (two years) Year 3 (three years)
Return All Ql Q2 Q3 04 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff.
Raw returns 
p-value
Adjusted returns 
p-value
0.0584
0.1389
-0.0713
0.0490
0.1025
0.1338
-0.0209
0.7462
-0.0014 0.1566 
0.9820 0.0391 
-0.1361 -0.0083 
0.0130 0.8892
-0.0192
0.8533
-0.1171
0.2458
-0.1217
0.3310
-0.0962
0.4242
0.0550 0.2672 -0.1329 0.1458 -0.0532-0.3204 
0.3743 0.1253 0.1314 0.1854 0.6289 0.1125 
-0.2167 0.0311 -0.4110-0.2317-0.2528-0.2839 
0.0004 0,8539 0.0000 0.0264 0.0284 0.1565
-0.1130 0.0801 -0.1641 -0.0777 -0.2797-0.3597 
0.0192 0.5350 0.0319 0.4018 0.0006 0.0158 
-0.4732 -0.2755 -0.5859 -0.5094 -0.5192 -0.2437 
0.0000 0.0954 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1731
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US literature, in which the evaluation of investment performance starts three to six 
months after the publication of the first annual report.65
In Table 25, we report the adjusted and unadjusted buy-and-hold performance of 
German IPOs, categorized by DCA quartiles and calculated across various measurement 
periods and different starting dates. The results do confirm evidence that German IPOs 
issued during the sample period have underperformed, on average, in the long-run. 
When measured over three years, this underperformance is statistically and 
economically significant. For example, when viewing our return window after nine 
months o f trading, the sample o f 126 German IPOs underperformed the FAZ 
Index by 45.79 percent. When looking at shorter measurement horizons, however, the 
underperformance falls substantially to 14.54 percent over two years and 5.74 percent 
when measured over one year. Table 25 also shows that the magnitude of IPO 
aftermarket performance is not only sensitive to the length o f the measurement period, 
but also to its starting date. Results in Panel A, B, and C indicate that the closer the 
starting point of the measurement period to the IPO date, the more favourable the long- 
run performance picture. The discrepancy is particularly large when calculating returns 
over short measurement horizons. For the sample as a whole, the two-year market- 
adjusted performance is positive 81.21 percent when measured after three months of 
trading and negative 21.67 percent when the two-year measurement begins after twelve 
months of trading.
Apart from the results obtained for the sample as whole, we also document 
aftermarket performance when categorizing the sample by DCA Quartile. This allows 
us to take a closer look at the cross-section o f earnings management behaviour and 
market response. When return measurement starts after nine or twelve months following
65 Starting performance measurement after three to six months following the publication of the First 
Annual Report roughly corresponds to our benchmark starting date of nine months.
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the IPO, companies that are less opportunistic towards earnings management during the 
IPO year outperform their counterparts over three years. When measuring three year 
returns starting after nine and twelve month o f trading, for example, the market-adjusted 
return difference between the most conservative (Q l) and most aggressive (Q4) groups 
is 24.37 percent and 32.92 percent, respectively. When applying these starting times, 
this difference also generally applies when looking at shorter return horizons. 
Companies that manage earnings more conservatively during the IPO year consistently 
outperform their more aggressive counterparts. The longer the measurement horizon, 
the larger and more significant is this difference. When measuring from the benchmark 
starting date and afterwards, the results clearly indicate that the market identifies 
earnings management behaviour.
However, when measuring performance after month three following the IPO, the 
one-year and two-year return picture changes dramatically. The results are displayed in 
Panel A of Table 25. The most aggressive managers substantially outperform their 
conservative counterparts. The difference o f the market-adjusted return between the 
most aggressive (Q4) and the most conservative group (Ql) amounts to 107.46 percent 
over one year and 291.01 percent over two years. One reason for this discrepancy is that 
the more opportunistic managers in the IPO year tend to be the more aggressive 
managers in the year following the IPO. When measuring returns over three-years 
starting after three month of trading, however, this “wrong” relationship is corrected.66 
The result is plotted in Figure 7.
66 The company with the largest price increase was EM.TV AG, a Media company, which recorded a 
DCA coefficient of 0.8962 and a three-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of positive 817.78 
percent when measured after three months following the IPO, negative 63.56 percent when measured 
after nine month and negative 77.37 percent after twelve months after the IPO.
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Figure 7. Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of DCA Quartiles (%). Returns are measured over 
36 months with measurement starting after three, nine and twelve months post-IPO. Our proxy for 
earnings management is the firm’s use of discretionary accruals (DCA). Firms are divided into quartiles 
based on how aggressively they manage earnings during the IPO year.
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4. Market Response to Income Reporting Strategies
4.1 Measuring Management Behaviour with Income Smoothing (IS)
In contrast to firms using accruals to boost earnings in the short-term, firms 
might want to smooth their income to signal the firm’s long-term strategy. As in Chaney 
and Lewis (1998), smoothing income is a long-term strategy and, in doing so, managers 
communicate the firm’s “permanent earnings”, a strategy which enhances investors’ 
current and future perception of a firm. It is believed that firms with good future 
prospects will be able to smooth their income more effectively than firms that use 
accruals aggressively for window dressing, as discretionary accruals must reverse in the 
future. Thus, whether income is smoothed can be viewed as a management strategy that 
conveys fundamental information of a firm.
In this paper, the measure o f income smoothing is the same as in Roosenboom, 
van Goot and Mertens (2000). The income smoothing (IS) coefficient is defined as the 
ratio of the variance in operating cash flow changes to variance of operating income 
changes:
VaKACF^
Var(AOI' )
where ACF, is defined as changes in operating cash flow for firm i, and AO/, is defined 
as the changes in operating income for firm i.
The income smoothing (IS) coefficient defined in (4) compares the relative 
variability o f changes in operating cash flow with the relative variability of changes in 
operating income. Since the operating cash flow is essentially not manageable, a 
successful income smoothing strategy will lead to a smaller variability in the changes of
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Table 26
Distribution of the Income Smoothing (IS) coefficient
For the analysis of Income Smoothing (IS), the sample is reduced to 124 companies because of missing 
information on operating cash flows for two companies (Refiigium AG and Pro Sieben AG). We use the 
Mean difference test and Wilcoxon signed test to test for mean difference and the significance of the 
median.
Distribution o f the proxy for Income Smoothing categorized by IS Quartiles
ALL Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. p.value
Mean 1.18 0.80 0.98 1.13 1.81 -1.01 0.0000
p-value 0.0003
Median 1.05 0.84 0.98 1.13 1.54 -0.70 0.0000
z-value 0.0008
Max 4.91 0.91 1.05 1.22 4.91
Min 0.17 0.17 0.91 1.05 1.22
N 124 31 31 31 31
operating income (01) and hence a larger coefficient for income smoothing. In other 
words, an income smoothing (IS) coefficient greater than one points to a company that 
tends to smooth its operating income relative to its operating cash flows. The drawback 
of this measurement is that we can only measure a firm’s income smoothing ex-post.
In this study, we use five years o f operating data to measure each IPOs income 
smoothing coefficient. In Table 26, we present some descriptive statistics for our 
sample of German IPOs. For the sample as a whole, the mean income smoothing 
coefficient is 1.18 and the median value is 1.05. Both values are significant at 
conventional levels. This indicates that, on average, German IPOs engage in earnings 
management by using income smoothing. Table 26 also documents the distribution of 
the proxy for Income Smoothing by dividing the total sample into four equally-sized 
groups. The results reveal large and significant differences in the IS coefficient between 
conservative earnings managers who smooth the most (Q4), and aggressive earnings 
managers who smooth the least (Ql).
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4.2. Income Smoothing (IS) and IPO Stock Returns
In Table 27, we present the main findings. The results are reported both for the 
sample as a whole and for the individual Quartiles. Similarly, we measure performance 
with a benchmark starting date of nine months after the IPO. We also deviate from this 
benchmark starting date in order to study the dynamics o f the market response. The 
result for measuring starting time of three-month, nine-month and twelve-month 
performance dynamics are presented in Panel A, B and C of Table 27.
The results underline some earlier observations that the degree of aggressiveness 
in earnings management is related to the stock price performance. Over the long-run, 
companies with a higher IS coefficient tend to outperform their most aggressive 
counterpart regardless o f the starting date of the measurement period. Based on market- 
adjusted three-year stock returns, the difference is 57.47 percent, 30.75 percent and
28.01 percent when measured from month three, nine and twelve following the IPO, 
respectively. The difference is consistently large and significant when measuring 
returns over two or three years after the start of the measurement periods. When 
measured over a one-year horizon, however, the difference in performance between 
companies that apply income smoothing most and those that do least, is not significant. 
This finding confirms our earlier result that the market is not able to respond to earnings 
management choices effectively in the short-run. However, the result here is less 
significant than the one when we used DCA. In Figure 8, the dynamics of aftermarket 
performance are shown graphically. Here, a similar picture to the one observed in 
Figure 7 emerges. The most conservative companies (Q4) display a significantly better 
performance than their more aggressive counterparts over the long-run. In the short-run, 
however, the differences are less clear. For example, in Graph (a) the second most 
aggressive group (Q2) outperforms others up until the medium-term.
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Table 27
IPO performance categorized by Issue Year IS Quartiles
The sample consists of 124 German IPOs between 1988 and 1997. Returns are calculated as equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns. One month is defined as a consecutive 
21-day trading interval using the local trading calendar. Returns are reported separately as raw returns and returns adjusted by the broad-based value-weighted FAZ Index. 
The raw and market-adjusted buy-and-hold return is calculated after three, nine and twelve months following the IPO. Difference (Diff.) refers to the percentage change 
between the most aggressive earnings manager (Ql) and the most conservative earnings manager (Q4) in terms of IS. Associated test statistics for Diff. refer to mean 
difference tests.
Year 1 (one year)
Panel A: Measurement period starts three months after the IPO date
Year 2 (two years) Year 3 (three years)
Return All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff.
Raw returns 
p-value
Adjusted returns 
p-value
0.4210
0.2134
0.3501
0.2992
-0.0392
0.4185
-0.0604
0.2564
1.4914
0.2740
1.4021
0.3024
0.1399
0.0873
0.0551
0.4645
0.0919
0.2637
0.0035
0.9658
0.1311
0.1672
0.0639
0.5089
1.0611 -0.0782 3.7122 0.1643 0.4462 
0.2396 0.3897 0.3084 0.2285 0.0530 
0.8319 -0.2759 3.4616 -0.0307 0.1727 
0.3547 0.0069 0.3406 0.7905 0.4003
0.5244
0.0320
0.4485
0.0494
0.1768
0.0956
-0.1821
0.0889
-0.1948
0.0244
-0.5251
0.0001
0.3835 0.0751 
0.2239 0.5476 
0.0048 -0.2579 
0.9877 0.0508
0.4434
0.0700
0.0496
0.8313
0.6382
0.0132
0.5747
0.0288
Year 1 (one year)
Panel B: Measurement period starts nine months after the IPO date
Year 2 (two years) Year 3 (three years)
Return All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff.
Raw returns 
p-value
Adjusted returns 
p-value
0.0571
0.2067
-0.0559
0.2225
-0.0762 0.1760 
0.0815 0.2506 
-0.1340 0.0406 
0.0133 0.7976
0.0767
0.2530
-0.0693
0.2535
0.0520 0.1282 
0.3826 0.0813 
-0.0610 0.0731 
0.2564 0.3227
0.1010 -0.1390 0.1388 0.0170 0.3870 
0.1691 0.0985 0.4301 0.8354 0.0597 
-0.1501 -0.3157-0.1722-0.2241 0.1114 
0.0412 0.0012 0.3406 0.0123 0.5665
0.5260
0.0168
0.4271
0.0480
-0.0991
0.0310
-0.4608
0.0000
-0.2380
0.0011
-0.5628
0.0000
-0.1280 -0.0984 
0.1467 0.3246 
-0.4872 -0.5380 
0.0000 0.0005
0.0682
0.5183
-0.2553
0.0573
0.3062
0.0158
0.3075
0.0564
Year 1 (one year)
Panel C: Measurement period starts twelve months after the IPO date
Year 2 (two years) Year 3 (three years)
Return All Ql Q2 Q3 04 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff.
Raw returns 
p-value
Adjusted returns 
p-value
0.0648
0.1033
-0.0675
0.0648
-0.0193
0.7726
-0.1022
0.0855
0.0978
0.3785
-0.0614
0.5654
0.0591
0.3259
-0.0867
0.1138
0.1215
0.1054
-0.0195
0.7616
0.1408
0.1576
0.0827
0.3396
0.0477 -0.1322 0.0290 -0.0387 0.3326 
0.4346 0.1432 0.7694 0.6059 0.0804 
-0.2250 -0.3548 -0.2832 -0.2934 0.0313 
0.0002 0.0000 0.0044 0.0016 0.8643
0.4648
0.0261
0.3861
0.0524
-0.1087
0.0247
-0.4752
0.0000
-0.1892
0.0081
-0.5820
0.0000
-0.1209 -0.1625 
0.2196 0.1019 
-0.4404 -0.5762 
0.0002 0.0001
0.0379 0.2271 
0.7460 0.0944 
-0.3020 0.2801 
0.0444 0.0922
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Figure 8. Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of IS Quartiles (%). Returns are measured over 36 
months with measurement starting after three, nine and twelve months post-IPO. Our proxy for earnings 
management is the firm’s use o f income smoothing (IS). Firms are divided into Quartiles based on how 
aggressively they manage earnings during the IPO year.
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Figure 8 underlines the importance of the month of seasoning when measuring 
aftermarket returns. Results reported from a date closer to the IPO make the distribution 
of returns more susceptible to the effect of other factors, such as extreme returns. It 
should be noted that the magnitude o f long-run returns in the most conservative group 
of income smoothers (Q4) is clearly different from the rest of the sample companies 
which, in turn, do not display a large divergence in performance among them.
5 Comparative Analysis of Methods of Earnings Management
Thus far, we have investigated two widely cited forms of earnings management 
and the market response. While we have shown that the use of DCA is a predominantly 
short-term tool for opportunistic earnings managers, the nature of IS lies clearly in its 
ability to provide a framework for strategic long-run earnings management. In this 
section, we focus on the relation between these two forms, which thus far has been left 
unexplored in the literature. Based on our earlier results, we hypothesize a link between 
DCA and IS and design our research methodology accordingly.
In Panel A of Table 28, we replicate the distribution of the DCA coefficients (in 
Quartiles) from Table 24 and calculate the IS coefficient of each DCA group. There is a 
tendency that companies, which manage their earnings least opportunistically in terms 
of DCA, also have the highest IS coefficient. For example, the most conservative group 
in terms o f DCA recording a DCA of -0.27 also has the highest IS coefficient of 1.30. 
In Panel B, we replicate the distribution o f our IS coefficient (in Quartiles) from Table 
26 and calculate the DCA of each IS group. Here, we find a similar tendency to the one 
reported above: companies with a higher income smoothing coefficient, that are also
67 This notion is similar to Brav and Gompers (1997) who find that the widely acclaimed 
underperformance reported for US IPOs in Ritter (1991) is due to nonventure-backed IPOs, and that 
venture-backed IPOs, which make up 21.52 percent of the sample, do not significantly underperform. 
Schuster (2002) finds that New Economy stocks, that account for around 28 percent of the sample, drive 
the positive aftermarket performance of a sample of 973 European IPOs issued between 1988 and 1998.
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Table 28
Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) versus Income Smoothing (IS)
In this table, we compare the two proxies for earnings management: Discretionary Current Accruals 
(DCA) and Income Smoothing (IS). We set the number of companies to 124, the sample size used when 
we measured the IS coefficient. In Panel A, companies are grouped by their DCA quartile. In Panel B, 
companies are grouped by their IS quartile. Diff. refers to the mean difference of Q1 and Q4. We use the 
Mean difference test and Wilcoxon signed test to test for mean difference and the significance of the 
median difference.
Proxy
Panel A: DCA and IS Grouped by DCA in 
All Ql 02 03
the IPO year 
04 Diff. p-value
DCA Mean 0.07 -0.27 -0.01 0.11 0.43 -0.70 0.0000
Median 0.05 -0.20 -0.01 0.12 0.30 -0.50 0.0000
IS Mean 1.18 1.30 1.16 1.11 1.15 0.15 0.3854
Median 1.05 1.11 1.06 1.06 1.02 0.03 0.1440
N 124 31 31 31 31
Panel B: DCA and IS Grouped by IS
Proxy All Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Diff. p-value
IS Mean 1.18 0.80 0.98 1.13 1.81 -1.01 0.0000
Median 1.05 0.84 0.98 1.13 1.54 -0.70 0.0000
DCA Mean 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.3434
Median 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.2503
N 124 31 31 31 31
better stock market performers over the long-term, have a tendency to manage their 
earnings less opportunistically during the year o f going public. In contrast, companies 
which have a low tendency to smooth their income are also likely to manage their 
earnings more aggressively. For example, the most aggressive group in terms of IS (Ql) 
recording a median IS coefficient of 0.84, has the highest median DCA of 0.12. The 
results suggest that the two forms of earnings management are clearly not mutually 
exclusive. The column headed Diff. shows the difference in the coefficient between Ql 
and Q4. The last column in Table 28 reports the p-value of the mean difference test of 
coefficients between Ql and Q4. While there is a tendency for companies to apply 
various techniques for earnings management, either equally aggressively or 
conservatively, the lack o f statistical significance for both the mean and median might 
suggest that the two strategies are not deterministic.
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Table 29
IPO performance of companies in the DCA/IS intersection
Table VII presents the adjusted and unadjusted buy-and-hold performance of the Best DCA/IS (Panel A) 
and Worst DCA/IS intersection (Panel B). The sample consists of 124 German IPOs going public 
between 1988 and 1997. Aftermarket returns are calculated as equally-weighted returns whereas one 
month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading period using the local trading calendar. Adjusted and 
Unadjusted mean and median returns are calculated from month three, nine and twelve following the IPO 
date. Returns are adjusted using the broad-based value-weighted FAZ Index as the benchmark.________
Panel A : Best DCA/IS intersection
Returns 3 months after IPO 9 months after IPO 12 Months after IPO
Raw returns 1.2981 0.4119 0.3760
Median 0.6616 0.3830 0.2780
Adjusted returns 0.8577 0.1900 0.1785
Median 0.2456 0.1856 0.0243
Number of IPOs 10 10 10
Panel B: Worst DCA/IS intersection
Returns 3 months after IPO 9 months after IPO 12 Months after IPO
Raw returns -0.2241 -0.2641 -0.2013
Median -0.3524 -0.3797 -0.2972
Adjusted returns -0.4995 -0.3965 -0.4398
Median -0.3515 -0.4413 -0.3670
Number of IPOs 9 9 9
In Table 29, we analyse the impact of the interaction of these two forms of earnings 
management on the dynamics of aftermarket returns. In Panel A, we present evidence 
concerning the long-run performance of companies, which fall into the intersection o f 
companies with the most conservative form o f earnings management in terms of DCA 
(Ql) and IS (Q4). Panel B contains the result of those companies that fall into the 
intersection that applies the most aggressive behaviour towards earnings management in 
terms o f DCA (Q4) and IS (Ql). This approach allows us to study whether companies 
that use both forms o f earnings management most conservatively (Best DCA/Best IS 
Quartile) do in fact experience performance differences and vice versa.
Overall, the results do confirm our earlier observation that the magnitude o f 
long-run performance is sensitive to the start o f the measurement period. There is a 
strong indication that mean and median returns of companies falling into the 
intersection o f Best DCA/Best IS outperform other companies, that do not fall into this
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intersection, by a considerable margin. This result extends to all starting dates of our 
measurement period. For example, when measuring performance following the ninth 
month o f aftermarket trading, the ten companies which fell into the Best DCA/Best IS 
intersection returned a market-adjusted 19.00 percent, while in Table 25, the best DCA 
group (Q l) only enjoyed a negative 20.40 percent three-year market-adjusted return. 
Similarly, in Table 27, the best IS Group (Q4) recorded a negative 25.53 percent three- 
year market-adjusted return when measured after nine months of trading.
The results are less robust for the intersection of Worst DCA/Worst IS, which is 
generally in line with the returns of the worst DCA and worst IS Quartiles reported in 
Tables 25 and 27.68 This is not surprising as 75 percent of the sample in both earnings 
management regimes produced similar long-run underperformance. It must be noted 
that, due to the small sample size, reported results must be treated with caution.
6 Aftermarket Return Dynamics and Earnings Management
As documented throughout the paper, the dynamics of aftermarket performance 
are sensitive to the start of the period from which returns are measured. Starting the 
measurement period at a date closer to the date of going public has a dramatically 
different effect on the return dynamics than when measuring returns from a date further 
away from the IPO date. In this section, we combine the empirical methodology of 
Ritter (1991) with the framework for analysing DCA and IS, in order to disentangle the 
observations. We include the two major explanatory variables DCA and IS, which are 
proxies for the fundamentals of IPO firms, into the regression model described in Ritter 
(1991) where most of the explanatory variables have no accounting features.
68 Three out of the nine companies in the Worst DCA/Worst IS intersection are companies associated 
with strong retail brands: Jil Sander AG, a fashion company; Leica Camera AG, a camera manufacturer; 
and Marbert AG, a cosmetics company.
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We use market-adjusted three-year returns as the dependent variable and 
measure performance following month three, nine and twelve of trading. The 
explanatory variables are the DCA coefficient in the IPO year, the IS coefficient, a 
proxy for New Economy companies (NEW), the logarithm of market value (MV), the 
log of one plus age, the percentage of equity retained (ER) and the initial return.69
The generalised model specification is as follows:
Rj = a + PiDCAj + |ySi + fbNEWj + P4Log(MVj) + P5Log(l+Agej)+ P6ERj + P?IRj +£i (5)
Table 30 reports the major results o f a set of multivariate regression models (5). 
The results in Table 30 shed more light on our earlier observations about both the short- 
and long-run dynamics of IPO returns and the explanatory power of both proxies for 
earnings management. When measuring long-run returns in the three months after the 
IPO (Panel A), both proxies for earnings management have very little power to explain 
long-run returns. Including our accounting proxies for earnings management in the 
regression leads to just a marginal increase in explanatory power from 9.35 percent to 
10.30 percent.70 In this case, the New Economy proxy shows considerable statistical 
power. This confirms our conjecture made in the previous chapter that the positive long- 
run abnormal return performance measured from the first day o f trading of a sample o f 
973 European IPOs issued between 1988 and 1998 is driven by firms in the New 
Economy sectors. The power of the two accounting proxies for earnings management 
that help to explain long-run returns, however, increases dramatically when long-run 
performance is measured after nine or twelve months of trading. As shown in Panel B, 
not only does the inclusion of the DCA and IS increase the overall explanatory power of
69 New Economy firms represent Technology, Media, Telecommunications and Healthcare, respectively.
70 The R2s reported in this study are unadjusted. We also checked adjusted R2s and found that it does not 
change the results qualitatively.
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Table 30
OLS Regression Results for the Aftermarket Performance
Rj = a  + PiDCAj + ffelSj + p3NEWj + p4Log(MVj) + p5Log(l+A gei)+ P6ERi + p7IR, +£j.
Ri is the three-year market adjusted return, measured from the applicable measurement starting date. 
DCA* is the DCA of company i at the year of the IPO. ISj is die income smoothing coefficient of 
company i measured over the whole period. DCAj and ISj are proxies for earnings management. New 
Economy (NEW*) firms belong to market sectors 5,13,15,17 representing Technology, Media, 
Telecommunications and Healthcare, respectively, in the Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification 
scheme. Log(MVj) is the Market Value of the Firm at the IPO date defined as the total number of shares 
issued (including overalottment options) times the IPO price, measured in end-1997 purchasing power. 
Log(l+ AgeO is defined as the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded 
before 1901 assumed to be founded in 1901. EquityRetentionj (ER) is defined as one minus the 
percentage of Equity offered based on the IPO date. IR, measures the Initial Returns of the IPO defined as 
the unadjusted percentage change between the IPO price and the first closing price; Standard Error (S.E) 
in parenthesis.__________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Coefficient estimates based on starting measurement after three months ofgoing public
P \ P i  P i  Pa Ps Pt> P 7
-0.1893c 0.1063 0.0001
(0.1089) (0.3267)
-0.4390 0.2175 0.0100
(0.2541) (0.1955)
1.0700 0.6855b -0.0694 -0.1304 0.6133 0.2072 0.0935
(05437) (0.3076) (0.1022) (0.0942) (0.5614) (0.5059)
0.7186 0.1125 0.2105 0.7043 b -0.0649 -0.1234 0.5871 0.1938 0.103
(2.0156) (0.3220) (0.1922) (0.3091) (0.1033) (0.0947) (0.5636) (0.5112)
Panel B: Coefficient estimates based on starting measurement after nine months o f going public
a A P i A P a Ps A P 7 R2
-0.4399“ -0.3089c 0.0244
(0.0589) (0.1768)
-0.7220“ 0.2212b 0.0346
(0.1374) (0.1057)
0.0313 0.2588 -0.0331 -0.0165 0.1982 0.2924 0.0552
(1.0999) (0.1719) (0.0571) (0.0526) (0.3138) (0.2828)
-0.5570 -0.3108° 0.2120b 0.2639 -0.0146 -0.0144 0.1791 0.3601 0.1140
(1.0969) (0.1752) (0.1046) (0.1682) (0.0562) (0.0515) (0.3067) (0.2782)
Panel B: Coefficient estimates based on starting measurement after twelve months o f going public
a A A A A A A P7
-0.4582“ -0.2504 0.0161
(0.0590)
-0.7139“
(0.1770)
0.202 lb 0.0291
(0.1374)
0.3912
(0.1057)
0.2191 -0.0484 -0.0011 0.0043 0.2708 0.0461
(1.1020)
-0.1271 -0.2405 0.1962b
(0.1723)
0.2253
(0.0572)
-0.0328
(0.0527)
0.0013
(0.3144)
-0.0143
(0.2833)
0.3244 0.0901
(1.1085)
(L b ,c  J ___
(0.1771) (0.1057) (0.1700) (0.0568) (0.0521) (0.3100) (0.2811)
*,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
the regression model from 5.52 percent to 11.40 percent, but DCA and IS also become 
significant. This finding demonstrates that factors other than fundamentals drive IPO 
prices in the short-run. In an environment characterized by high levels of “divergence of
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Figure 9. Model Explanatory Power Dynamics and Weekly Abnormal Returns. In Panel A and B, 
we measure the power of the regression model (including DCA/IS and excluding DCA/IS) from Table 30 
to explain 36-month buy-and-hold returns. Panel C measures the weekly abnormal return dynamics (FAZ 
Index adjusted) during the first year of trading.
Panel C: Weekly Anormal Returns
-i n r i  rn n n "L np f  T p
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including DCA/IS
opinion” (Miller (1977)), factors such as company characteristics (such as age, initial 
return, free-float, size or economic sector), short-selling constraints (Duffie, Garleanu 
and Pederson (2002) and Gecy, Musto and Reed (2001)), lock-up periods (Brav and 
Gompers (2002)), underwriter stabilization (Aggarwal (2000)) or the expiration of the 
“quiet period” (Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2002)) may be the driving forces behind 
short-run IPO returns.
In Figure 9, we study the explanatory power dynamics of model (5) in more 
detail. The 36-months returns (both raw and adjusted) are measured starting from the 
first week to 52 weeks after the IPO date. The R2s of the regression with and without the 
proxies for fundamentals (DCA and IS) are plotted in Panels A and B, respectively. 
Clearly, the R2s of the model, with and without the variables explaining fundamentals, 
are almost the same for the first several months after the IPO date. Take, for example, 
the adjusted return (Panel A). The model explanatory power with and without 
fundamentals starts to diverge only four to five months after the IPO date. After that, the 
explanatory power of the typical IPO explaining variables (such as size, age, initial 
returns, economic sector) starts to decrease while the explanatory power of 
fundamentals starts to increase dramatically. Both of them remain relatively stable one 
or two months afterwards. This pattern also holds when the raw return is used (Panel 
B).71 The substantially increased model explanatory power with DCA and IS after four 
to five months indicates that fundamentals start to play a bigger role in determining the 
long-run return of IPO stocks. After that time, the non-fundamental factors lessen their 
impact in determining IPO long-run performance.
We investigate this issue further by examining the actual short-term return 
dynamics of IPO stocks. The results are reported in Panel C of Figure 9. In Panel C, we
71 When the raw return is used, the market return is added the right-hand side of the model (5).
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document average weekly abnormal returns of IPO stocks. Clearly, during the first five 
to six months (the time that the fundamentals take to establish their role), the IPO stocks 
perform well relative to the market. After that, however, they start to underperform. 
When comparing the time when the fundamental factors start to play a bigger role with 
the time when the IPO stocks start to underperform, a clear picture emerges: in the 
short-run, IPO stocks outperform the market and their return dynamics are essentially 
driven by factors other than fundamentals. After some period of learning, fundamentals 
start to play a bigger role and IPOs start to underperform. This result casts light upon 
the reported anomaly documenting the significant short-run overperformance in IPOs in 
general and German IPOs in particular, as well as the sharp drop-off in performance 
thereafter.
7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has analysed management behaviour towards earnings management 
and the dynamics of the subsequent market response. The analysis has been conducted 
through the evaluation of accounting information and stock prices of a large number of 
companies that chose to go public in Germany over the ten-year period between 1988 
and 1997. We have defined two widely acknowledged forms of earnings management 
and have investigated some issues that have so far remained unexplained. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that applies this concept to German IPOs, a market 
which has gained considerable international attention during the past decade.
For the sample o f German IPOs, we provide evidence that the IPO event itself 
may give managers an incentive to opportunistically manage earnings so as to maximize 
IPO proceeds. We also find that the form of earnings management during the IPO year 
is indeed linked to the long-run aftermarket performance. Firms that perform best over
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the long-run manage earnings least opportunistically. This applies to the two methods of 
earnings management studied. We also find that two types o f earnings management are 
not deterministic, yet complementary. The ten IPOs that fall into the intersection of 
companies with the lowest DCA and highest IS substantially outperform the rest of the 
sample and the market.
The outperformance of the less aggressive companies could be due to a variety 
of reasons such as varying risk premia, the empirical methodology or simply bad luck. 
To check for the robustness of our results, we exercised a set of robustness analyses. We 
found that the risk premium proxied by the standard deviation of monthly returns or age 
does not show significant difference between the more conservative and more 
aggressive earnings management groups. Since a broad set of the empirical literature 
(Clarkson and Thompson (1990), Ritter (1991), Chan and Lakonishok (1992), 
Keloharju (1993), Leleux and Muzyka (1998)) rejects the notion that beta can explain 
away the differences in return performance o f IPO stocks, we believe that beta 
adjustments cannot account for the large performance discrepancies identified in this 
study. Moreover, using cumulative returns, another conventional method of returns 
measurement, we find that the qualitative nature of the results does not change.
This analysis has also been set up with the aim of shedding some light on the 
forces behind the return dynamics in aftermarket trading of IPOs. We find that the long- 
run performance is sensitive to the starting date of the measurement period. The 
explanatory power of both DCA and IS for long-run returns, proxies for fundamentals 
of IPO firms, increases dramatically when the performance is measured after some time 
of trading in the aftermarket (four to five months). This result indicates that investor 
sentiment, driven by institutional peculiarities in an IPO market typically characterised 
by high levels of “divergence o f opinion” (such as the immediate IPO aftermarket),
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replaces fundamentals as the driving force behind the short-run price dynamics. It takes 
many months for the market to catch-up to the company fundamentals conveyed in the 
proxies for earnings management.
For academics and practitioners alike, the findings presented here have a number 
of repercussions: for academics, it matters when to start measuring performance. 
Delaying the start of the measurement period beyond the first four months is most likely 
going to improve the explanatory power of accounting information. Investors should not 
treat IPOs like any other firm that is being traded in the market, particularly during a 
firm’s first year o f trading because IPO returns, as shown in this analysis, are largely 
driven by factors other than fundamentals in the short-run. The message for firms is that 
there is always a trade-off between short-term gains and long-term losses. If a firm is 
concerned about its long-term perspective, it should not manage its earnings 
aggressively, because the market is going to catch up sooner or later.
The findings also provide a potential rational for investors to ignore IPO 
fundamentals in the short-run, because the extreme winner is likely to be found in those 
companies that manage earnings more aggressively. This indeed sheds light on the 
short-run aftermarket return dynamics o f US IPOs during Internet bubble of 1999 and 
part of 2000, and on the even more extreme events that took place on the Neuer Markt 
and its subsequent fall.
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Appendix A: Sector Classification 
Table 31: Global Sector Classification Standard59
The Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard groups companies that have similar primary 
revenue sources. There are 10 economic sectors and derived from these -  in increasingly finer 
classifications -  are 18 market sectors (used for this study), 51 industry groups and 89 sub-groups. New 
Economy firms (270) belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, representing Media [MDI], Healthcare 
[HCR], Technology [TEC] and Telecommunications [TLS], respectively. For the purpose of this study, 
all other Market Sectors are defined as belonging to the Old Economy. Europe (EU) = Total Number of 
IPOs issued between 1988 and 1998 in Germany (BD), France (FR), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Spain (SP), Sweden (SD) and Switzerland (SW). _________________________________________
Market Sectors
EU BD
Country and Number o f IPOs 
FR IT NL SP SD SW
1 Basic Resources [BAS] 46 5 13 3 3 9 11 2
2 Chemicals [CHM] 27 4 1 0 4 5 1 0 3
3 Automobiles [ATO] 36 1 0 11 4 4 1 6 0
4 Cyclical Goods and Services [CGS] 124 33 39 2 1 6 9 1 0 6
5 Media [MDI] 32 3 18 3 1 2 5 0
6 Retail [RTS] 44 16 19 1 3 1 4 0
7 Food & Beverage [FOB] 51 7 24 2 1 1 2 3 2
8 Non-Cyclical Goods & Services [NCG] 63 13 26 1 8 9 5 1
9 Energy [ENE] 11 0 4 2 1 2 2 0
1 0 Banks [BNK] 2 0 3 2 6 0 6 2 1
11 Financial Services [FSV] 58 1 2 13 6 4 9 13 1
1 2 Insurance [INS] 17 4 5 5 0 2 0 1
13 Healthcare [HCR] 54 7 2 2 1 4 0 14 6
14 Construction [CNS] 47 18 8 2 3 13 3 0
15 Industrial Goods & Services [IGS] 147 32 45 1 2 7 9 34 8
16 Technology [TEC] 170 43 56 1 24 1 34 11
17 Telecommunications [TLS] 14 4 6 0 1 0 2 1
18 Utilities [UTI] 1 2 5 2 3 0 2 0 0
Total 973 219 323 77 75 8 8 148 43
59 For the complete classification standard see: http://www.stoxx.com/indexes/guide/index_guide.pdf
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Table 32: Aftermarket Performance (Value-Weighted)
The sample contains 973 European Initial Public Offerings between 1988 and 1998. Aftermarket returns 
are measured as value-weighted buy-and-hold returns whereas one month is defined as consecutive 2 1 - 
day trading interval from the close of the first day of trading using European trading days, assuming a 
declining sample size. If the IPO is delisted before the end of the measurement period, we calculate the 
return until the delisting date. Aftermarket returns are compared with alternative benchmarks. The Dow 
Jones STOXX, size-based benchmarks, ex. UK, were used as a proxy for the European market. The 
wealth relative (WR) is the ratio on one plus the average aftermarket period buy-and-hold IPO return 
divided by one plus the average aftermarket benchmark buy-and-hold return. For example, for the month 
36 adjustment of IPO returns for the movement in the broad market, (l+0.7414)/(l+0.6495) = 1.06; 
Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.______________________________________________________
Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: All Market Conditions
IPO and Benchmark Returns
Raw Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative
Month 1 0.0059 0.0116 0.99 0.0147 0.99 0.0057 1 . 0 0 -0.0049 1 . 0 1
(N=973) (0.0068) (0.0117) (0.0067) (0.0148) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0053) (-0.0048) (0.0066)
Month 3 0.0374s 0.0463 0.99 0.0526 0.99 0.0321 1 . 0 1 0.0096 1.03s
(N=972) (0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0.0467) (0.0104) (0.0534) (0.0104) (0.0319) (0.0105) (0.0093) (0.0105)
Month 12 0.2422s 0.1513 1.08 0.1766 1.06 0.0882 1.14s 0.0147 1 .2 2 s
(N=970) (0.0582) (0.1402) (0.0575) (0.1673) (0.0576) (0.0773) (0.0576) (0 .0 1 2 0 ) (0.0578)
Month 36 0.7412s 0.6495 1.06 0.7625 0.99 0.3784 1.26b 0.1128 1.56s
(N=6 8 6 ) (0.1746) (0.6153) (0.1729) (0.7718) (0.1733) (0.2996) (0.1733) (0.0721) (0.1735)
Month 60 0.7763s 1.1732 0.82s 1.4143 0.74s 0.6698 1.06 0.2003 1.48s
(N=381) (0.1245) (1.4353) (0.1178) (1.9223) (0.1177) (0.6296) (0.1193) (0.1353) (0 .1 2 1 0 )
),c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 33: Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) for 
Alternative Benchmarks
Aftermarket Returns are measured as Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) (not in percent), with
associated Standard Errors (S.E.) (in parentheses) for 60 months after going public, excluding the initial
returns. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval using European trading days. The
value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX size indices (Broad-Market, Large-Caps, Mid-Caps and Small Caps),
excluding UK, were used as a proxy for the market benchmark respectively.________________________
IDr,n  Broad Market Large-Cap . . . .  ~ .. . . Small-CapMonth IPO Return ,. A . ,r x /  Mid-Cap adjusted ,. . /adjusted adjusted J adjusted
CAR S.E. CAR S.E. CAR S.E. CAR S.E. CAR S.E.
1 0.0312“ (0.0068) 0.0134b 0.0066) 0.0106 0.0067) 0.0208* (0.0066) 0.0296“ (0.0066)
2 0.0461“ (0.0087) 0.0215b 0.0084) 0.0166b 0.0084) 0.0347“ (0.0084) 0.0500“ (0.0085)
3 0.0512“ (0.0105) 0.0252* 0.0098) 0.0187° 0.0098) 0.0431“ (0.0098) 0.0646“ (0.0098)
4 0.0678“ (0.0122) 0.0346“ 0 .0 1 1 2 ) 0.0263b 0 .0 1 1 2 ) 0.0569“ (0.0113) 0.0857“ (0.0114)
5 0.0862“ (0.0141) 0.0432* 0.0131) 0.0332b 0.0131) 0.0685“ (0.0131) 0.1054“ (0.0133)
6 0.0933“ (0.0151) 0.0327b 0.0141) 0.0203 0.0142) 0.0636“ (0.0142) 0.1083“ (0.0143)
7 0.1036“ (0.0158) 0.0205 0.0149) 0.0060 0.0150) 0.0582“ (0.0149) 0.1091“ (0.0151)
8 0.1097“ (0.0165) 0.0115 0.0156) -0.0045 0.0159) 0.0540* (0.0156) 0.1094“ (0.0158)
9 0.1247“ (0.0173) 0.0093 0.0162) -0.0085 0.0162) 0.0577* (0.0162) 0.1176“ (0.0164)
1 0 0.1339* (0.0179) 0.0097 0.0171) -0.0091 0.0171) 0.0605“ (0.0170) 0.1227“ (0.0172)
11 0.1391“ (0.0183) 0.0069 0.0176) -0.0127 0.0175) 0.0593* (0.0174) 0.1246“ (0.0176)
1 2 0.1499“ (0.0197) -0.0005 0.0204) -0.0226 0.0188) 0.0588“ (0.0188) 0.1322“ (0.0190)
13 0.1588“ (0.0210) -0.0081 0 .0 2 0 1 ) -0.0323 0 .0 2 0 1 ) 0.0564“ (0 .0 2 0 0 ) 0.1374“ (0 .0 2 0 2 )
14 0.1651“ (0.0226) -0 . 0 1 1 0 0.0215) -0.0370° 0.0215) 0.0590“ (0.0214) 0.1440“ (0.0216)
15 0.1800“ (0.0240) -0.0089 0.0227) -0.0368 0.0228) 0.0673“ (0.0228) 0.1550“ (0.0228)
16 0.1917“ (0.0257) -0.0065 0.0242) -0.0361 0.0242) 0.0738“ (0.0242) 0.1662“ (0.0243)
17 0.1977“ (0.0264) -0.0188 0.0250) -0.0512b 0.0250) 0.0688* (0.0251) 0.1673“ (0.0251)
18 0.2028“ (0.0272) -0.0346 0.0257) -0.0694“ 0.0258) 0.0579b (0.0258) 0.1662“ (0.0258)
19 0.2170* (0.0275) -0.0424 0.0261) -0.0794“ 0.0262) 0.0560b (0.0262) 0.1697“ (0.0262)
2 0 0.2413“ (0.0282) -0.0408 0.0268) -0.0795* 0.0269) 0.0636b (0.0270) 0.1793“ (0.0269)
2 1 0.2688“ (0.0292) -0.0342 0.0279) -0.0743“ 0.0280) 0.0758“ (0.0281) 0.1930“ (0.0280)
2 2 0.2762“ (0.0290) -0.0349 0.0281) -0.0758“ 0.0281) 0.0772“ (0.0282) 0.1959“ (0.0280)
23 0.2902“ (0.0295) -0.0294 0.0285) -0.0717 b 0.0286) 0.0856“ (0.0286) 0.206“ (0.0285)
24 0.2893“ (0.0301) -0.0388 0.0291) -0.0833“ 0.0292) 0.0817“ (0.0292) 0.2066* (0.0291)
25 0.2733“ (0.0302) -0.062lb 0.0291) -0.1088“ 0.0292) 0.0628b (0.0293) 0.1945“ (0.0291)
26 0.2748“ (0.0305) -0.0703b 0.0294) -0.1181“ 0.0295) 0.0572° (0.0295) 0.1928“ (0.0294)
27 0.2661“ (0.0307) -0.0860“ 0.0295) -0.1351“ 0.0296) 0.0438 (0.0296) 0.1832“ (0.0295)
28 0.2548“ (0.0311) -0 .1 0 2 2 “ 0.0297) -0.1538“ 0.0298) 0.0321 (0.0299) 0.1794“ (0.0299)
29 0.2574“ (0.0313) -0.1109“ 0.0298) -0.1645“ 0.0298) 0.0269 (0.0300) 0.1812* (0.0299)
30 0.2250“ (0.0316) -0.1482“ 0.0302) -0.2043“ 0.0302) -0.0060 (0.0302) 0.1567* (0.0303)
31 0.2258* (0.0319) -0.1599“ 0.0303) -0.2179“ 0.0304) -0.0134 (0.0306) 0.1551“ (0.0305)
32 0.2315“ (0.0327) -0.1718“ 0.0312) -0.2315“ 0.0312) -0.0223 (0.0313) 0.1505“ (0.0313)
33 0.2325* (0.0342) -0.1951“ 0.0323) -0.2575“ 0.0324) -0.0434 (0.0324) 0.1397“ (0.0325)
34 0.2569“ (0.0353) -0.1850“ 0.0332) -0.2495“ 0.0333) -0.0317 (0.0333) 0.1579“ (0.0335)
35 0.2595“ (0.0365) -0.1929“ 0.0342) -0.2591“ 0.0343) -0.0381 (0.0343) 0.1550“ (0.0344)
36 0.2658“ (0.0376) -0.2052“ 0.0350) -0.2742* 0.0350) -0.0467 (0.0351) 0.1552“ (0.0353)
37 0.2854“ (0.0383) -0.2082“ 0.0356) -0.2808“ 0.0357) -0.0407 (0.0357) 0.1730* (0.0359)
38 0.2938* (0.0388) -0.2199“ 0.0362) -0.2947“ 0.0362) -0.0451 (0.0363) 0.1742“ (0.0364)
39 0.2952“ (0.0391) -0.2293“ 0.0365) -0.3053“ 0.0365) -0.0519 (0.0366) 0.1708“ (0.0368)
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40 0.2898* (0.0403) -0.2399* (0.0378) -0.3175“ (0.0378) -0.0607 (0.0379) 0.1658* (0.0381)
41 0.2651* (0.0389) -0.2748* (0.0362) -0.3548* (0.0362) -0.0923b (0.0363) 0.1396* (0.0367)
42 0.2736* (0.0394) -0.2732* (0.0368) -0.3551* (0.0368) -0.0874b (0.0370) 0.1511* (0.0373)
43 0.2652* (0.0400) -0.2926“ (0.0375) -0.3767* (0.0375) -0.1024* (0.0376) 0.1433* (0.0379)
44 0.2752* (0.0403) -0.2986* (0.0376) -0.3838* (0.0376) -0.1065* (0.0377) 0.1436* (0.0381)
45 0.2968* (0.0413) -0.2951* (0.0384) -0.3826“ (0.0385) -0.1012* (0.0386) 0.1552* (0.0389)
46 0.2930* (0.0416) -0.3097* (0.0386) -0.3995* (0.0386) -0.1133* (0.0388) 0.1490* (0.0392)
47 0.3083* (0.0440) -0.2975* (0.0411) -0.3882* (0.0411) -0.1012b (0.0412) 0.1634* (0.0416)
48 0.3210* (0.0452) -0.2934* (0.0423) -0.3855* (0.0423) -0.0946b (0.0425) 0.1742* (0.0429)
49 0.2990* (0.0450) -0.3239* (0.0419) -0.4188* (0.0419) -0.1194* (0.0421) 0.1565* (0.0427)
50 0.3113* (0.0448) -0.3212* (0.0420) -0.4174* (0.0420) -0.1141* (0.0422) 0.1696* (0.0427)
51 0.3181* (0.0455) -0.3232* (0.0430) -0.4205* (0.0430) -0.1136* (0.0431) 0.1735* (0.0435)
52 0.3000* (0.0465) -0.3296* (0.0444) -0.4289* (0.0444) -0.1200* (0.0445) 0.1733* (0.0449)
53 0.3011* (0.0464) -0.3295* (0.0444) -0.4305* (0.0443) -0.1181* (0.0443) 0.1814* (0.0446)
54 0.2895* (0.0474) -0.3448* (0.0451) -0.4480* (0.0451) -0.1310* (0.0450) 0.1756* (0.0454)
55 0.3057* (0.0481) -0.3432“ (0.0459) -0.4483* (0.0459) -0.1251* (0.0459) 0.1876* (0.0462)
56 0.3281* (0.0480) -0.3394* (0.0459) -0.4456* (0.0459) -0.1167b (0.0459) 0.1991* (0.0462)
57 0.3385* (0.0493) -0.3339* (0.0474) -0.4413* (0.0474) -0.1114b (0.0473) 0.2075* (0.0474)
58 0.3388* (0.0501) -0.3322* (0.0482) -0.4412* (0.0483) -0.1094b (0.0480) 0.2127* (0.0482)
59 0.3347* (0.0505) -0.3404* (0.0487) -0.4501* (0.0487) -0.1157b (0.0485) 0.2061* (0.0485)
60 0.3525* (0.0532) -0.3220* (0.0506) -0.4328* (0.0506) -0.0964c (0.0505) 0.2263* (0.0506)
*,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Appendix B, Figure 10. The Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Europe. Cumulative average returns 
(CARs) for an equally-weighted portfolio of European Initial Public Offerings, with monthly rebalancing, 
month 1 to 60. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval using European trading 
days. Five CAR series are plotted for the first 60 months after the IPO date: 1) Raw returns (no 
adjustment), 2) broad-market adjustment using the STOXX broad-market index (value-weighted), 
excluding UK, 3) large-cap adjustment using the STOXX large-cap index (value-weighted), excluding 
UK, 4) mid-cap adjustment using the STOXX mid-cap index (value-weighted), excluding UK and 5) 
small-cap adjustment using the STOXX small-cap index (value-weighted), excluding UK. Month 0 is the 
initial return interval. Returns were calculated on the basis of final closing prices.
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Table 34: Aftermarket Performance - 
constant sample size (686 IPOs)
The sample contains 6 8 6  European IPOs between 1988 and 1997. Aftermarket returns are measured as 
equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns, whereas one month is defined as a consecutive 2 1 -day trading 
interval from the first closing price, using European trading days. The value-weighted Dow Jones 
STOXX size indices (Broad-Market, Large-Caps, Mid-Caps and Small-Caps), excluding UK, were used 
as a proxy for the market benchmark. The wealth relative is the ratio of one plus the average aftermarket 
period buy-and-hold IPO return, divided by one plus the average aftermarket period benchmark buy-and- 
hold return. For example, for the month 36 adjustment of IPO returns for the movement in the broad- 
market benchmark, (1 + 0.6791)/(l+0.5947) = 1.05; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________
____________ Panel A: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: All Market Conditions____________
IPO and Benchmark Returns
Aftermarket
IPO
Return
Broad-
Market
Wealth
Relative
Large-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Mid-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Small-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Month 1 
(N=6 8 6 ) 
Month 3 
(N=6 8 6 ) 
Month 12 
(N=6 8 6 ) 
Month 36 
(N=6 8 6 ) 
Month 60 
(N=381)
0.0233“
(0.0065)
0.0682“
(0.0110)
0.3308“
(0.0788)
0.6791“
(0.1746)
0.5974“
(0.1245)
0.0164“
(0.0016)
0.0473“
(0.0030)
0.1708“
(0.0073)
0.5947“
(0.0172)
0.6179“
(0.0351)
1.01
(0.0064)
1.02b
(0.0105)
1.14b
(0.0780)
1.05
(0.1729)
0.99
(0.1204)
0.0184“
(0.0017)
0.0517“
(0.0030)
0.1933“
(0.0073)
0.7037“
(0.0184)
1.1974“
(0.0426)
1.00
(0.0064)
1.02
(0.0106)
1. 12°
(0.0780)
0.99
(0.1729)
0.73“
(0.1177)
0 .0120“
(0.0016)
0.0374“
(0.0030)
0.1252“
(0.0070)
0.3462“
(0.0120)
0.5313“
(0.0228)
l . o r
(0.0064)
1.03“
(0.0105)
1.18“
(0.0781)
1.25°
(0.1733)
1.04
(0.1193)
0.0065“
(0.0016)
0.0244“
(0.0033)
0.0418®
(0.0073)
0.0951“
(0.0091)
0.0933“
(0.0151)
1.02“
(0.0064)
1.04®
(0.0105)
1.28“
(0.0784)
1.53“
(0.1735)
1.46“
(0.1209)
Panel B: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: Hot Markets
IPO and Benchmark Returns
Aftermarket
IPO
Return
Broad-
Market
Wealth
Relative
Large-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Mid-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
1.02b
(0.0099)
1.05“
(0.0168)
1.27b
(0.1349)
1.41°
(0.3001)
1.04
(0.1212)
Small-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
1.02b
(0.0098)
1.05“
(0.0168)
1.37“
(0.1354)
1.72“
(0.3002)
1.41“
(0 .1222)
Month 1 
(N=389) 
Month 3 
(N=389) 
Month 12 
(N=389) 
Month 36 
(N=389) 
Month 60 
(N=119)
0.0369“
(0.0100)
0.1119“
(0.0174)
0.4752*
(0.1357)
0.8568“
(0.3014)
0.2795b
(0.1231)
0.0231“
(0.0022)
0.0759“
(0.0036)
0.2238“
(0.0108)
0.6120“
(0.0239)
0.1264®
(0.0310)
1.01
(0.0099)
1.03b
(0.0169)
1.21c
(0.1349)
1.15
(0.2997)
1.14
(0.1228)
0.0252“
(0.0023)
0.0794“
(0.0037)
0.2457“
(0 .0110)
0.7244“
(0.0255)
0.6066“
(0.0343)
1.01
(0.0099)
1.03c
(0.0170)
1.18°
(0.1348)
1.08
(0.2997)
0.80“
(0.1229)
0.0168®
(0.0020)
0.0633“
(0.0035)
0.1661“
(0.0098)
0.3146“
(0.0151)
0.2257*
(0.0194)
0.0129“
(0.0022)
0.0545“
(0.0035)
0.0768“
(0 .0100)
0.0775“
(0.0124)
-0.0903“
(0 .0100)
Panel C: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: Cold Markets_______________
_____________________IPO and Benchmark Returns____________________
IPO Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative
Month 1 0.0054 0.0075“ L00 0.0096* L00 0.0058b L00 -0.0019 L01
(N=297) (0.0072) (0.0022) (0.0071) (0.0022) (0.0071) (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0025) (0.0072)
Month 3 0.0108 0.0097b 1.00 0.0156“ 1.00 0.0033 1.01 -0.0151“ 1.03b
(N=297) (0.0107) (0.0043) (0.0101) (0.0042) (0.0101) (0.0046) (0.0101) (0.0051) (0.0103)
Month 12 0.1417“ 0.1014“ 1.04 0.1247“ 1.02 0.0716“ 1.07b -0.0040 1.15“
(N=297) (0.0369) (0.0076) (0.0349) (0.0069) (0.0350) (0.0087) (0.0349) (0.0100) (0.0355)
Month 36 0.4465“ 0.5719“ 0.92c 0.6766“ 0.86“ 0.3875“ 1.04 0.1182“ 1.29“
(N=297) (0.0810) (0.0243) (0.0734) (0.0262) (0.0733) (0.0191) (0.0742) (0.0133) (0.0764)
Month 60 0.7418“ 0.8412“ 0.95 1.4657“ 0.71“ 0.6701“ 1.04 0.1766“ 1.48“
(N=262) (0.1716) (0.0425) (0.1658) (0.0522) (0.1614) (0.0281) (0.1646) (0.0194) (0.1669)
“’D,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 35: Aftermarket Performance of European IPOs - 
constant sample size (381 IPOs)
The sample contains 381 European IPOs between 1988 and 1995. Aftermarket returns are measured as 
equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns, whereas one month is defined as a consecutive 2 1 -day trading 
interval from the first closing price, using European trading days. The value-weighted Dow Jones 
STOXX size indices (Broad-Market, Large-Caps, Mid-Caps and Small-Caps), excluding UK, were used 
as a proxy for the market benchmark. The wealth relative is the ratio of one plus the average aftermarket 
period buy-and-hold IPO return, divided by one plus the average aftermarket period benchmark buy-and- 
hold return. For example, for the month 36 adjustment of IPO returns for the movement in the broad- 
market benchmark, (1 + 0.6791)/(l+0.5947) = 1.05; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________
_____________Panel A: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs: All Market Conditions____________
IPO and Benchmark Returns
Aftermarket
Month 1 
(N=381) 
Month 3 
(N=381) 
Month 12 
(N=381) 
Month 36 
(N=381) 
Month 60 
(N=381)
IPO
Return
Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth
Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative
0.0144°
(0.0061)
0.0379*
(0.0094)
0.1358*
(0.0294)
0.3266*
(0.0632)
0.5974*
(0.1245)
0.0118*
(0.0020)
0.0226*
(0.0035)
0.0753*
(0.0076)
0.4184*
(0.0223)
0.6179“
(0.0351)
1.00 
(0.0061) 
1.02c 
(0.0088) 
1.06b 
(0.0278) 
0.94 
(0.0568) 
0.99 
(0.1204)
0.014* 
(0.0020) 
0.027* 
(0.0034) 
0.093 * 
(0.0072) 
0.517* 
(0.0237) 
1.1974“ 
(0.0426)
1.00
(0.0061)
1.01
(0.0089)
1.04
(0.0279)
0.87*
(0.0569)
0.73*
(0.1177)
0.009“
(0.0020)
0.017*
(0.0039)
0.054*
(0.0084)
0.262*
(0.0179)
0.5313“
(0.0228)
1.00
(0.0060)
1.02b
(0.0088)
1.08*
(0.0277)
1.05
(0.0572)
1.04
(0.1193)
0.004°
(0.0021)
0.006
(0.0043)
-0.008
(0.0093)
0.019
(0.0133)
0.0933“
(0.0151)
1.01c 
(0.0061) 
1.03* 
(0.0088) 
1.15* 
(0.0281) 
1.30* 
(0.0588) 
1.46* 
(0.1209)
Panel B: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f  IPOs: Hot Markets
IPO and Benchmark Returns
Aftermarket
IPO Broad- 
Retum Market
Wealth
Relative
Large-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Mid-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
1.02°
(0.0098)
1.05*
(0.0165)
1. 10*
(0.0361)
1.01
(0.0619)
1.04
(0 .1212)
Small-
Caps
Wealth
Relative
Month 1 
(N=119) 
Month 3 
(N=119) 
Month 12 
(N=l 19) 
Month 36 
(N=119) 
Month 60 
(N=119)
0.0363*
(0.0098)
0.0952*
(0.0172)
0.1334*
(0.0393)
-0.0199
(0.0648)
0.2795b
(0.1231)
0.0207*
(0.0033)
0.0505*
(0.0046)
0.0290c
(0.0165)
0.0508*
(0.0158)
0.1264*
(0.0310)
1.02
(0.0101)
1.04*
(0.0168)
1. 10*
(0.0365)
0.93
(0.0624)
1.14
(0.1228)
0.0225*
(0.0035)
0.0508*
(0.0046)
0.0327b
(0.0154)
0.1291“
(0.0144)
0.6066*
(0.0343)
1.01
(0.0103)
1.04*
(0.0171)
1. 10*
(0.0369)
0.87b
(0.0627)
0.80*
(0.1229)
0.0171*
(0.0032)
0.0476*
(0.0057)
0.0313°
(0.0180)
-0.0276
(0.0168)
0.2257*
(0.0194)
0.0174*
(0.0030)
0.0537*
(0.0052)
0.0033
(0.0196)
-0.1993*
(0.0166)
-0.0903*
(0.0100)
1.02°
(0.0098)
1.04b
(0.0166)
1.13“
(0.0363)
1.22*
(0.0620)
1.41*
(0.1222)
Panel C: Mean Aftermarket Performance o f  IPOs: Cold Markets_______________
_____________________IPO and Benchmark Returns____________________
IPO Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative
Month 1 0.0044 0.0077* L00 0.0097* 099 0.0060° L00 -0.0018 L01
(N=262) (0.0077) (0.0024) (0.0076) (0.0024) (0.0076) (0.0025) (0.0075) (0.0026) (0.0076)
Month 3 0.0119 0.0099b 1.00 0.0157* 1.00 0.0034 1.01 -0.0152* 1.03*
(N=262) (0.0109) (0.0045) (0.0102) (0.0043) (0.0102) (0.0048) (0.0103) (0.0053) (0.0104)
Month 12 0.1370* 0.0963* 1.04 0.1210* 1.01 0.0639* 1.07b -0.0138 1.15*
(N=262) (0.0389) (0.0078) (0.0369) (0.0072) (0.0370) (0.0090) (0.0369) (0.0101) (0.0375)
Month 36 0.4840* 0.5854* 0.94 0.6932* 0.88* 0.3931* 1.07 0.1186“ 1.33*
(N=262) (0.0854) (0.0257) (0.0777) (0.0276) (0.0777) (0.0203) (0.0783) (0.0141) (0.0806)
Month 60 0.7418* 0.8412* 0.95 1.4657* 0.71* 0.6701* 1.04 0.1766* 1.48*
(N=262) (0.1716) (0.0425) (0.1658) (0.0522) (0.1614) (0.0281) (0.1646) (0.0194) (0.1669)
*,b,° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 36: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Initial Return - constant sample size (686 IPOs)
Ri =  a. +  +
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). Rj is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, D2j, and D3j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified initial return 
category and 0 otherwise. The initial return is the percentage difference from the final offering price to the first-day closing price and divided into four categories: IPOs with 
initial returns of not more than 0%, IPOs with more than 0% but less than 7% initial returns, IPOs with at least 7% but less than 20% initial returns and IPOs with more than 
20% initial returns; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses._____________________________________________________________________________________________
Aftermarket Ri
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions 
a  S.E. P\ S.E. P i S.E. Pi, S.E. Total
Number of Issues 
D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0069 -0.0323b (0.0132) 0.0013 (0.0176) 0.0724s (0.0179) 0.0886s (0.0188) 6 8 6 152 199 185 150
Month 3 0.0290b -0.0470b (0.0219) 0 . 0 2 0 2 (0.0291) 0.1118s (0.0296) 0.1456s (0.0311) 6 8 6 152 199 185 150
Month 12 0.1600b -0.0707 (0.1658) 0.2302 (0 .2 2 0 2 ) 0.3567 (0.2237) 0.2993 (0.2352) 6 8 6 152 199 185 150
Month 36 0.0845 -0.3006 (0.3676) 0.6181 (0.4882) 0.2319 (0.4961) 0.6552 (0.5216) 6 8 6 152 199 185 150
Month 60 -0.0205 -0.1792 (0.2375) -0.0035 (0.3140) -0.1228 (0.3341) 1.1742s (0.3779) 381 95 127 97 62
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P\ S.E. P i S.E. Pi S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0138 -0.0336s (0.0239) -0.0073d (0.0314) 0.0781s (0.0297) 0.0831s (0.0297) 389 64 8 8 119 118
Month 3 0.0360b -0.0468 (0.0412) 0.0179 (0.0541) 0.1166b (0.0511) 0.1420s (0.0512) 389 64 8 8 119 118
Month 12 0.2514c -0.1664 (0.3328) 0.6430 (0.4373) 0.5374 (0.4126) 0.3561 (0.4133) 389 64 8 8 119 118
Month 36 0.2448 -0.5121 (0.7391) 1.5288 (0.9714) 0.5059 (0.9166) 0.8449 (0.9179) 389 64 8 8 119 118
Month 60 0.1531 0.1761 (0.2912) 0.0266 (0.4028) -0.3238 (0.3597) 0.2747 (0.3684) 119 2 1 23 40 35
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance of IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P\ S.E. P i S.E. Pi S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0 . 0 0 2 1 -0.0314D (0.0125) 0.0082 (0.1670) 0.0634s (0.0191) 0.1127s (0.0242) 297 8 8 1 1 1 6 6 32
Month 3 0 . 0 0 1 1 -0.0471s (0.0177) 0 . 0 2 2 1 (0.0236) 0.1030s (0.0270) 0.1584s (0.0342) 297 8 8 1 1 1 6 6 32
Month 12 0.0403 -0 . 0 0 1 0 (0.0627) -0.0746 (0.0839) 0.1339 (0.0957) 0.3737s (0.1214) 297 8 8 1 1 1 6 6 32
Month 36 -0.1254° -0.1468 (0.1339) -0.0900 (0.1792) -0.0346 (0.2045) 0.5819b (0.2592) 297 8 8 1 1 1 6 6 32
Month 60 -0.0994 -0.2800 (0.3055) 0 . 0 1 2 1 (0.3997) -0.1302 (0.4632) 1.9807s (0.5909) 262 74 104 57 27
* ° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 37: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Age - constant sample size (686 IPOs)
Ri = a + /?iDu + /?2D2i+ Ej
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R, is the broad-market-adjusted return. Dn and D2j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified age category and 0 
otherwise. Age is defined as the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 assumed to be founded in 1901. Observations of company 
age are divided into three categories: IPOs with age between 0-14 years (young firms), 15-36 years (medium-young firms) and IPOs older than 37 years (old firms); Standard 
Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 0.0069 0.0220b (0.0103) -0.0085 (0.0155) -0.0399* (0.0154) 686 262 210 214
Month 3 0.0290b 0.0661* (0.0169) -0.0573b (0.0254) -0.0887* (0.0253) 686 262 210 214
Month 12 0.1600b 0.4254" (0.1258) -0.3845b (0.1885) -0.4722b (0.1876) 686 262 210 214
Month 36 0.0845 0.5794b (0.2792) -0.7318° (0.4186) -0.8684b (0.4164) 686 262 210 214
Month 60 -0.0205 0.0404 (0.2110) 0.1410 (0.3100) -0.2554 (0.2852) 381 124 107 150
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 0.0138 0.0360b (0.0153) -0.0250 (0.0231) -0.0537D (0.0246) 389 161 126 102
Month 3 0.0360b 0.1057" (0.0259) -0.1152* (0.0392) -0.1236* (0.0417) 389 161 126 102
Month 12 0.2514° 0.6582* (0.2085) -0.6894b (0.3146) -0.6998b (0.3347) 389 161 126 102
Month 36 0.2448 1.1135b (0.4635) -1.4614b (0.6995) -1.5079b (0.7443) 389 161 126 102
Month 60 0.1531 0.2806 (0.2312) -0.1643 (0.3224) -0.1889 (0.3009) 119 34 36 49
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 -0.0021 -0.0003 (0.0122) 0.0175 (0.0180) -0.0179 (0.0168) 297 101 84 112
Month 3 0.0011 0.0029 (0.0171) 0.0333 (0.0254) -0.0298 (0.0236) 297 101 84 112
Month 12 0.0403 0.0542 (0.0595) 0.0947 (0.0883) -0.1058 (0.0820) 297 101 84 112
Month 36 -0.1254° -0.2720b (0.1251) 0.4129b (0.1857) 0.0791 (0.1726) 297 101 84 112
Month 60 -0.0994 -0.0503 (0.2830) 0.2647 (0.4261) -0.3134 (0.3891) 262 90 71 101
“• ° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test
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Table 38: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size - constant sample size (686 IPOs)
R, = a + /?iDii + /?2D2i+ Ej
The model is estimated for each o f the return measurement horizons (1 ,3 , 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R, is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, and D2i, are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value o f 1 if the IPO falls into the specified size category and 0 
otherwise. Size/Market Capitalization in €m is the number of shares issued times the final offer price and is expressed in constant end-1998 prices. Observations for size are 
divided into three categories: Firms with a first day market capitalization less than €100m (small firms), between €100 and €500m (medium firms) and exceeding €500m 
(large firms); Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number o f Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0069 0.0344® (0.0107) -0.0467® (0.0145) -0.0341' (0.0172) 686 242 290 154
Month 3 0.0290b 0.0660® (0.0176) -0.0799® (0.0239) -0.0503' (0.0283) 686 242 290 154
Month 12 0.1600b 0.3112b (0.1312) -0.3113' (0.1778) -0.0857 (0.2105) 686 242 290 154
Month 36 0.0845 0.4670 (0.2910) -0.5975 (0.3942) -0.5786 (0.4667) 686 242 290 154
Month 60 -0.0205 0.2566 (0.2135) -0.6038b (0.2813) -0.0731 (0.3184) 381 120 163 98
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number o f Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0138 0.0427® (0.0159) -0.0477b (0.0221) -0.0451' (0.0272) 389 149 162 78
Month 3 0.0360b 0.0896® (0.0272) -0.0943b (0.0376) -0.0713 (0.0463) 389 149 162 78
Month 12 0.2514' 0.4238' (0.2179) -0.4127 (0.3019) -0.0023 (0.3717) 389 149 162 78
Month 36 0.2448 0.6823 (0.4847) -0.6444 (0.6715) -0.8436 (0.8268) 389 149 162 78
Month 60 0.1531 0.4713b (0.2162) -0.4704' (0.2844) -0.4622 (0.3286) 119 38 52 29
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance of IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number o f Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0021 0.0209' (0.0126) -0.0427® (0.0166) -0.0179 (0.0188) 297 93 128 76
Month 3 0.0011 0.0281 (0.0179) -0.0537b (0.0235) -0.0151 (0.0266) 297 93 128 76
Month 12 0.0403 0.1308b (0.0622) -0.1449' (0.0818) -0.1064 (0.0928) 297 93 128 76
Month 36 -0.1254' 0.1220 (0.1299) -0.4658“ (0.1707) -0.1825 (0.1937) 297 93 128 76
Month 60 -0.0994 0.1571 (0.2950) -0.6674' (0.3889) 0.0996 (0.4363) 262 82 111 69
*’ 'denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 39: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Public Float - constant sample size (686 IPOs)
R ,  = a  +  / ? i D i i  +  /? 2 D 2 i+ /?3E>3i +  e i
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1 ,3 , 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R, is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, D2j, and D3j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified category of 
public float and 0 otherwise. Public Float is defined as the percentage of equity offered to the public at the IPO date. Observations on the public float are divided into four 
categories: Firms with less than 20% of public float, with at least 20% but less than 30% of public float, with at least 30% but less than 50% of public float, and at least 50% 
of public float; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0069 0.0402s (0.0116) -0.0272 (0.0174) -0.0557s (0.0167) -0.0615s (0.0187) 686 206 164 189 127
Month 3 0.0290b 0.0621s (0.0192) -0.0415 (0.0288) -0.0567b (0.0277) -0.0848s (0.0310) 686 206 164 189 127
Month 12 0.1600b 0.2106 (0.1424) 0.0741 (0.2139) -0.0368 (0.2059) -0.3121 (0.2306) 686 206 164 189 127
Month 36 0.0845 0.2513 (0.3158) -0.2374 (0.4744) 0.0321 (0.4566) -0.6423 (0.5114) 686 206 164 189 127
Month 60 -0.0205 0.2162 (0.2095) -0.2859 (0.3195) -0.3244 (0.3215) -0.4907 (0.3556) 381 126 95 93 67
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0138 0.0535s (0.0183) -0.0256 (0.0265) -0.0631D (0.0264) -0.0869s (0.0292) 389 111 102 104 72
Month 3 0.0360b 0.0945s (0.0315) -0.0499 (0.0455) -0.0765c (0.0453) -0.1347s (0.0502) 389 111 102 104 72
Month 12 0.2514c 0.2682 (0.2530) 0.1593 (0.3656) 0.0247 (0.3637) -0.3520 (0.4033) 389 111 102 104 72
Month 36 0.2448 0.3654 (0.5624) -0.2107 (0.8127) 0.2581 (0.8086) -0.7261 (0.8965) 389 111 102 104 72
Month 60 0.1531 0.0872 (0.2165) 0.1776 (0.3042) -0.1006 (0.3605) 0.1641 (0.3852) 119 39 40 22 18
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance of IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0021 0.0246b (0.0125) -0.0361° (0.0199) -0.0475s (0.0182) -0.0301 (0.0206) 297 95 62 85 55
Month 3 0.0011 0.0243 (0.0178) -0.0430 (0.0283) -0.0342 (0.0259) -0.0240 (0.0294) 297 95 62 85 55
Month 12 0.0403 0.1432b (0.0613) -0.0935 (0.0975) -0.1152 (0.0892) -0.2680s (0.1012) 297 95 62 85 55
Month 36 -0.1254° 0.1180 (0.1289) -0.3357 (0.2051) -0.2506 (0.1876) -0.5486s (0.2129) 297 95 62 85 55
Month 60 -0.0994 0.2740 (0.2878) -0.5870 (0.4624) -0.4115 (0.4293) -0.7416 (0.4795) 262 87 55 71 49
“■° denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 40: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Sector - 
constant sample size (686 IPOs)
R i =  a  +  pD\ + £j
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for 
different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets and Cold Markets). Rj is the broad- 
market-adjusted return. Dj is a (0 ,1) dummy variable taking the value of 0  if the firm belongs to a market 
sector defined as New Economy and 1 otherwise. New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 
and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively. Old economy 
firms belong to all other sectors; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: A11 Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 0.0069 0.0391“ (0.0132) -0.0418“ (0.0151) 6 8 6 159 527
Month 3 0.0290b 0.0903“ (0.0217) -0.09048 (0.0248) 6 8 6 159 527
Month 12 0.1600b 0.4728“ (0.1616) -0.407b (0.1844) 6 8 6 159 527
Month 36 0.0845 1.30808 (0.3555) -1.5930“ (0.4056) 6 8 6 159 527
Month 60 -0.0205 0.79828 (0.2733) - 1 .0 1 1 0 “ (0.3034) 381 72 309
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 0.0138 0.0529“ (0.0188) -0.0538b (0 .0 2 2 1 ) 389 106 283
Month 3 0.0360b 0.1093“ (0.0321) -0.1007“ (0.0377) 389 106 283
Month 12 0.2514c 0.5382b (0.2582) -0.3941 (0.3027) 389 106 283
Month 36 0.2448 1.8065“ (0.5673) -2.1470“ (0.6651) 389 106 283
Month 60 0.1531 0.5148c (0.2663) -0.4581 (0.2997) 119 25 94
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 -0 . 0 0 2 1 0.0114 (0.0168) -0.0164 (0.0186) 297 53 244
Month 3 0 . 0 0 1 1 0.0524 (0.0236) -0.0625 (0.0261) 297 53 244
Month 12 0.0403 0.3420“ (0.0805) -0.3663 (0.0888) 297 53 244
Month 36 -0.1254c 0.3109° (0.1718) -0.5310“ (0.1895) 297 53 244
Month 60 -0.0994 0.9490b (0.3857) -1.2780“ (0.4257) 262 47 215
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 41: OLS Regression Results for Aftermarket Performance - constant sample size (686 IPOs)
Rt = a + PiIRt + p2Log (1+ageO + p3Marketj + p4Log(Sizej) + p5PublicFloatj + p6Dj + et 
Rt is the raw return (not reported separately), measured from the first closing price. IR» is the initial return, defined as the difference between the first closing price and the 
offering price. Log (1+agej) is the natural logarithm of one plus the difference between the year of going public and the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Market* is the return on the value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index for the same return interval as the dependent variable. 
Log (Size*) is the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted size/market capitalization, defined as the total number of shares issued times the first closing price. PublicFloat* is the 
Percentage of Equity offered to the public. D* is a (0,1) Dummy variable taking on the value of 0 if the issuing firm belongs to a New Economy sector, and 1 otherwise. 
Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: All Market Conditions
Aftermarket a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.162b (0.0838) 0.680“ (0.1490) 0.109“ (0.0271) -0.005 (0.0145) -0.017° (0 .0 1 0 2 ) -0.086“ (0.0283) 0.029° (0.0154) 0.086 6 8 6
Month 3 0.156 (0.0139) 1.019“ (0.1325) 0.105b (0.0452) -0.025 (0.0242) -0.013 (0.0169) -0.099b (0.0472) 0.071“ (0.0259) 0 . 1 2 1 6 8 6
Month 12 0.063 (1.0465) 1.570“ (0.4152) 0.184 (0.3384) -0.183 (0.1816) 0.040 (0.1267) -0.524 (0.3545) 0.312 (0.1932) 0.034 6 8 6
Month 36 0.438 (2.3137) 0.480 (0.7465) -0.196 (0.4008) 1.282“ (0.3892) -0.047 (0.2790) -0.862 (0.7806) 1.439“ (0.4259) 0.044 6 8 6
Month 60 0.045 (1.5609) 1.466“ (0.5574) 0.149 (0.2641) 0.950“ (0.1737) -0.039 (0.1899) -0.806 (0.5330) 0.934“ (0.3092) 0.116 381
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: Hot Markets
Aftermarket a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.232° (0.1359) 0.658“ (0.2254) 0.065° (0.0381) -0 . 0 1 0 (0.0235) -0.023 (0.0161) -0 .1 1 0 “ (0.0440) 0.038° (0.0229) 0.069 389
Month 3 0.315 (0.2348) 1.119“ (0.2411) 0.073 (0.0660) -0.050 (0.0403) -0.026 (0.0277) -0.157“ (0.0760) 0.072° (0.0394) 0.090 389
Month 12 0.052 (1.9095) 1.474b (0.6549) 0.083 (0.5326) -0.342 (0.3283) 0.084 (0.2243) -0.695 (0.6165) 0.297 (0.3184) 0.024 389
Month 36 1.017 (4.2188) 0.095 (1.1723) -0.636 (0.7309) 1.079 (0.6607) -0.036 (0.4931) -0.828 (1.3604) 1.955“ (0.7043) 0.040 389
Month 60 2.556 (1.7854) 0.557 (0.4746) -0.228 (0.2906) 0.497 (0.3643) -0.275 (0.2035) 0.102 (0.5341) 0.286 (0.3167) 0.073 119
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: Cold Markets
Aftermarket a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.044 (0.0883) 0.714“ (0.1757) 0.219“ (0.0379) -0 . 0 0 2 (0.0154) -0.005 (0.0110) -0.048 (0.0306) 0.009 (0.0181) 0.155 297
Month 3 -0.093 (0.1306) 0.767“ (0.1367) 0.180“ (0.0555) 0.003 (0.0227) 0.009 (0.0163) -0.022 (0.0450) 0.067“ (0.0271) 0.169 297
Month 12 0.328 (0.4430) 1.527 (0.2669) 0.304 (0.1897) 0.034 (0.0771) -0.044 (0.0555) -0.327 (0.1540) 0.309 (0.0931) 0.185 297
Month 36 0.514 (0.9272) 1.049“ (0.3974) -0.300° (0.1613) 1.423“ (0.1700) -0.148 (0.1158) -0.794b (0.3214) 0.474b (0.1899) 0.263 297
Month 60 -0.630 (2.1128) 2.437“ (0.9183) 0.272 (0.3631) 0.983“ (0.2388) 0.024 (0.2650) -1.296° (0.7414) 1.279“ (0.4302) 0.134 262
a’b’c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 42: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Initial Return - constant sample size (381 IPOs)
R i  = a  +  / ? | D i i + / ? 2 D 2 i + /?3D 3i +  e i
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R* is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, D2i, and D3j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified initial return 
category and 0 otherwise. The initial return is the percentage difference from the final offering price to the first-day closing price and divided into four categories: IPOs with 
initial returns of not more than 0%, IPOs with more than 0% but less than 7% initial returns, IPOs with at least 7% but less than 20% initial returns and IPOs with more than 
20% initial returns; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses._____________________________________________________________________________________________
Aftermarket Ri
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions 
a  S.E. Pi S.E. P i S.E. P i S.E. Total
Number of Issues 
D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0026 -0.0252b (0.0118) 0.0047 (0.0156) 0.0471* (0.0166) 0.0873“ (0.0187) 381 95 127 97 62
Month 3 0.0154° -0.0303° (0.0170) 0.0110 (0.0224) 0.0806* (0.0239) 0.1319“ (0.0270) 381 95 127 97 62
Month 12 0.0606b 0.0408 (0.0550) -0.0825 (0.0727) 0.0520 (0.0774) 0.2089b (0.0875) 381 95 127 97 62
Month 36 -0.0918 -0.0574 (0.1171) -0.1165 (0.1548) -0.1320 (0.1648) 0.2814 (0.1864) 381 95 127 97 62
Month 60 -0.0205 -0.1792 (0.2375) -0.0035 (0.3140) -0.1228 (0.3341) 1.1742* (0.3779) 381 95 127 97 62
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P\ S.E. P i S.E. Pi S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0156 -0.0117 (0.0237) -0.0063 (0.0328) 0.0297 (0.0293) 0.06216 (0.0300) 119 21 23 40 35
Month 3 0.0448* -0.0021 (0.0396) 0.0069 (0.0548) 0.0444 (0.0489) 0.1042b (0.0501) 119 21 23 40 35
Month 12 0.1044* 0.0410 (0.0877) 0.0918 (0.1214) 0.0513 (0.1083) 0.0966 (0.1110) 119 21 23 40 35
Month 36 -0.0707 0.0171 (0.1487) 0.0683 (0.2057) -0.2038 (0.1836) -0.1105 (0.1881) 119 21 23 40 35
Month 60 0.1531 0.1761 (0.2912) 0.0266 (0.4028) -0.3238 (0.3597) 0.2747 (0.3684) 119 21 23 40 35
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance of IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. P\ S.E. P i S.E. Pi S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0033 -0.0291b (0.0137) 0.0079 (0.0179) 0.0536* (0.0208) 0.1063* (0.0265) 262 74 104 57 27
Month 3 0.0020 -0.0383b (0.0184) 0.0137 (0.0241) 0.0942* (0.0279) 0.1393* (0.0356) 262 74 104 57 27
Month 12 0.0407 0.0408 (0.0678) -0.1210 (0.0888) 0.0525 (0.1028) 0.3544* (0.1312) 262 74 104 57 27
Month 36 -0.1014 -0.0785 (0.1497) -0.1527 (0.1958) -0.1127 (0.2269) 0.7140b (0.2895) 262 74 104 57 27
Month 60 -0.0994 -0.2800 (0.3055) 0.0121 (0.3997) -0.1302 (0.4632) 1.9807* (0.5909) 262 74 104 57 27
** ’° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
178
Appendix B: Alternative Performance Tests 
Table 43: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Age - constant sample size (381 IPOs)
R, = a + + /?2D2i+ Ej
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R< is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du and D2i are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified age category and 0 
otherwise. Age is defined as the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 assumed to be founded in 1901. Observations of company 
age are divided into three categories: IPOs with age between 0-14 years (young firms), 15-36 years (medium-young firms) and IPOs older than 37 years (old firms); Standard 
Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. fix S.E. P i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 0.0026 0.0071° (0.0106) 0.00906 (0.0156) -0.0180 (0.0144) 381 124 107 150
Month 3 0.0154° 0.0171 (0.0154) 0.0174 (0.2270) -0.0168 (0.0208) 381 124 107 150
Month 12 0.0606b 0.0616 (0.0486) 0.0777 (0.0715) -0.0580 (0.0657) 381 124 107 150
Month 36 -0.0918 -0 . 2 0 1 2 (0.1024) 0.3494 (0.1504) 0.0483 (0.1384) 381 124 107 150
Month 60 -0.0205 0.0404 (0 .2 1 1 0 ) 0.1410 (0.3100) -0.2554 (0.2852) 381 124 107 150
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. Pi S.E. P i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 0.0156 0.0355° (0.0190) -0.0225 (0.0265) -0.0325 (0.0247) 119 34 36 49
Month 3 0.0448* 0.0849* (0.0314) -0.0781° (0.0437) -0.0399 (0.0408) 119 34 36 49
Month 12 0.1044* 0.1795“ (0.0684) -0.1294 (0.0953) -0.0875 (0.0890) 119 34 36 49
Month 36 -0.0707 -0.0025 (0.1175) -0.0882 (0.1638) -0.1008 (0.1529) 119 34 36 49
Month 60 0.1531 0.2806 (0.2312) -0.1643 (0.3224) -0.1889 (0.3009) 119 34 36 49
Aftermarket Ri
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance of IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
a S.E. fix S.E. P i S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2
Month 1 -0.0033 -0.0037 (0.0128) 0.0213 (0.0193) -0.0140 (0.0177) 262 90 71 191
Month 3 0 . 0 0 2 0 -0.0090 (0.0172) 0.0571b (0.0259) -0.0130 (0.0236) 262 90 71 191
Month 12 0.0407 0.0171 (0.0624) 0.1674° (0.0940) -0.0564 (0.0858) 262 90 71 191
Month 36 -0.1014 -0.2762b (0.1361) 0.5456* (0.2049) 0.0994 (0.1871) 262 90 71 191
Month 60 -0.0994 -0.0503 (0.2830) 0.2647 (0.4261) -0.3134 (0.3891) 262 90 71 10 1
*•° denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 44: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size - constant sample size (381 IPOs)
Ri = a + /?iDij +/?2D2i+ £j
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R* is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, and D2i, are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified size category and 0 
otherwise. Size/Market Capitalization in €m is the number of shares issued times the final offer price and is expressed in constant end-1998 prices. Observations for size are 
divided into three categories: Firms with a first day market capitalization less than €100m (small firms), between €100 and €500m (medium firms) and exceeding €500m 
(large firms); Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses._________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0026 0.0224b (0.0108) -0.0357b (0.0142) -0.0179 (0.0161) 381 1 2 0 163 98
Month 3 0.0154® 0.0319 (0.0156) -0.0376b (0.0206) -0 .0 0 2 1 b (0.0233) 381 1 2 0 163 98
Month 12 0.0606b 0.1252b (0.0495) -0.0983 (0.0653) -0.0876 (0.0739) 381 1 2 0 163 98
Month 36 -0.0918 0.1247 (0.1037) -0.4022a (0.1366) -0.1424 (0.1546) 381 1 2 0 163 98
Month 60 -0.0205 0.2566 (0.2135) -0.6038b (0.2813) -0.0731 (0.3184) 381 1 2 0 163 98
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0156 0.0331® (0.0179) -0.0305 (0.0236) -0.0181 (0.0273) 119 38 52 29
Month 3 0.04488 0.0748b (0.0298) -0.0531 (0.0393) -0.0279 (0.0454) 119 38 52 29
Month 12 0.10448 0.1783 (0.0646) -0.0888 (0.0849) -0.1440 (0.0981) 119 38 52 29
Month 36 -0.0707 0.0383 (0.1104) -0.2054 (0.1452) -0.0787 (0.1678) 119 38 52 29
Month 60 0.1531 0.4713b (0.2162) -0.4704® (0.2844) -0.4622 (0.3286) 119 38 52 29
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. P i S.E. D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0033 0.0174 (0.0134) -0.038l b (0.0177) -0.0173 (0.0198) 262 82 11 1 69
Month 3 0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 1 2 1 (0.0182) -0.0305 (0.0240) 0.0106 (0.0269) 262 82 1 1 1 69
Month 12 0.0407 0.1006 (0.0660) -0.1030 (0.0870) -0.0616 (0.0976) 262 82 1 1 1 69
Month 36 -0.1014 0.1647 (0.1427) -0.4939a (0.1882) -0.1728 (0 .2 1 1 1 ) 262 82 1 1 1 69
Month 60 -0.0994 0.1571 (0.2950) -0.6674® (0.3889) 0.0996 (0.4363) 262 82 1 1 1 69
* ® denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 45: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Public Float - constant sample size (381 IPOs)
Ri = a + + &D2i + $E>3i + gj
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets 
and Cold Markets). R, is the broad-market-adjusted return. Du, D2j, and D3j are (0,1) dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the IPO falls into the specified category of 
public float and 0 otherwise. Public Float is defined as the percentage of equity offered to the public at the IPO date. Observations on the public float are divided into four
categories: Firms with less than 20% of public float, with at least 20% but less than 30% of public float, with at least 30% but less than 50% of public float, and at least 50%
of public float; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0026 0.0291“ (0.0105) -0.0366b (0.0160) -0.0452“ (0.0161) -0.0370b (0.0178) 381 126 95 93 67
Month 3 0.0154° 0.0325b (0.0153) -0.0235 (0.0234) -0.0286 (0.0235) -0.0244 (0.0260) 381 126 95 93 67
Month 12 0.0606b 0.1267“ (0.0482) -0.0280 (0.0735) -0.1220° (0.0740) -0.1667b (0.0818) 381 126 95 93 67
Month 36 -0.0918 0.0500 (0.1021) -0.1596 (0.1557) -0.1597 (0.1566) -0.3142° (0.1732) 381 126 95 93 67
.Month 60 -0.0205 0.2162 (0.2095) -0.2859 (0.3195) -0.3244 (0.3215) -0.4907 (0.3556) 381 126 95 93 67
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 0.0156 0.0472“ (0.0175) -0.0476° (0.0246) -0.0402 (0.0292) -0.0579° (0.0312) 119 39 40 22 18
Month 3 0.0448“ 0.0705b (0.0296) -0.0213 (0.0415) -0.0669 (0.0492) -0.0410 (0.0526) 119 39 40 22 18
Month 12 0.1044“ 0.0740 (0.0638) 0.0882 (0.0896) -0.0756 (0.1062) 0.0972 (0.1135) 119 39 40 22 18
Month 36 -0.0707 -0.1856' (0.1082) 0.1584 (0.1521) 0.0180 (0.1802) 0.3859b (0.1926) 119 39 40 22 18
Month 60 0.1531 0.0872 (0.2165) 0.1776 (0.3042) -0.1006 (0.3605) 0.1641 (0.3852) 119 39 40 22 18
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance o f IPOs Categorized by Initial Return: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. A S.E. Total D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3
Month 1 -0.0033 0.0210 (0.0130) -0.0343 (0.0209) -0.0442b (0.0194) -0.0271 (0.0217) 262 87 55 71 49
Month 3 0.0020 0.0154 (0.0177) -0.0357 (0.0285) -0.0115 (0.0264) -0.0152 (0.0295) 262 87 55 71 49
Month 12 0.0407 0.1503b (0.0635) -0.0978 (0.1021) -0.1437 (0.0948) -0.2679b (0.1058) 262 87 55 71 49
Month 36 -0.1014 0.1557 (0.1389) -0.3252 (0.2232) -0.2473 (0.2072) -0.5904“ (0.2314) 262 87 55 71 49
Month 60 -0.0994 0.2740 (0.2878) -0.5870 (0.4624) -0.4115 (0.4293) -0.7416 (0.4795) 262 87 55 71 49
“’ c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test
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Table 46: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Sector - 
constant sample size (381 IPOs)
R , =  a  +  pD\ + £j
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1,3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for 
different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets and Cold Markets). Ri is the broad- 
market-adjusted return. D; is a (0 ,1) dummy variable taking the value of 0  if the firm belongs to a market 
sector defined as New Economy and 1 otherwise. New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5,13, 16 
and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively. Old economy 
firms belong to all other sectors; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.____________________________
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: All Market Conditions
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. fi S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 0.0026 0 . 0 2 2 0 (0.0140) -0.0243 (0.0155) 381 72 309
Month 3 0.0154c 0.0545* (0 .0 2 0 2 ) -0.048 lb (0.0224) 381 72 309
Month 12 0.0606b 0.2460* (0.0632) -0.2294* (0.0702) 381 72 309
Month 36 -0.0918 0.2770b (0.1337) -0.445“ (0.1485) 381 72 309
Month 60 -0.0205 0.7982* (0.2733) - 1 .0 1 1 0 “ (0.3034) 381 72 309
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Hot Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. f i S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 0.0156 0.0536* (0.0218) -0.0485b (0.0246) 119 25 94
Month 3 0.0448* 0.0842b (0.0367) -0.0498 (0.0413) 119 25 94
Month 12 0.1044* 0.1239 (0.0800) -0.0247 (0.0900) 119 25 94
Month 36 -0.0707 0.1063 (0.1355) -0.2240 (0.1524) 119 25 94
Month 60 0.1531 0.5148c (0.2663) -0.4581 (0.2997) 119 25 94
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Cold Markets
Number of Issues
Aftermarket Ri a S.E. f t S.E. Total D=0 D=1
Month 1 -0.0033 0.0053 (0.0178) -0.0105 (0.0197) 262 47 215
Month 3 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0387 (0.0240) -0.0447° (0.0264) 262 47 215
Month 12 0.0407 0.3109* (0.0852) -0.3293“ (0.0941) 262 47 215
Month 36 -0.1014 0.3672° (0.1882) -0.5572* (0.2077) 262 47 215
Month 60 -0.0994 0.9490b (0.3857) -1.2780“ (0.4257) 262 47 215
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 47: OLS Regression Results for Aftermarket Performance - constant sample size (381 IPOs)
Rt = a + PJRt + p2Log (1+age*) + p3Marketi + p4Log(Sizej) + p5PublicFloatj + p6D* + 6t 
Rt is the raw return (not reported separately), measured from the first closing price. IRt is the initial return, defined as the difference between the first closing price and the 
offering price. Log (1+agej) is the natural logarithm of one plus the difference between the year of going public and the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Market* is the return on the value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index for the same return interval as the dependent variable. 
Log (Size;) is the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted size/market capitalization, defined as the total number of shares issued times the first closing price. PublicFloatj is the 
Percentage of Equity offered to the public. D* is a (0,1) Dummy variable taking on the value of 0 if the issuing firm belongs to a New Economy sector, and 1 otherwise. 
Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Aftermarket a S.E. fix
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: All Market Conditions 
S.E. P i S.E. A S.E. Pa S.E. A S.E. A S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.089 (0.0777) 0.634s (0.1554) 0.114s (0.0279) 0.003 (0.0132) -0.010 (0.0094) -0.056b (0.0264) 0.017 (0.0154) 0 . 1 0 0 381
Month 3 -0.049 (0.1155) 0.893s (0.1293) 0.116s (0.0411) 0 . 0 1 1 (0.0198) 0.006 (0.0140) -0.042 (0.0392) 0.046b (0.0230) 0.156 381
Month 12 0.214 (0.3623) 1.264 (0.1875) 0 . 2 0 0 (0.1300) 0.016 (0.0615) -0.023 (0.0440) -0.213 (0.1234) 0.204 (0.0722) 0.144 381
Month 36 0.253 (0.7587) 1.342 (0.1329) 0.623 (0.2712) 0.166 (0.1283) -0.088 (0.0920) -0.453 (0.2588) 0.404 (0.1502) 0.239 381
Month 60 0.045 (1.5609) 1.466s (0.5574) 0.149 (0.2641) 0.950s (0.1737) -0.039 (0.1899) -0.806 (0.5330) 0.934s (0.3092) 0.116 381
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: Hot Markets
Aftermarket a S.E. fix S.E. P i S.E. A S.E. P a S.E. A S.E. A S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.151 (0.1438) 0 . 2 0 0 (0.2871) -0 . 0 1 0 (0.0392) -0 . 0 0 1 (0.0234) -0.013 (0.0163) -0.075 (0.0431) 0.039 (0.0254) 0.066 119
Month 3 0.238 (0.2514) 0.823b (0.3664) 0.040 (0.0676) -0 . 0 1 0 (0.0414) -0.020 (0.0285) -0.075 (0.0752) 0.030 (0.0448) 0.067 119
Month 12 0.980 (0.5415) 0.917s (0.2132) 0.048 (0.1444) -0.097 (0.0892) -0.094 (0.0617) 0.038 (0.1620) -0.033 (0.0964) 0.162 119
Month 36 0.411 (0.9100) 1.066s (0.3618) -0.161 (0.2419) -0 . 2 0 2 (0.1476) -0.050 (0.1036) 0.475° (0.2723) 0.213 (0.1614) 0.130 119
Month 60 2.556 (1.7854) 0.557 (0.4746) -0.228 (0.2906) 0.497 (0.3643) -0.275 (0.2035) 0.102 (0.5341) 0.286 (0.3167) 0.073 119
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Size: Cold Markets
Aftermarket a S.E. fix S.E. P i S.E. A S.E. P a S.E. Ps S.E. fie S.E. R2 N
Month 1 0.040 (0.0937) 0.752s (0.1876) 0 .2 1 0 s (0.0408) 0 . 0 0 2 (0.0162) -0.006 (0.0117) -0.047 (0.0327) 0.006 (0.0191) 0.145 262
Month 3 -0.166 (0.1324) 0.793s (0.1437) 0.153s (0.0569) 0.013 (0.0228) 0.017 (0.0165) -0.021 (0.0459) 0.053 (0.0274) 0.167 262
Month 12 0.123 (0.4669) 1.553s (0.2934) 0.294 (0 .2 0 2 1 ) 0.067 (0.0803) -0.023 (0.0583) -0.361b (0.1638) 0.289s (0.0984) 0.175 262
Month 36 0.524 (1.0024) 1.444s (0.1871) 1.214s (0.4365) 0.338° (0.1722) -0.151 (0.1253) -0.942s (0.3513) 0.552s (0.2042) 0.266 262
Month 60 -0.630 (2.1128) 2.437s (0.9183) 0.272 (0.3631) 0.983s (0.2388) 0.024 (0.2650) -1.296' (0.7414) 1.279s (0.4302) 0.134 262
“*,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 48: Listing Requirements on European M arket Segments
These minimum listing requirements were in effect during 2001 and are also broadly applicable to the study period between 1988 and 1998. The number in parenthesis 
corresponds to the number of IPOs in the sample. This study does not include issues on the Italian Nuovo Mercato, Spanish Nuevo Mercado and SWX Swiss New Market. 
The Swedish New Market section includes IPOs going public on Aktietorget Norden AB and SBI AB.
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Germany (Stock exchange operator: Deutsche Borse AG)
Amtlicher Handel (Official Market) (80) Geregelter Markt (Official Parallel Market (89) Neuer Markt (New Market) (50)
Company should have existed for at least three years; a min. of 
25% of nominal equity must be offered to the market; turnover 
between €50-100m with min. nominal stockholder equity of 
€ 1.25m; at least 50,000 shares must be offered with gross 
proceeds exceeding €25m; no stringent requirement 
concerning the use of funds; issuance of different share classes 
possible; no retention obligation for existing shareholders; 
operates under public law; in addition to the annual financial 
statements, a minimum of one interim report covering the first 
six months of the financial year is required; required to 
comply with ad-hoc publicity rules.
No set requirements for size of free float and for the 
company’s minimum age; min. amount of shares issued: 
10,000; companies going public usually have gross proceeds 
smaller than €25m and turnover smaller than €50-100m; the 
nominal stockholder equity must be at least €250,000; no 
stringent requirement concerning the use of funds; issuance of 
different share types possible; no set retention obligation for 
existing shareholders; operates under public law; in addition to 
the annual financial statements, a minimum of one interim 
report covering the first six months of the financial year is 
required; required to comply with ad-hoc publicity rules.
Company should have existed for at least one year (recently 
changed to three years); min. expected market capitalization: 
€5m; nominal stockholder equity: min. €250,000; number of 
shares for free float: min. 100,000; at least 25% of the shares 
widely held; at least 50% of the issue volume to be placed 
should originate from a capital increase; existing shareholders 
and issuer shall retain shares for the first six months following 
the IPO; established in 1997 to attract young, high growth 
companies; operates under private law; three quarterly reports 
per business year and one annual report are required; required 
to comply with ad-hoc publicity rules.
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: France (Stock exchange operator: SBF-Paris Bourse SA)
Premier Marche (Official Market) (21) Second Marche (Official Parallel Market) (231) Nouveau Marche (New Market) (71)
Company must provide three years of certified consolidated 
statements; min. gross proceeds of €250m; at least 25% of the 
company must be publicly placed representing a min. of 
600,000 shares; company must provide quarterly updates and 
half-year results and one annual report; listing applicable to 
large, established French and Foreign companies.
Company must provide certified consolidated accounts for the 
last two years prior to listing; min. size of the floatation 
between €10-20m; min. percentage of equity offered: 10%; 
company must provide quarterly updates and half-year results 
and one annual report; applicable to medium-sized companies 
(or large companies seeking an eventual listing on the Premier 
Marche); established in 1983.
No min. operating history; min. nominal equity: 
€250,000; min. no. of shares offered: 100,000 representing a 
float of at least €1.5m; for companies in existence of less than 
two years, offering must constitute a capital increase; 
management/personnel must keep 80% of shares for three 
years after the IPO; same reporting requirements as for other 
market segments; established in 1996.
Minimum Listing Requirments on Alternative Market Segments: Italy (Stock exchange operator: Borsa Italiana SpA)
Borsa Valori (Official Market) (70) Mercato Ristretto (Official Parallel Market) (7) Nuovo Mercato (New Market) (0)
Company must provide three years of consolidated annual 
accounts; foreseeable market capitalization: at least €5m; may 
admit companies with lower market capitalization if deemed 
as adequate; min. public float: 25% of shares outstanding 
represented by shares of the same class.
Issuer must carry on, directly or through its subsidiaries, an 
activity capable of generating revenues; a foreseeable market 
capitalisation of at least €500,000; adequate distribution 
presumed to exist where shares representing at least 20 % of 
the capital represented by shares of the same class are 
distributed among the public.
Annual accounts published and filed for the last financial 
years; min. floatation: 20% of capital; min. nominal 
shareholder equity: €5m representing at least 100,000 shares; 
constant information and three quarterly financial reports; 
initial shareholders must keep 80% of their shares after 
quotation for one year; established in 1999.
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Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Netherlands (Stock exchange operator: Amsterdam Exchanges NV)
Officiele Markt (Official Market) (56) Officiele Parallel Markt (Official Parallel Market) (8) Nieuwe Markt (New Market) (11)
Business run by the issuer must have a track record of at least 
three years; at the time of first admission at least three out of 
five issuer’s book years preceding such admission must have 
closed with a net profit; issuer capital must amount to at least 
€5m; a min. of 10% of the capital placed must be available for 
trading; lock-up period: 180 days after the IPO.
Applicable to Dutch IPOs from 1988-1993; min. nominal value 
of shareholder equity: NGL4m; min. gross proceeds for an 
IPO: NGL2.5m; since 1994 the Official Parallel Market is 
closed for IPOs.
New economy stocks must have a track record of at least one 
year (other companies: three years); after admission to listing, 
at least 100,000 shares must be placed; tradable market value at 
least €5m; all listed companies are also required to satisfy the 
requirements that apply to the Official Market; quarterly 
figures and annual certified accounts; established in 1997.
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Spain (Stock exchange operator: Bolsa de Madrid SA)
Primer Mercado (Official Market) (56) Segundo Mercado (Official Parallel Market) (32) Nuevo Mercado (New Market) (0)
Provide audited financial statements for the three years prior to 
IPO; min. nominal shareholder equity: €1.5m, excluding 
stakes of 25% or more belonging to two shareholders; at least 
100 shareholders must own less than 25% of the capital; (in the 
last two years before IPO or in three of the last five years) must 
have distributed a dividend of 6% of its capital.
Official prospectus has to be filed with the Spanish supervisory 
authority (CNMV); min. capital reserves of €250,000; in 
addition, 20% of the capital should be available for trading in 
the market; a security issue prospectus must be presented and 
other administrative and legal certificates provided.
Approved 1999, operational since 2000, to create a “special 
trading section for innovative, high technology companies 
offering considerable future growth prospects, although at 
higher levels of risk than the traditional sectors”; part of the 
continuous market, but subject to more information regulations 
than other market segments.
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Sweden (Stock exchange operator: OM Stockholm Exchanges AB)
A-list (Official Market) (15) OTC-list (Official Parallel Market) (52) O-list (New Market) (81)
Must have at least three years of verifiable history and possess 
documented profit earning capacity; have at least 2,000 
shareholders; possess an ownership structure under which at 
least 25% of the equities in the company and 10% of the votes 
are owned by the general public; min. market value: SEK 
300m; approval must be obtained from the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority; dual class shares common.
Must have at least three years of verifiable history and possess 
documented profit earning capacity; have at least 500 
shareholders; possess an ownership structure under which at 
least 25% of the equity in the company and 10% of the votes 
are owned by the general public; have a market value of at least 
SEK50m; approval must be obtained from the Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority.
No history and profit-earning capability requirement; required: 
at least 300 shareholders and an ownership structure under 
which at least 10% of the equity in the company and 10% of 
the votes are owned by the general public; approval granted by 
the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority; dual class shares 
common (low voting B shares and high voting A shares).
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Switzerland (Stock exchange operator: SWX Swiss Exchange AG)
SWX Hauptsegment (Official Market) (35) SWXNebensegment (Official Parallel Market) (8) SWX New Market (New Market) (0)
Issuer must present audited accounts covering three complete 
financial years; issuer must have a min. nominal equity of 
CHF25m; at least 25% of shares must be floated publicly; 
sustained or expected capitalisation of at least CHF25m; no set 
rules on lock-up periods for insiders; price sensitive facts and 
relevant company events must be disclosed; reports must be 
provided annually with semi-annual updates.
Applicable to Swiss IPOs issued during 1988; min. nominal 
value of shareholder equity: CHFlm; min. gross proceeds: 
CHF2.5m; applicable to small- and medium-sized companies.
Shareholders’ equity must amount to at least CHF2.5m; min. 
20% of the equity capital must be in diversified hands; total 
market cap: min. CHF8m; company must demonstrate an 
operating and financial track record extending over at least 12 
months before the IPO; account must be in IAS or US GAAP; 
lock-up period: six months following the IPO; the IPO must 
involve a capital increase of at least 50%.
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Table 49: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by IPO year - 
Mean Difference Test
In each Panel, we measure whether die adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two-samples test for Mean Difference. BHRT is defined as the 
broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from die first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock 
market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. Significance 
values correspond to p-values.____________________________________________________________
Panel A: IPO year 1988 -1990
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.0425 0.4944 0.6169 0.8884 0.0061 0.1245 0.6326
France (FR) -0.1248 0.2765 0.7339 0.0223 0.2624 0.4162
Italy (IT) 0.0389 0.6340 0.0031 0.0581 0.9116
Netherlands (NL) -0.0675 0.0543 0.2862 0.6989
Spain (ES) -0.3572 0.3347 0.0558
Sweden (SD) -0.2617 0.2286
Switzerland (SW) 0.0757
Panel B: IPO year 1991 -1994
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.3938 0.0024 0.1662 0.8588 0.6938 0.7986 0.4319
France (FR) 0.1560 0.0477 0.1494 0.0966 0.0062 0.5462
Italy (IT) -0.6713 0.4772 0.1279 0.3837 0.2439
Netherlands (NL) -0.3547 0.9526 0.7929 0.7742
Spain (ES) -0.3357 0.6458 0.6197
Sweden (SD) -0.4288 0.5084
Switzerland (SW) -0.1784
Panel C: IPO year 1995 -1998
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 3.2408 0.0141 0.1345 0.3538 0.3662 0.2045 0.3665
France (FR) -0.4217 0.3568 0.2114 0.7338 0.1469 0.7202
Italy (IT) -0.8884 0.0128 0.0884 0.0136 0.0188
Netherlands (NL) 0.3397 0.4674 0.9147 0.4230
Spain (ES) -0.1819 0.4950 0.9889
Sweden (SD) 0.2734 0.4726
Switzerland (SW) -0.1746
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Table 50: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by IPO year -
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. BHRT is defined as the broad-market- 
adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock market, 
whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. Significance values 
correspond to p-values._________________________________________________________________
Panel A: IPO year 1988 - 1990
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.0425 0.8614 0.3618 0.6808 0.0054 0.1687 0.5074
France (FR) -0.1248 0.3999 0.9559 0.0335 0.2999 0.6915
Italy (IT) 0.0389 0.4904 0.0008 0.0320 0.2661
Netherlands (NL) -0.0675 0.2433 0.6440 0.9411
Spain (ES) -0.3572 0.3223 0.5470
Sweden (SD) -0.2617 0.9522
Switzerland 0.0757(SW)
Panel B: IPO year 1991 - 1994
Country BHRj Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.3938 0.0063 0.1982 0.6732 0.6466 0.5185 0.8656
France (FR) 0.1560 0.0223 0.0818 0.1079 0.0064 0.3114
Italy (IT) -0.6713 0.5962 0.1718 0.5301 0.3152
Netherlands (NL) -0.3547 0.6092 0.9235 0.8513
Spain (ES) -0.3357 0.5160 0.9588
Sweden (SD) -0.4288 0.6447
Switzerland (SW) -0.1784
Panel C: IPO year 1995 - 1998
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 3.2408 0.0003 0.0062 0.9317 0.6711 0.8530 0.5838
France (FR) -0.4217 0.7426 0.0057 0.1355 0.0024 0.0114
Italy (IT) -0.8884 0.0202 0.1342 0.0113 0.0091
Netherlands (NL) 0.3397 0.7609 0.6173 0.7610
Spain (ES) -0.1819 0.6390 0.3753
Sweden (SD) 0.2734 0.5734
Switzerland (SW) -0.1746
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Table 51: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Sector -
Mean Difference Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two-samples test for Mean Difference. BHRT is defined as the 
broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock 
market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. New Economy 
firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication 
and Healthcare, respectively, in the attached Dow Jones STOXX sector classification standard. 
Significance values correspond to p-values.__________________________________________________
Panel A: New Economy
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 6.2868 0.0291 0.5184 0.2847 0.6835 0.1499 0.3158
France (FR) 0.2404 0.5523 0.6555 0.9103 0.6504 0.7951
Italy (IT) -0.7864 0.2839 0.2173 0.3289 0.1925
Netherlands (NL) 0.6375 0.7172 0.9249 0.4016
Spain (ES) -0.0343 0.7584 0.9849
Sweden (SD) 0.5621 0.4712
Switzerland (SW) -0.0197
Panel B: Old Economy
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.0836 0.1234 0.1229 0.7405 0.3905 0.3223 0.9058
France (FR) -0.3998 0.4565 0.4182 0.6428 0.7698 0.4000
Italy (IT) -0.5415 0.1602 0.2080 0.2801 0.1208
Netherlands (NL) -0.2054 0.6326 0.5419 0.8564
Spain (ES) -0.3173 0.8585 0.5051
Sweden (SD) -0.3484 0.4389
Switzerland (SW) -0.1415
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Table 52: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Sector -
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. BHRT is defined as the broad-market- 
adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock market, 
whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. New Economy firms 
belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and 
Healthcare, respectively, in the attached Dow Jones STOXX sector classification standard. Significance 
values correspond to p-values.____________________________________________________________
Panel A: New Economy
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 6.2868 0.0295 0.0943 0.4987 1.0000 0.2422 0.4852
France (FR) 0.2404 0.6297 0.1920 0.5371 0.3365 0.2951
Italy (IT) -0.7864 0.2750 0.1333 0.3639 0.2121
Netherlands (NL) 0.6375 0.7485 0.7842 0.9826
Spain (ES) -0.0343 0.6815 0.6593
Sweden (SD) 0.5621 0.7108
Switzerland (SW) -0.0197
Panel B: Old Economy
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.0836 0.1435 0.0841 0.6816 0.5138 0.3395 0.9817
France (FR) -0.3998 0.6801 0.4718 0.5692 0.6099 0.3918
Italy (IT) -0.5415 0.2899 0.3036 0.3523 0.2398
Netherlands (NL) -0.2054 1.0000 0.8001 0.7589
Spain (ES) -0.3173 0.7580 0.9537
Sweden (SD) -0.3484 0.6776
Switzerland (SW) -0.1415
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Table 53: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Age -
Mean Difference Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two samples test for mean difference. BHRT is defined as the 
broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock 
market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. Age is the 
year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 assumed to be 
founded in 1901. Significance values correspond to p-values.____________________________________
Panel A: Age < 15
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 4.0658 0.0119 0.1957 0.3582 0.3991 0.0912 0.3723
France (FR) -0.1812 0.4537 0.3611 0.9888 0.8401 0.8706
Italy (IT) -0.6383 0.0640 0.1892 0.2024 0.1045
Netherlands (NL) 0.4529 0.4296 0.3370 0.4908
Spain (ES) -0.1695 0.8929 0.7965
Sweden (SD) -0.0913 0.9466
Switzerland (SW) -0.0558
Panel B: 15 < Age < 3 7
Country BHRj Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.2714 0.6335 0.1978 0.3744 0.9792 0.8988 0.2655
France (FR) -0.1255 0.2053 0.6976 0.6797 0.6378 0.7607
Italy (IT) -0.5748 0.1523 0.3245 0.4108 0.1084
Netherlands (NL) 0.0465 0.4781 0.4593 0.9989
Spain (ES) -0.2646 0.9071 0.4870
Sweden (SD) -0.3051 0.4282
Switzerland (SW) 0.0457
Panel C: Age > 37
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.3334 0.5620 0.7912 0.9685 0.5497 0.0649 0.8613
France (FR) -0.4195 0.9090 0.7373 0.9828 0.1280 0.7343
Italy (IT) -0.3846 0.8483 0.8878 0.3807 0.8199
Netherlands (NL) -0.3263 0.6904 0.3690 0.9315
Spain (ES) -0.4150 0.1690 0.6786
Sweden (SD) 0.1206 0.5466
Switzerland (SW) -0.2910
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Table 54: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Age -
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. BHRT is defined as the broad-market 
adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock market, 
whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. Age is the year of 
going public minus the year of foundation, with firm founded before 1901 assumed to be founded in 
1901. Significance values correspond to p-values._____________________________________________
Panel A: Age < 15
Country BHRj Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 4.0658 0.0077 0.0245 0.6949 0.7271 0.1253 0.7382
France (FR) -0.1812 0.7495 0.1310 0.3303 0.2879 0.1693
Italy (IT) -0.6383 0.1404 0.1368 0.1985 0.1693
Netherlands (NL) 0.4529 0.7739 0.4365 0.8902
Spain (ES) -0.1695 0.7159 1.0000
Sweden (SD) -0.0913 0.4525
Switzerland (SW) -0.0558
Panel B: 15 < Age < 37
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.2714 0.7893 0.0995 0.8650 0.3028 0.3403 0.2970
France (FR) -0.1255 0.2669 0.6421 0.9496 0.8142 0.3530
Italy (IT) -0.5748 0.2451 0.2633 0.4919 0.0659
Netherlands (NL) 0.0465 0.6053 0.5271 0.3224
Spain (ES) -0.2646 0.7066 0.0423
Sweden (SD) -0.3051 0.1880
Switzerland (SW) 0.0457
Panel C: Age >37
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.3334 0.5951 0.4600 0.4763 0.6672 0.8016 0.2305
France (FR) -0.4195 0.5551 0.9106 0.8540 0.4228 0.5334
Italy (IT) -0.3846 0.6160 0.3275 0.8204 0.4639
Netherlands (NL) -0.3263 0.6164 0.3690 0.4910
Spain (ES) -0.4150 0.5987 0.2325
Sweden (SD) 0.1206 0.2105
Switzerland (SW) -0.2910
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Table 55: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Size -
Mean Difference Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two samples test for mean difference. BHRT is defined as the 
broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from die first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock 
market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. Size is the 
number of shares issued times the final offer price and is expressed in constant end-1998 prices.
Significance values correspond to p-values.__________________________________________________
Panel A : Small Firms
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 2.7667 0.0591 0.5909 0.6728 0.5593 0.2448 0.6141
France (FR) -0.1796 0.6207 0.2244 0.7561 0.4031 0.7610
Italy (IT) 0.7470 0.0964 0.3649 0.3222 0.7532
Netherlands (NL) 0.8226 0.3383 0.3635 0.1113
Spain (ES) 0.0759 0.8723 0.4590
Sweden (SD) 0.1877 0.4404
Switzerland (SW) -0.5262
Panel B: Medium Firms
Country BHRj Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.7080 0.2552 0.2846 0.5418 0.4164 0.3930 0.6880
France (FR) -0.3596 0.1278 0.8595 0.8224 0.8508 0.2577
Italy (IT) -0.7038 0.2154 0.1300 0.1496 0.0060
Netherlands (NL) -0.4143 0.9959 0.9701 0.2168
Spain (ES) -0.4130 0.9672 0.1311
Sweden (SD) -0.4039 0.1711
Switzerland (SW) -0.0110
Panel C: Large Firms
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.1483 0.7865 0.5233 0.8531 0.2439 0.5712 0.9332
France (FR) 0.0357 0.4684 0.9843 0.0960 0.4651 0.9402
Italy (IT) -0.1927 0.6799 0.4280 0.9355 0.5916
Netherlands (NL) 0.0469 0.3796 0.7022 0.9760
Spain (ES) -0.3626 0.3760 0.1649
Sweden (SD) -0.2176 0.5180
Switzerland (SW) 0.0736
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Table 56: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Size -
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. BHRT is defined as the broad-market- 
adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock market, 
whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. Size is the number of 
shares issued times the final offer price and is expressed in constant end-1998 prices. Significance values 
correspond to p-values.__________________________________________________________________
Panel A : Small Firms
Country BHRy Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 2.7667 0.0173 0.0234 0.1000 0.3409 0.1988 0.1848
France (FR) -0.1796 0.4736 0.0063 0.2418 0.0486 0.7087
Italy (IT) 0.7470 0.0320 0.0182 0.0572 0.1797
Netherlands (NL) 0.8226 0.0449 0.0382 0.0320
Spain (ES) 0.0759 0.8432 0.3845
Sweden (SD) 0.1877 0.4987
Switzerland (SW) -0.5262
Panel B: Medium Firms
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.7080 0.4631 0.0838 0.5212 0.6981 0.4996 0.2568
France (FR) -0.3596 0.2492 0.9464 0.8203 0.9601 0.1565
Italy (IT) -0.7038 0.3860 0.3085 0.3276 0.0399
Netherlands (NL) -0.4143 0.6380 0.9348 0.2331
Spain (ES) -0.4130 1.0000 0.1535
Sweden (SD) -0.4039 0.1453
Switzerland (SW) -0.0110
Panel C:• Large Firms
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.1483 0.4417 0.7867 0.0933 0.3983 1.0000 0.8643
France (FR) 0.0357 0.3806 0.0609 0.0789 0.4626 0.5063
Italy (IT) -0.1927 0.3286 0.6281 0.9263 0.8648
Netherlands (NL) 0.0469 0.3070 0.2741 0.5109
Spain (ES) -0.3626 0.5397 0.9799
Sweden (SD) -0.2176 1.0000
Switzerland (SW) 0.0736
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Table 57: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Public Float -
Mean Difference Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two samples test for Mean Difference. Public Float (%) is the 
percentage of equity offered. BHRT is defined as the broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from the 
first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-
trading period using local trading days. Significance values correspond to p-values._________________
Panel A: Public Float < 20
Country BHRy Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 3.6473 0.0053 0.5579 0.5293 0.4533 0.3760 NA
France (FR) 0.0000 0.9684 0.0024 0.8634 0.1005 NA
Italy (IT) -0.1942 0.2744 0.7934 0.5063 NA
Netherlands (NL) 1.1441 0.4008 NA
Spain (ES) -0.1151 0.4347 NA
Sweden (SD) 0.4311 NA
Switzerland (SW) -0.4512
Panel B: 20.0 < Public Float < 30
Country BHRy Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p--value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.1026 0.7838 0.2807 0.9386 0.3767 0.4899 NA
France (FR) 0.2882 0.4031 0.9273 0.5187 0.5448 NA
Italy (IT) -0.3596 0.1800 0.8969 0.5899 NA
Netherlands (NL) 0.1600 0.0734 0.3419 NA
Spain (ES) -0.3980 0.5267 NA
Sweden (SD) -0.2082 NA
Switzerland (SW) 0.2882
Panel C: 30.0 <; Public Float < 50
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 1.5246 0.2482 0.3896 0.5132 0.3843 0.5557 0.7584
France (FR) -0.8811 0.8015 0.4811 0.0527 0.0465 0.2910
Italy (IT) -0.7987 0.5505 0.0526 0.1224 0.0198
Netherlands (NL) -0.6105 0.3166 0.2976 0.0809
Spain (ES) -0.3787 0.2799 0.0591
Sweden (SD) 0.1558 0.9254
Switzerland (SW) 0.2440
Panel D: Public Float >50.0
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-■value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.3794 0.7905 0.1218 0.6566 0.7228 0.6721 0.5417
France (FR) -0.5100 0.2082 0.9946 0.7478 0.9411 0.5222
Italy (IT) -1.0803 0.1442 0.2862 0.1007 0.0494
Netherlands (NL) -0.5129 0.5807 0.8999 0.3167
Spain (ES) -0.2314 0.5288 0.9555
Sweden (SD) -0.4807 0.2796
Switzerland (SW) -0.2050
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Table 58: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Public Float -
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. Public Float (%) is the percentage of 
equity offered. BHRT is defined as the broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to 
the third-year anniversary on the stock market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period 
using local trading days. Significance values correspond to p-values._____________________________
Panel A: Public Float < 20
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 3.6473 0.4827 0.7805 0.6121 0.5726 0.7951 0.9000
France (FR) 0.0000 0.6079 0.1246 0.4263 0.2785 0.9588
Italy (IT) -0.1942 0.8577 0.8749 0.9260 0.8571
Netherlands (NL) 1.1441 0.8971 0.7561 0.9412
Spain (ES) -0.1151 0.6683 0.5455
Sweden (SD) 0.4311 0.8000
Switzerland (SW) -0.4512
Panel B: 20.0 < Public Float < 30
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.1026 0.1204 0.4717 0.2233 0.3629 0.6448 0.9545
France (FR) 0.2882 0.5895 0.1316 0.7345 0.4091 0.7273
Italy (IT) -0.3596 0.0671 0.6937 0.7434 0.8571
Netherlands (NL) 0.1600 0.0950 0.3132 0.6667
Spain (ES) -0.3980 0.7766 0.6667
Sweden (SD) -0.2082 0.8000
Switzerland (SW) 0.2882
PanelC: 30.0 < Public Float < 50
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 1.5246 0.0001 0.0020 0.0347 0.1848 0.2026 0.4077
France (FR) -0.8811 0.2571 0.1185 0.0010 0.0163 0.0224
Italy (IT) -0.7987 0.4259 0.0098 0.1591 0.0339
Netherlands (NL) -0.6105 0.1433 0.5076 0.1847
Spain (ES) -0.3787 0.6820 0.3351
Sweden (SD) 0.1558 0.2362
Switzerland (SW) 0.2440
Panel D: Public Float > 50.0
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.3794 1.0000 0.0980 0.7735 0.8413 0.8851 0.5115
France (FR) -0.5100 0.4286 0.9681 0.7354 0.9454 0.7051
Italy (IT) -1.0803 0.1775 0.1570 0.1235 0.0488
Netherlands (NL) -0.5129 0.8609 0.9183 0.3868
Spain (ES) -0.2314 0.8397 0.5681
Sweden (SD) -0.4807 0.3978
Switzerland (SW) -0.2050
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Table 59: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Initial Return -
Mean Difference Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two samples test for Mean Difference. BHRT is defined as the 
broad-market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock 
market, whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. The initial 
return is the percentage difference from the final offering price to the first-day closing price. Significance
values correspond to p-values.____________________________________________________________
Panel A: Initial Return < 0
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-•value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.4822 0.5607 0.5534 0.1343 0.9570 0.7720 0.0814
France (FR) -0.2936 0.4252 0.5902 0.6402 0.8266 0.4948
Italy (IT) -0.6006 0.0582 0.4720 0.5881 0.0236
Netherlands (NL) -0.0465 0.1292 0.5204 0.6862
Spain (ES) -0.4931 0.7975 0.0354
Sweden (SD) -0.3778 0.4602
Switzerland (SW) 0.1635
Panel B: 0 < Initial Return < 7
Country BHRT Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 1.0617 0.7031 0.5664 0.6020 0.5859 0.5057 0.6932
France (FR) 0.3852 0.3223 0.5148 0.4225 0.3090 0.6663
Italy (IT) -0.6543 0.3271 0.2453 0.4617 0.1598
Netherlands (NL) -0.1672 0.6889 0.5371 0.7872
Spain (ES) -0.3216 0.7422 0.3608
Sweden (SD) 1.0617 0.2944
Switzerland (SW) -0.0369
Panel C: 7 < Initial Return < 20
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.0599 0.5929 0.1370 0.5927 0.2243 0.7455 0.7655
France (FR) -0.1535 0.2260 0.7949 0.3884 0.4181 0.9514
Italy (IT) -0.7840 0.1894 0.2996 0.1065 0.1541
Netherlands (NL) -0.3267 0.3454 0.4821 0.7878
Spain (ES) -0.5578 0.1574 0.1965
Sweden (SD) 0.2366 0.6527
Switzerland (SW) -0.2031
Panel D: Initial Return >20.0
Country BHRt Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 4.1639 0.0383 0.2713 0.4614 0.2302 0.1494 0.5114
France (FR) -0.6910 0.2152 0.0104 0.0665 0.0295 0.6283
Italy (IT) -0.2076 0.2122 0.6326 0.5284 0.7519
Netherlands (NL) 0.8671 0.3193 0.3209 0.3765
Spain (ES) 0.0369 0.8740 0.5877
Sweden (SD) 0.1172 0.5396
Switzerland (SW) -0.3940
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Table 60: Significance Tests of Country Differences categorized by Initial Return -
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. BHRT is defined as the broad-market- 
adjusted buy-and-hold return from the first close to the third-year anniversary on the stock market, 
whereas one month is defined as a 21-day-trading period using local trading days. The initial return is the 
percentage difference from the final offering price to the first-day closing price. Significance values 
correspond to p-values._________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Initial Return < 0
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) -0.4822 0.7001 0.7717 0.1434 0.6063 0.7465 0.0550
France (FR) -0.2936 0.5018 0.3149 0.9076 0.5530 0.1838
Italy (IT) -0.6006 0.0609 0.4641 0.9727 0.0655
Netherlands (NL) -0.0465 0.3470 0.1454 0.8269
Spain (ES) -0.4931 0.6748 0.1035
Sweden (SD) -0.3778 0.0268
Switzerland (SW) 0.1635
Panel B: 0 < Initial Return < 7
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 1.0617 0.7059 0.1374 0.2185 0.8875 0.1806 0.6404
France (FR) 0.3852 0.3248 0.8417 0.9661 0.5692 0.7309
Italy (IT) -0.6543 0.5520 0.2754 0.5400 0.2737
Netherlands (NL) -0.1672 0.2944 0.9014 0.8992
Spain (ES) -0.3216 0.4307 0.6300
Sweden (SD) 1.0617 0.4840
Switzerland (SW) -0.0369
Panel C: 7 < Initial Return < 20
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 0.0599 0.3823 0.0522 0.7035 0.0923 0.8010 0.9881
France (FR) -0.1535 0.2375 0.8602 0.5414 0.6402 0.6825
Italy (IT) -0.7840 0.3786 0.4211 0.1079 0.2051
Netherlands (NL) -0.3267 0.2746 0.2039 0.4537
Spain (ES) -0.5578 0.9852 0.9460
Sweden (SD) 0.2366 0.9812
Switzerland (SW) -0.2031
Panel D: Initial Return > 20.0
Country BHRt Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value)
BD FR IT NL ES SD SW
Germany (BD) 4.1639 0.0115 0.5258 0.7540 0.5699 0.6974 0.5270
France (FR) -0.6910 0.1232 0.0678 0.0498 0.0108 0.3555
Italy (IT) -0.2076 0.6141 0.9869 0.6424 1.0000
Netherlands (NL) 0.8671 0.8933 0.9235 0.6461
Spain (ES) 0.0369 1.0000 0.9215
Sweden (SD) 0.1172 0.6638
Switzerland (SW) -0.3940
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Table 61: Relationship between findings in Chapter II and Chapter III
This table demonstrates performance differences between the empirical methodology used in Chapter II 
and Chapter III using two methods for calculating returns (BHRs and CARs). The main differences 
between the empirical methodology used in Chapter II and Chapter III are the following: 1) the use of a 
European trading day calendar (Chapter II) versus a local trading day calendar (Chapter III) (this results 
in a smaller sample size for the calculation of long-run returns in Chapter III (686 versus 677 
companies)), 2) stock prices in Chapter II are converted into Euro (€), whenever appropriate, versus local 
currency units (Chapter III), and 3) the choice of a pan-European benchmark (Chapter II) versus national 
benchmarks (Chapter III). Returns were calculated as buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) and Cumulative 
Average Returns (CARs) from the close of the first day of trading to the three-year anniversary on the 
stock markets with one month defined as a 21-day-trading interval. In this table, returns are reported as 
RAW returns (no adjustment) and returns adjusted for movements in the broad market (ADJ). The Dow 
Jones Eurostoxx broad-market index (Chapter II) and the respective national broad-market indices 
(Chapter III) are used as benchmarks. The large difference in the RAW and ADJ returns using both return 
methodologies between Panel A and Panel B in French IPOs is due to the additional four companies 
available for calculating three-year returns in Chapter II. When excluding those companies from 
calculation in Chapter II, the increase in French BHRs, amounts to 52.49 percent versus 47.80 reported.
Panel A: Pan-European,Study (Chapter II)
Return Methodology
Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) Cumulative Average Returns (CARs)
Country No % RAW S.E. ADJ S.E. RAW S.E. ADJ S.E.
Germany 156 22.7 1.3654b (0.7206) 0.8872 (0.7159) 0.2279* (0.0447) -0.1557* (0.0572)
France 217 31.6 0.4780* (0.1337) -0.2135 (0.1326) 0.2892b (0.1210) -0.2511° (0.1525)
Italy 58 8.5 0.1789 (0.1119) -0.4470* (0.1009) 0.1161 (0.0974) -0.3758* (0.0910)
Netherlands 68 9.9 -0.0303 (0.1617) -0.4083* (0.1411) -0.1324 (0.0992) -0.4608* (0.1214)
Spain 55 8.0 0.7237“ (0.2549) 0.1506 (0.2396) 0.3847“ (0.1446) -0.0720 (0.0921)
Sweden 101 14.7 0.8281* (0.1997) 0.1515 (0.1870) 0.5293“ (0.0961) 0.0048 (0.0594)
Switzerland 31 4.5 0.5616* (0.1997) -0.1296 (0.1949) 0.3756b (0.1566) -0.1730 (0.1330)
All 686 100.0 0.679 la (0.1746) 0.0844 (0.1729) 0.2658“ (0.0376) -0.2052* (0.0349)
Panel B: Individual-Country Study (Chapter III)
Return Methodology
Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) Cumulative Average Returns (CARs)
Country No % RAW S.E. ADJ S.E. RAW S.E. ADJ S.E.
Germany 155 22.9 1.3892c (0.7369) 0.9850 (0.7318) 0.2301“ (0.0448) -0.1166* (0.0439)
France 213 31.5 0.5369* (0.1490) -0.2074 (0.1483) 0.3717* (0.1413) -0.1901 (0.1388)
Italy 58 8.6 0.1794 (0.1171) -0.4924* (0.1050) 0.1104 (0.0940) -0.4185* (0.0918)
Netherlands 68 10.0 -0.0465 (0.2481) -0.3089° (0.1068) -0.1433 (0.1055) -0.3021* (0.0865)
Spain 53 7.8 0.7369“ (0.2763) 0.0727 (0.2791) 0.3725* (0.1413) -0.1558 (0.1248)
Sweden 99 14.6 0.7290“ (0.1887) -0.0725 (0.1747) 0.4786* (0.0916) -0.1270 (0.0789)
Switzerland 31 4.6 0.5595* (0.2014) -0.0943 (0.1840) 0.3510b (0.1479) -0.1817 (0.1378)
All 677 100.0 0.6888“ (0.1802) 0.0616 (0.1786) 0.2762* (0.0387) -0.1973* (0.0340)
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.
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Table 62: Specimen Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account
For each individual German Initial Public Offerings (IPO), we collected the information for calculating 
the proxies for earnings management (the Discretionary Current Accrual (DCA) and Income Smoothing 
(IS) coefficients) from balance sheet and profit and loss accounts based on the full version (Vollbilanz) 
available from Hoppenstedt Finanzinformationen GmbH (in English and German language), a Germany- 
based provider of financial data.___________________________________________________________
row
1 Name: Company XYZ (Version in English)
row
1 Name: Firma XYZ (Version in German)
2 Date 2 Datum
3 ASSETS 3 A K T I V A
4 outstanding contributions to subscribed capital 4 Ausstehende Einlagen
5 .thereof called-in 5 .(davon eingefordert)
6 expenses for starting up + extending business operations 6 Aufw. f. Ingangsetz./Erweit. Geschaftsb.
7 fixed assets 7 Anlagevermogen
8 .gross values at the beginning of the year 8 .Anfangsbestand
9 .additions 9 .Zugange
10 .appreciation/write-ups 10 .Zuschreibungen
11 .disposals 11 .Abgange
12 .other changes 12 . Sonstige V eranderungen
13 ..additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 13 ..(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
14 .accumulated depreciation and write-downs 14 .Kumulierte Abschreibungen
15 ..thereof depreciation during the year 15 . .(davon Geschaftsj ahresabschreibungen)
16 . .thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 16 ..(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
17 .intangible assets 17 .Immaterielle Vermogensgegenstande
18 . .gross values at the beginning of the year 18 . .Anfangsbestand
19 ..additions 19 ..Zugange
20 ..appreciation/write-ups 20 ..Zuschreibungen
21 ..disposals 21 ..Abgange
22 ..other changes 22 ..Sonstige Veranderungen
23 ...additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 23 ...(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
24 ..accumulated depreciation and write-ups 24 ..Kumulierte Abschreibungen
25 ...thereof depreciation during the year 25 ...(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
26 ...thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 26 ...(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
27 ..franchises, patents/similar rights/assets & licences 27 ..Konzessionen
28 ...gross values at the beginning of the year 28 ...Anfangsbestand
29 ...additions 29 ...Zugange
30 ...appreciation/write-ups 30 ...Zuschreibungen
31 ...disposals 31 ...Abgange
32 ...other changes 32 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
33 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 33 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
34 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups 34 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
35 ....thereof depreciation during the year 35 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
36 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 36 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
37 ..goodwill (from indiv statements/capital consolidation) 37 ..Geschafts- oder Firmenwert
38 ...thereof goodwill from capital consolidation 38 ...(dav. Unterschiedsbetrag aus Konsol.
39 ...gross values at the beginning of the year 39 ...Anfangsbestand
40 ...additions 40 ...Zugange
41 ...appreciation/write-ups 41 ...Zuschreibungen
42 ...disposals 42 ...Abgange
43 ...other changes 43 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
44 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 44 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
45 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups 45 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
46 ....thereof depreciation during the year 46 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
47 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 47 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
48 ..advance payments 48 ..Geleistete Anzahlungen
49 ...gross values at the beginning of the year 49 ...Anfangsbestand
50 ...additions 50 ...Zugange
51 ...appreciation/write-ups 51 ...Zuschreibungen
52 ...disposals 52 ...Abgange
53 ...other changes 53 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
54 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 54 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
55 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups 55 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
56 ....thereof depreciation during the year 56 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
57 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 57 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
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58 .fixed tangible assets
59 ..gross values at the beginning of the year
60 ..additions
61 ..appreciation/write-ups
62 ..disposals
63 ..other changes
64 ...additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
65 ..accumulated depreciation and write-ups
66 ...thereof depreciation during the year
67 ...thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
68 ..real estate, leasehold rights
69 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
70 ...additions
71 ...appreciation/write-ups
72 ...disposals
73 ...other changes
74 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
75 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
76 ....thereof depreciation during the year
77 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
78 ..technical equipment and machinery
79 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
80 ...additions
81 ...appreciation/write-ups
82 ...disposals
83 ...other changes
84 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
85 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
86 ....thereof depreciation during the year
87 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
88 ..other equipment, fixtures and office equipment
89 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
90 ...additions
91 ...appreciation/write-ups
92 ...disposals
93 ...other changes
94 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
95 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
96 ....thereof depreciation during the year
97 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
98 ..advance payments and construction in progress
99 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
100 ...additions
101 ...appreciation/write-ups
102 ...disposals
103 ...other changes
104 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
105 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
106 ....thereof depreciation during the year
107 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
108 ..fixed assets leased to customers
109 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
110 ...additions
111 ...appreciation/write-ups
112 ...disposals
113 ...other changes
114 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
115 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
116 ....thereof depreciation during the year
117 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
118 .financial assets
119 ..thereof with a remaining term exceeding 1 year
120 ..thereof to members of company boards
121 ..thereof to partners
122 ..gross values at the beginning of the year
58 .Sachanlagen
59 ..Anfangsbestand
60 ..Zugange
61 . .Zuschreibungen
62 ..Abgange
63 ..Sonstige Veranderungen
64 ...(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
65 ..Kumulierte Abschreibungen
66 ...(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
67 ...(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
68 ..Grundstucke
69 ...Anfangsbestand
70 ...Zugange
71 ...Zuschreibungen
72 ...Abgange
73 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
74 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
75 ... Kumul ierte Abschreibungen
76 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
77 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
78 ..Technische Anlagen und Maschinen
79 ...Anfangsbestand
80 ...Zugange
81 . ..Zuschreibungen
82 ...Abgange
83 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
84 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
85 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
86 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
87 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
88 ..And. Anlagen
89 ...Anfangsbestand
90 ...Zugange
91 ...Zuschreibungen
92 ...Abgange
93 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
94 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
95 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
96 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
97 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
98 ..Geleistete Anzahlungen/Anlagen im Bau
99 ...Anfangsbestand
100 ...Zugange
101 ...Zuschreibungen
102 ...Abgange
103 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
104 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
105 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
106 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
107 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
108 ..Vermietete Anlagengegenstande
109 ...Anfangsbestand
110 ...Zugange
111 ...Zuschreibungen
112 ...Abgange
113 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
114 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
115 .. .Kumul ierte Abschreibungen
116 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
117 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
118 .Finanzanlagen
119 ..(davon mit Restlaufzeit fiber 1 Jahr)
120 ..(dav. an Mitgl. v. Gesellschaftsorg.)
121 . .(davon an Gesel Ischafter)
122 . .Anfangsbestand
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123 ..additions
124 ..appreciation/write-ups
125 ..disposals
126 ..other changes
127 ...additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
128 ..accumulated depreciation and write-ups
129 ...thereof depreciation during the year
130 ...thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
131 ..shares in affiliated companies
132 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
133 ...additions
134 ...appreciation/write-ups
135 ...disposals
136 ...other changes
137 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
138 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
139 ....thereof depreciation during the year
140 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
141 ..shares in associated companies
142 ...thereof goodwill from equity consolidation
143 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
144 ...additions
145 ...appreciation/write-ups
146 ...disposals
147 ...other changes
148 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
149 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
150 ....thereof depreciation during the year
151 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
152 ..loans to affiliated companies
153 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
154 ...additions
155 ...appreciation/write-ups
156 ...disposals
157 ...other changes
158 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
159 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
160 ....thereof depreciation during the year
161 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
162 ..loans to associated companies
163 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
164 ...additions
165 ...appreciation/write-ups
166 ...disposals
167 ...other changes
168 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
169 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
170 ....thereof depreciation during the year
171 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
172 ..other share investments
173 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
174 ...additions
175 ...appreciation/write-ups
176 ...disposals
177 ...other changes
178 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation
179 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups
180 ....thereof depreciation during the year
181 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation
182 ..loans to other share investments
183 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year
184 ...gross values at the beginning of the year
185 ...additions
186 ...appreciation/write-ups
187 ...disposals
123 ..Zugange
124 ..Zuschreibungen
125 ..Abgange
126 ..Sonstige Veranderungen
127 ...(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
128 ..Kumulierte Abschreibungen
129 ...(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
130 ...(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
131 .. Anteile an verbunden Untemehmen
132 ...Anfangsbestand
133 ...Zugange
134 ...Zuschreibungen
135 ...Abgange
136 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
137 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
138 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
139 ....(dav. Geschaftjahresabschreib.)
140 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
141 ..Ant. an assoz. Untem.
142 ...(dav. Untersch.Betrag aus Equ.-Kons.)
143 ...Anfangsbestand
144 ...Zugange
145 ...Zuschreibungen
146 ...Abgange
147 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
148 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
149 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
150 ....(dav. Geschaftjahresabschreib.)
151 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
152 ..Ausl. an verb. Untem.
153 ...Anfangsbestand
154 ...Zugange
155 ... Zuschreibungen/ Aufzinsungen
156 ...Abgange
157 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
158 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
159 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
160 ....(dav. Gesch.j.abschr./Abzins.)
161 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
162 ..Ausl. an assoz. Untem.
163 ...Anfangsbestand
164 ...Zugange
165 ...Zuschreibungen/Aufzinsungen
166 ...Abgange
167 ... Sonstige Veranderungen
168 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
169 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
170 ....(dav. Gesch.j.abschr./Abzins.)
171 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
172 ..Beteiligungen
173 ...Anfangsbestand
174 ...Zugange
175 ...Zuschreibungen
176 ...Abgange
177 ...Sonstige Veranderungen
178 ....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis)
179 ...Kumulierte Abschreibungen
180 ....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
181 ....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
182 ..Ausleihungen an Betei 1 igungsuntemeh.
183 ...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit fiber 1 Jahr)
184 ...Anfangsbestand
185 ...Zugange
186 ...Zuschreibungen/Aufzinsungen
187 ...Abgange
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188 ...other changes 188
189 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 189
190 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups 190
191 ....thereof depreciation during the year 191
192 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 192
193 ..securities of fixed assets 193
194 ...gross values at the beginning of the year 194
195 ...additions 195
196 ...appreciation/write-ups 196
197 ...disposals 197
198 ...other changes 198
199 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 199
200 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups 200
201 ....thereof depreciation during the year 201
202 ....thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 202
203 ..other financial assets 203
204 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 204
205 ...thereof to members of company boards 205
206 ...thereof to partners 206
207 ...gross values at the beginning of the year 207
208 ...additions 208
209 ...appreciation/write-ups 209
210 ...disposals 210
211 ...other changes 211
212 ....additions incl changes in scope of consolidation 212
213 ...accumulated depreciation and write-ups 213
214 ....thereof depreciation during the year 214
215 . ...thereof appreciation/write-ups under depreciation 215
216 items treated as fixed assets 216
217 .leasing equipment and assets leased or rented out 217
218 .nuclear fuel 218
219 .special items from companies of the mining industrie 219
220 .special assets 220
221 ..thereof to accounting in accordance with DMBilG 1990 221
222 current assets 222
223 .current assets leased to customers 223
224 .fixed assets intended to be sold 224
225 .inventories (net value) 225
226 ..inventories (gross value) 226
227 ..raw material and supplies 227
228 ..work in process 228
229 ..finished goods and merchandise 229
230 ..goods and services not yet invoiced 230
231 ..goods and services not yet completed 231
232 ..advance payments 232
233 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 233
234 ..payments received on account of orders 234
235 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 235
236 ..other deductions (part payt/provision etc) 236
237 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 237
238 .receivables and other current assets 238
239 ..thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 239
240 ..thereof from affiliated companies 240
241 ..thereof from associated companies 241
242 ..from other co's in which participations are held 242
243 ..value adjustments/over value adjustments set off direct 243
244 ..thereof from members of company board 244
245 ..thereof to partners 245
246 ..trade receivables 246
247 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 247
248 ..receivables from partially complete services 248
249 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 249
250 ..receivables from goods/services not yet invoiced 250
251 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 251
252 ..receivables from leasing and rental business 252
...Sonstige Veranderungen 
....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis) 
...Kumulierte Abschreibungen 
....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
..Wertpapiere des Anlagevermogens
.. .Anfangsbestand
...Zugange
...Zuschreibungen
...Abgange
...Sonstige Veranderungen 
....(dav. Zug. incl. Ver3nd. Kons.kreis) 
...Kumulierte Abschreibungen 
....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
..Sonstige Finanzanlagen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr)
...(dav. an Mitgl. v. Gesellsch.-Org.)
...(davon an Gesellschafter)
...Anfangsbestand
...Zugange
...Zuschreibungen
...Abgange
...Sonstige Veranderungen 
....(dav. Zug. incl. Verand. Kons.kreis) 
...Kumulierte Abschreibungen 
....(dav. Geschaftsjahresabschreib.)
....(dav. Zuschr. b. Abschr.)
Anlagevermogenahnliche Posten
. V ermi et vermogen
.Kembrennelemente
.Vorabraum
.Sondervermogen
..(dav. Sonderbil. nach DMBilG)
Umlaufvermfigen
.Vermietete Erzeugn. im UmlaufVermogen 
.Zum Verkauf best. Gegenstande des AV 
.Vorrate (gesamt)
..Vorrate (unspezifiziert)
..Roh- /Hilfs-/Betriebsstoffe 
..Unfertige Erzeugnisse / Arbeiten 
..Fertige Erzeugnisse / Waren 
..Noch nicht abgerechnete Auftrage 
..In Ausfuhrung befindliche Arbeiten 
..Geleistete Anzahlungen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit uber 1 Jahr) 
..Erhaltene Anzahlungen auf Bestellung. 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
..Sonstige AbzQge (Abschlagszahl. u.a.) 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
.Forderungen und son. Vermogensgegenst. 
..(davon mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
..(davon an verbundene Untemehmen) 
..(davon an assoziierte Untemehmen) 
..(davon an Beteiligungsuntemehmen) 
..(dav. direkt abges. Wertberichtigung) 
..(dav. ggu. Mitgl. v. Gesellsch.-Org.) 
..(davon an Gesellschafter)
..Ford, aus Lieferungen und Leistungen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit uber 1 Jahr)
..Ford, aus teilfertigen Leistungen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit uber 1 Jahr)
..Ford, aus noch nicht abger. Lei stung. 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr)
..Ford, aus Vermietung und Verpachtung
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253 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 253
254 ..receiv. fr. contracts, prelim agreem., custmrsodial serv's 254
255 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 255
256 ..receivables from affiliated companies 256
257 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 257
258 ...thereof trade receivables 258
259 ..receivables from associated companies 259
260 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 260
261 ...thereof trade receivables 261
262 ..receivables from other co's participations are held 262
263 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 263
264 ...thereof trade receivables 264
265 ..receivables from co brd members 265
266 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 266
267 ..other receivables and other current assets 267
268 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 268
269 ...contributions called-in/supplementary or contractual 269
270 ..payments received 270
271 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 271
272 ..other deductions (e.g. part payts) 272
273 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 273
274 .securities of current assets 274
275 ..shares in affiliated companies 275
276 ...thereof shares in associated companies 276
277 ..own shares 277
278 ..other securities 278
279 ...thereofbonds 279
280 .liquid funds 280
281 ..thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 281
282 ..cash in hand, central bank and postal giro balances 282
283 ..cheques 283
284 ..bank balances 284
285 ...thereof with remaining term exceeding 1 year 285
286 prepaid expenses 286
287 .thereof discounts in accordance with §250(3) HGB 287
288 prepaid tax 288
289 loss not covered by equity capital 289
290 .thereof loss of shareholders with unlimited liability 290
291 total assets 291
292 .contingent receivables 292
293 LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY 293
294 equity (capital and reserves) 294
295 .thereof special accounting in accord with DMBilG 1990 295
296 .capital 296
297 ..called-in capital 297
298 ...subscribed capital 298
299 ...thereof value of ordinary share 299
300 ...thereof value of preference share 300
301 ....thereof preferred shares 301
302 ...non called-in capital 302
303 ..proprietary accounts of liable shareholders 303
304 ..other capital 304
305 ...thereof profit-sharing certificates 305
306 ...thereof capital share from remaining members 306
307 ...thereof capital share from retiring members 307
308 ...thereof capital share from cancelled shares 308
309 ...thereof contributions of limited partners 309
310 .general reserves 310
311 ..thereof set off direct as goodwill 311
312 ..capital reserves 312
313 ...thereof set off direct as goodwill 313
314 ...additional pd-in capital from share issues etc. 314
315 ...additional or supplementary contr. from shareholders 315
316 ...funds derived from reductions in share capital etc. 316
317 ..revenue reserves 317
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
..Ford, aus Vertragen + Betreuung 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit uber 1 Jahr) 
..Ford, an verb. Untem.
...(dav. Restl. >1 Jahr)
...(dav. aus Lief. + Leist.)
..Ford, an assoz. Untem.
...(dav. Restl. >1 Jahr)
...(dav. aus Lief. + Leist.)
..Forderungen an Beteiligungen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit fiber 1 Jahr) 
...(dav. aus Lieferungen + Leistungen) 
..Ford, an Mitgl. v. Gesellsch.-Organen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr)
..Son. Forderungen + Vermogensgegenst. 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
...(dav. eingeford. EinlTNachschusse) 
..Erhaltene Anzahlungen bei Forderungen 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
..Sonstige Abziige (Abschlagszahl. u.a.) 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
.Wertpapiere des UmlaufVermogens 
..Anteile an verbundenen Untemehmen 
...(dav. Ant. an assoziierten Untem.) 
..Eigene Anteile 
..Sonstige Wertpapiere 
...(davon Schuldscheine)
.Liquide Mittel
..(davon mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr)
..Kasse
..Schecks
..Guthaben bei Kreditinstituten 
...(dav. mit Restlaufzeit iiber 1 Jahr) 
Rechnungsabgrenzungsposten (Aktiva) 
.(davon Disagio)
Steuerabgrenzung
Nicht d. Eigenkap. gedeckter Fehlbetr. 
.(dav. Verlustanteil pers. haft. Ges.) 
Bilanzsumme (Aktiva)
.Eventual forderungen
P A S S I V A
Eigenkapital
.(dav. Sonderbil. nach DMBilG)
.Kapital
..Eingefordertes Kapital 
...Gezeichnetes Kapital 
...(davon Nennwert Stammaktien) 
...(davon Nennwert Vorzugsaktien) 
....(davon Vorziige)
...Nicht eingeford. aussteh. Einlagen 
..Kapitalkonten haft. Gesellschafter 
..Andere Kapitalbestandteile 
...(davon GenuBscheine)
...(dav. Gesch.Guth. verb. Mitgl.)
...(dav. Gesch.guth. aussch. Mitgl.)
...(dav. Gesch.Guth. gek. Gesch.Ant.) 
...(davon Kommanditeinlage)
.Offene Riicklagen
..(dav. direkt abges. Untersch.betr.)
..Kapital riicklagen
...(dav. direkt abges. Untersch.betr.)
...Agio aus Wertpapieremissionen u.S.
...Zuzahl./Nachschiisse von Gesellsch.
...Betrage aus Kapitalherabsetz. u.a.
. .Gewinnriicklagen
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318 ...thereof set off direct as goodwill
319 ...legal reserves
320 ...uncommitted reserves
321 ....reserves for own shares
322  thereof holdings in controlling or parent company
323 ....statutory reserves
324 . ...other revenue reserves
325  equity part from re-instatement of original values
326  equity part of tax-deductible reserves
327  thereof reserves for repairs/replacements/rationalis.
328  thereof contingency reserves
329  thereof reserves for foundations/charities
330  thereof set off direct as goodwill
331 .adjustment items from consolidation
332 .adjustment items for shares held by third parties
333 ..thereof shares in profits
334 ..thereof shares in losses
335 ..thereof shares in capital
336 .balance sheet result
337 ..net income/loss for the year
338 ..net income/loss carried forward from the previous year
339 ..profit/loss
340 ...net income/loss carried forward from the previous yr
341 equity related funds
342 .special item with an equity portion
343 ..taxation reserves
344 ...special items accord. to(sale of certain fixed assets)
345 ...special items acc. to sect. 35 EStR (replacem. of assets)
346 ...special items acc. with § 52(8) EStG (pension accruals)
347 ...special items in accord with Investment Allowance Act
348 ...special items in accord with Developing Countries Act
349 ...special items in accord with Foreign Investment Act
350 ...other special items
351 ...special items in accord with foreign legal provisions
352 ..special depreciation in accordance with taxation law
353 ...thereof value adjustments of fixed assets
354 ....thereof value adjustments of land and buildings
355 ...value adjustments of current assets/import deductions
356 .grants
357 ..thereof declared tax-free
358 ..investment grants
359 ..grants to cover building costs
360 ..grants on earnings
361 ..other mixed grants
362 outside/borrowed capital
363 .provisions
364 ..thereof long-term
365 ..thereof special accounting in accord with DMBilG 1990
366 ..adjustment items from consolidation
367 ..provision for pensions and similar commitments
368 ...deficit arising from non-allocation
369 ..other provisions
370 ...provisions for taxation
371 ....thereof for deferred taxes
372 ...other provisions
373 ....provisions to cover guarantee claims
374 ....provisions to cover repairs
375 ....provisions to cover removal of waste materials
376 ....all other provisions
377 .liabilities
378 ..thereofshort-term
379 ..thereof long-term
380 ..thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights
381 ..secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights
382 ..thereof to members of company boards
318 ...(dav. direkt abges. Untersch.betr.)
319 . ..Gesetzl iche Rucklage
320 ...Freie RQcklagen
321 ....Riicklage fur eigene Anteile
322  (dav. Ant. an herrsch. Untem.)
323 ....Satzungsmafiige Rucklagen
324 ....Andere Gewinnrucklagen
325  (dav. EK-Ant. v. Wertaufholung)
326  (dav. EK-Ant. abzugsf. Ruckl.)
327  (dav. Instandhaltungsrucklagen)
328  (davon Risikorucklagen)
329  (dav. Rucklagen fur Stiftungen)
330  (dav. als Goodwill dir. abges.)
331 .Unterschiedsbetrag aus Kapitalkonsolid.
332 .Anteile anderer Gesellschafter
333 ..(davon Gewinnanteile)
334 ..(davon Verlustanteile)
335 ..(davon Kapitalanteile)
336 .Bilanzergebnis
337 ..JahresuberschuB/-fehlbetrag
338 ..Gewinn- / Verlustvortrag aus Vorjahr
339 ..Bilanzgewinn / -verlust
340 ...(dav. Gewinn-/Verlustvortr. a  Vj.)
341 Eigenkapitalahnliche Mittel
342 .Sonderposten mit RQcklageanteil
343 ..Steuerrechtliche Rucklagen
344 ...Sonderposten gemafl § 6b EStG
345 ...Sonderposten gem. Abschnitt 35 EStR
346 ...Sonderposten gemafl § 52 (5) EStG
347 ...Sonderposten gemafl InvZulG
348 ...Sonderposten gemafl EntwLStG
349 ...Sonderposten gemafl AuslInvG
350 ...Sonstige Sonderposten
351 ...Sonderposten nach ausl and. Recht
352 ..Steuerrechtliche Sonderabschreibungen
353 ...(dav. Wertberichtigungen zum AV)
354 ....(dav. Wb. a  Grundstucke/Gebaude)
355 ...(dav. Wertberichtigungen zum UV)
356 .Zuschusse
357 ..(davon als steuerfrei bezeichnet)
358 ..InvestitionszuschQsse
359 . .Baukostenzuschusse/Anschluflbeitrage
360 ..Ertragszuschusse
361 ..Sonstige (gemischte) Zuschusse
362 Fremdkapital
363 .Ruckstellungen
364 ..(dav. langerfristig)
365 ..(dav. Sonderbil. n. DMBilG)
366 ..(dav. Untbetr. a  d. Kons.)
367 ..PensionsrQckstellungen
368 ...(Fehlbetrag aus unterl. Zufuhrung)
369 ..Andere Ruckstellungen
370 ...Steuerruckstellungen
371 ....(davon latente Steuem)
372 ...Sonstige Ruckstellungen
373 ....Gewahrleistungsruckstellungen
374 ....Instandhaltungsruckstellungen
375 ....Abraumbeseitigungsruckstellungen
376 ....Restliche Ruckstellungen
377 .Verbindlichkeiten
378 ..(davon kurzfristig)
379 ..(davon langfristig)
380 ..(dav. d. Pfandr. u.3. ges.)
381 . .(durch Grundpfandrechte gesi chert)
382 ..(dav. ggu. Mitgl. v. Gesellsch.-Org.)
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383 ..thereof to partners 383
384 ..contributions of dormant partners 384
385 ...thereof with a remaining term of up to 1 year 385
386 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 386
387 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 387
388 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 388
389 ..loans granted by shareholders 389
390 ...thereof with a remaining term of up to 1 year 390
391 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 391
392 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 392
393 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 393
394 ..loans, bonds, obligations 394
395 ...thereof with a remaining term of up to 1 year 395
396 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 396
397 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 397
398 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 398
399 ...thereof convertible 399
400 ...therof profit-sharing certificates 400
401 ..loans, mortgages 401
402 ...thereof with a remaining term of up to 1 year 402
403 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 403
404 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 404
405 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 405
406 ..liabilities to banks 406
407 ...thereof with a remaining term of up to 1 year 407
408 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 408
409 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 409
410 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 410
411 ..payments received on account of orders 411
412 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 412
413 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 413
414 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 414
415 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 415
416 ..trade liabilities 416
417 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 417
418 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 418
419 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 419
420 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 420
421 ..liabilities on bills accepted and drawn 421
422 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 422
423 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 423
424 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 424
425 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 425
426 ..liabilities to affiliated companies 426
427 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 427
428 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 428
429 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 429
430 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 430
431 ...thereof trade liabilities 431
432 ..liabilities to associated companies 432
433 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 433
434 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 434
435 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 435
436 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 436
437 ...thereof trade liabilities 437
438 ..liabilities to companies in which participations are held 438
439 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 439
440 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 440
441 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 441
442 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 442
443 ...thereof trade liabilities 443
444 ..other liabilities 444
445 ...thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 445
446 ...thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 446
447 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 447
..(dav. geg. Gesellschaftem)
..Einlagen stiller Gesellschafter 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert)
.. Gesel lschafterdarlehen 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
..Anleihen / Schuldverschreibungen 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
...(davon konvertibel)
...(davon GenuBscheine)
..Darlehen / Hypotheken / Schuldscheine 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
..Verbindlichkeiten ggii. Kreditinstit 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
..Erhaltene Anzahlungen auf Bestellung. 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.5. ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
..Verblk. aus Lieferungen + Leistungen 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fSllig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
..Wechselverbindlichkeiten 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
..Verbindlk. ggu. verbundenen Untemeh. 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.5. ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
...(dav. aus Lieferungen + Leistungen) 
..Verbindlk. ggu. assoziierten Untem. 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit iiber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.§. ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
...(dav. aus Lieferungen + Leistungen) 
..Verbindlichkeiten ggii. Beteiligungen 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u .a . ges.)
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
...(dav. aus Lieferungen + Leistungen) 
..Sonstige Verbindlichkeiten 
...(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahres fallig) 
...(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.a. ges.)
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448 ...secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 448
449 ...liabilities for taxation 449
450 ....thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 450
451 ....thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 451
452 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 452
453 ....secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 453
454 ...liabilities relating to social security 454
455 ....thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 455
456 ....thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 456
457 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 457
458 ....secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 458
459 ...other liabilities 459
460 ....thereof with a remaining term up to 1 year 460
461 ....thereof with a remaining term of more than 5 years 461
462 ...thereof secured by mortgages and similar rights 462
463 ....secured by mortgages on real estate & similar rights 463
464 deferred income 464
465 total equity and liabilities 465
466 .contingent liabilities and other obligations 466
467 ..contingent liabilities 467
468 ...thereof to affiliated companies 468
469 ...contingent liabilities on discounted bills of exchange 469
470 ...contingent liabilities from guarantees & indemnity 470
471 ...thereof contingent liabilities arising from warranties 471
472 ...contingent liabilit. fr. securit. arrang. f. cust liabilit. 472
473 ..other financial obligations 473
474 ...thereof to affiliated companies 474
475 ...thereof liabilites from leasing and rental agreements 475
476 ....thereof short-term 476
477 ....thereofmedium-term 477
478 ....thereof long-term 478
479 ....thereof actual value 479
480 ...commitments from investments 480
481 PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 481
482 .sales revenue/turnover 482
483 ..excise duties were deducted from sales in the amount of 483
484 ..equalisation levies accord, to the 3rd Coal Power Act 484
485 .inc/dec in inven. of finished products/work in progress 485
486 .own work capitalized 486
487 .other operating income 487
488 ..thereof special and not planned 488
489 ..thereof expenses not related to the according period 489
490 ..income from disposal of fixed assets and write-ups 490
491 ..income from release of accruals 491
492 ..income from liquidation of special items 492
493 ...in accord with °6b EStG (sale of certain fixed assets) 493
494 ...in accord with °52 EStG (provisions for pensions) 494
495 ...thereof in accordance with foreign legal law 495
496 ..other income 496
497 .cost of materials 497
498 ..cost of raw materials and supplies + of purchased goods 498
499 ..cost of purchased services 499
500 gross result 500
501 .personnel expenses 501
502 ..wages and salaries 502
503 ..social security contributions/exp for pensions 503
504 ...thereof compulsory social security contributions 504
505 ...thereof expenses for pensions 505
506 ...thereof expenses for other employee benefits 506
507 .depreciation 507
508 ..extraordinary & special depreciation & right-offs 508
509 ..write-downs, depreciation of value adjustments 509
510 ...extraordinary/special depreciation & right-offs 510
511 ..depreciation on current assets 511
512 ..special depreciation on current assets 512
...(durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert) 
...Verbindlichkeiten aus Steuem 
....(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahr. fall.)
....(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.a. ges.)
....(durch Grundpfandrechte gesich.) 
...Vblk. im Rahmen der soz. Sicherheit 
....(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahr. fall.)
....(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.a. ges.)
....(durch Grundpfandrechte gesich.) 
...Restliche Verbindlichkeiten 
....(dav. vor Abl. eines Jahr. fall.)
....(dav. Restlaufzeit uber 5 Jahre)
...(dav. d. Pfandr. u.a. ges.)
....(durch Grundpfandrechte gesich.) 
Rechnungsabgrenzungsposten (Passiva) 
Bilanzsumme (Passiva) 
.Eventualverbindlichkeiten 
..Haftungsverhaitnisse 
...(dav. ggu. verbundenen Untemehmen) 
...(dav. aus Wechselindossamenten) 
...(davon Verblk. aus Burgschaften) 
...(dav. Verblk. aus Gewahrleistungen) 
...(dav. Sich. -Best. f. fremde Vblk.) 
..Sonstige finanzielle Verpflichtungen 
...(dav. ggu. verbundenen Untemehmen) 
...(dav. aus Miet-/Leasingvertragen) 
....(dav. kurzfristig)
....(dav. mittelfristig)
....(dav. langfristig)
....(dav. Barwert)
...(dav. Bestellobligo fur Sachanl.)
G + V
.Umsatz / AuBenumsatz / Erldse (netto) 
..n. Abz. abges. Verbr.St.
..n. Abz. abges. Ausgl.Abgabe 
.BestandsverSnderungen 
.Aktivierte Eigenleistungen 
.Sonstige betriebliche ErtrSge 
..(dav. als auBerordentlich bezeichnet) 
..(dav. periodenfremd)
..Ertr. aus Anlageabgangen/Zuschreib. 
..ErtrSge aus ROckstellungsauflosungen 
..Ertr. aus der Sopo-Aufl8sung 
...(davon gemafl § 6b EStG)
...(davon gemafl § 52 (5) EStG)
...(dav. gem. ausl. Rechtsvorschr.) 
..Sonstige Ertrage 
.Materialaufwand
..Roh-/Hilfs-/Betriebsstoffe/bez. Waren
..Bezogene Leistungen
Rohergebnis (Gesamtkostenverfahren)
.Personalaufwand
..L6hne und Gehalter
.. Soz. Abgaben/Alters versVUnterstutzung
...(davon gesetzlicher Sozialaufwand)
...(davon Altersversorgung)
...(davon Unterstutzung)
.Abschreibungen
..(dav. Sonderabschreibungen)
..Abschr. auf SA/TV/Ingangs. G-Betrieb 
...(dav. Sonderabschreibungen)
..Abschr. auf UV 
..Sonderabschreibungen auf UV
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513 .other operating expenses 513
514 . .thereof special and not planned 514
515 ..thereof expenses not related to the according period 515
516 ..loss from value or disposals of current assets 516
517 ..losses from value or disposals of fixed assets 517
518 ..allocations to special items with reserve character 518
519 ...in accord with °6b EStG (sale of certain fixed assets) 519
520 ...in accord with °52 EStG (provisions for pensions) 520
521 ...thereof in accordance with foreign legal law 521
522 ..other expenses 522
523 operating expenses of the original business 523
524 .results from direct investments 524
525 ..income from participation interest 525
526 ...thereof from co-operation tax credit 526
527 ...thereof from affiliated companies 527
528 ...thereof from associated companies 528
529 ..income from profit-pooling/transfer agreements 529
530 ...thereof transfer to cover taxes by parent company 530
531 ...thereof from affiliated companies 531
532 ...thereof from associated companies 532
533 ..expenses from assumption of loss 533
534 ...thereof from affiliated companies 534
535 ...thereof from associated companies 535
536 .net interest income/loss 536
537 ..interest and similar income 537
538 ...thereof from affiliated companies 538
539 ...thereof from associated companies 539
540 ..income from financial assets 540
541 ...thereof from affiliated companies 541
542 ...thereof from associated companies 542
543 ..interest and similar expenses 543
544 ...thereof to affiliated companies 544
545 ...thereof to associated companies 545
546 .other financial result 546
547 ..write-downs of financial assets and securities 547
548 ...thereof special and not planned 548
549 ...thereof write-downs from financial assets 549
550 ...thereof write-downs from securities of current assets 550
551 ..other financial income 551
552 ..other financial expenses 552
553 financial results of ordinary business 553
554 results from ordinary activities 554
555 .extraordinary income 555
556 .extraordinary expenses 556
557 extraordinary result 557
558 .income taxes 558
559 ..thereof corporation tax 559
560 ..thereof trade profit tax 560
561 .other taxes 561
562 ..thereof property tax 562
563 ..thereof trade capital tax 563
564 .offsetting of taxation 564
565 total taxes 565
566 .compensation payments/equilization payments 566
567 ..thereof other changes 567
568 .income transferred from profit-pooling/transfer agreemts 568
569 .income from transfer of losses 569
570 offsetting of results before net income/loss for the year 570
571 net income/loss for the year 571
572 .net income/loss carried forward from the previous year 572
573 .changes to reserves 573
574 ..changes to revenue reserves 574
575 ...additions to revenue reserves 575
576 ...withdrawals from revenue reserves 576
577 ..changes to capital reserves 577
.Sonstige betriebliche Aufwendungen 
..(dav. als auBerordentlich bezeichnet) 
..(dav. periodenfremd)
..Verluste aus Wertmind/Abgangen im UV 
..Verluste aus Wertmind./Abgangen im AV 
..Einstell. in Sopo mit Rucklageanteil 
...(davon gemaB § 6b EStG)
...(davon gemaB § 52 (5) EStG)
...(dav. gem. ausl. Rechtsvorschrift.) 
..Sonstige Aufwendungen 
Betriebsaufwend. des gewdhnl. GeschSfts 
.Beteiligungsergebnis 
..Ertrage aus Beteiligungen 
...(dav. aus K6-Steuer-Anrechnung) 
...(davon aus verbundenen Untemehmen) 
...(dav. aus assoziierten Untemehmen) 
..Ertrage aus Gewinnabfiihrungsvertragen 
...(dav. Abfuhrung f. ubem. Steuem) 
...(davon aus verbundenen Untemehmen) 
...(dav. aus assoziierten Untemehmen) 
..Aufwendungen aus Verlustubemahme 
...(davon fur verbundene Untemehmen) 
...(davon fur assoziierte Untemehmen) 
.Zinsergebnis
..Zinsen und ahnliche Ertrage 
...(davon aus verbundenen Untemehmen) 
...(dav. aus assoziierten Untemehmen) 
..Ertrage aus Finanzanlagen 
...(davon aus verbundenen Untemehmen) 
...(dav. aus assoziierten Untemehmen) 
..Zinsen und ahnliche Aufwendungen 
...(davon an verbundene Untemehmen) 
...(davon an assoziierte Untemehmen) 
.Obriges Finanzergebnis 
..Abschreib. auf FA / Wertpap. des UV 
...(dav. als auBerordentl. bezeichnet)
...(dav. Abschreibungen auf FA)
...(davon Abschreibungen auf Wertpap.) 
..Sonstige Finanzertrage 
..Sonstige Finanzaufwendungen 
Finanzergebnis d. gewohnlichen Geschafts 
Ergebnis der gewohnl. Geschaftstatigkeit 
.AuBerordentliche Ertrage 
.AuBerordentl iche Aufwendungen 
AuBerordentliches Ergebnis 
.EE - Steuem / Steuererstaltungen 
..(davon Korperschaftsteuem)
..(davon Gewerbeertragsteuem)
.Sonstige Steuem / Steuererstattungen 
..(davon Vermogensteuem)
..(davon Gewerbekapitalsteuem)
. Steuerverrechnungen 
Ausgewies. Steuem / Steuererstattungen 
.Ausschuttungen / Ausgleichszahlungen 
..davon sonstige Veranderungen 
.Gewinnabfuhrung aufgrund von Vertragen 
.Ertrage aus Verlustubemahmen 
Ergebnisverrechnungen vor Jahresergebnis 
JahresiiberschuB / -fehlbetrag 
.Ergebnis vortrag aus Voijahr 
.Riicklagenveranderung 
..Veranderung der Gewinnrucklagen 
...Einstellung in Gewinnrucklagen 
...Auflosung von Gewinnrucklagen 
..Veranderung der Kapitalrucklagen
207
APPENDIX F continued:
578 ...additions to capital reserves 578 ...Einstellung in Kapitalriicklagen
579 ...withdrawals from capital reserves 579 ...Auflosung von Kapitalriicklagen
580 .profit and loss to minority interests 580 .Anteile Dritter
581 ..thereof shares in profit 581 ..(davon Gewinnanteile)
582 ..thereof shares in losses 582 ..(davon Verlustanteile)
583 .other changes 583 .Sonstige Veranderungen
584 changes before profit/loss 584 Veranderungen vor Bilanzgewinnausweis
585 profit/loss 585 Bilanzgewinn / -verlust
586 .dividends 586 .Dividende / Ausschuttungen
587 .changes to reserves pursuant to shareholder's resolution 587 .Rucklagenveranderungen nach HV-BeschluB
588 ..changes to revenue reserves 588 ..Veranderung der Gewinnrucklagen
589 ...additions to revenue reserves 589 ...Einstellung in Gewinnrucklagen
590 ...withdrawals from revenue reserves 590 ...Auflosung von Gewinnrucklagen
591 ..changes to capital reserves 591 ..Veranderung der Kapitalriicklagen
592 ...additions to capital reserves 592 ...Einstellung in Kapitalriicklagen
593 ...withdrawals from capital reserves 593 ...Aufl8sung von Kapitalriicklagen
594 .other changes 594 .Sonstige Veranderungen
595 .profit/loss carried forward to the following year 595 .Ergebnisvortrag in das neue Jahr
596 .divi. from parent co (only shown in consolid. statement) 596 .Dividende der Mutterges. bei Konzem
597 sales revenue/turnover 597 Umsatzerlose
598 income from participating interest 598 Ertrage aus Beteiligungen
599 staff expenses 599 Personalaufwand
600 .wages and salaries 600 .Lohne und Gehaiter
601 .social security contributions & exp for pensions 601 . Soz. Abg./Altersversorg./Unterstiitzung
602 ..thereof compulsory social security contributions 602 ..(davon Gesetzlicher Sozialaufwand)
603 ..thereof expenses for pensions 603 ..(davon Altersversorgung)
604 ..thereof expenses fot other employee benefits 604 ..(davon Unterstutzung)
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Table 63: Calculation of DCA and IS coefficients
To illustrate the calculation of DCA and IS, we list each component of formula (1), (2) and (3) (for the 
calculation of the DCA coefficient) and formula (4) (for the calculation of the IS coefficient). The Row is 
associated with the position of the relevant item in the specimen balance sheet and profit and loss 
statement in Appendix F, Table 62.______ __________________________________________________
Panel A: Calculation o f DCA
Item Row Formula
Current Accruals (CA) = Aaccounts receivable + Ainventory + Aother current assets - 
[Aaccounts payable^ Atax payable + Aother current liabilities]
(2)
Accounts receivable + Other current assets 238 (2)
Inventory 225 (2)
Accounts Payable 407+412+417+422+427 (2)
Tax payable 449 (2)
Other current liabilities 433+439+445+455+460 (2)
Trade receivables 246 (3)
Sales 482 (3)
Total assets 291 (3)
Panel B: Calculation o f  IS
Item Row Formula
Operating Income (OI) = gross result -  operating expenses (4)
Gross result 500 (4)
Operating expenses 523 (4)
Operating Cash Flow = Operating Income (OI) + Depreciation (4)
- Current Accruals (CA)
Depreciation 15 (4)
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